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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Billy Goehring 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Philosophy 
 
June 2019 
 
Title: Repurposing Deleuze and Design 
 
 
Gilles Deleuze’s interdisciplinary reception privileges the term, “assemblage,” but 
this translation runs the risk of appearing as jargon, whereas the original agencement would 
appear to a French audience as a more ordinary term. In the absence of a better alternative 
translation, I propose that we translate the problems motivating Deleuze’s word choice 
rather than the word, agencement, itself. I consult a wide range of the figures influential for 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari who are relevant for the many contexts in which agencement 
appears in their work. This leads me to propose design as suitable terrain for redescribing 
Deleuze’s philosophy. 
At the other end of the project, I note that design has its own share of problems. 
Theoretical approaches to design are often limited to particular kinds of design, and there 
are few efforts to reconcile design theories and definitions rooted in different designs, e.g. 
cinematography and engineering. Most accounts, though, define design primarily or 
exclusively in terms of its purpose or intended function. This poses problems for 
understanding changes in function and design’s unintended effects. Deleuze scholarship 
and design both have problems, and therefore I use each as an intervention into the other: 
design affords us the opportunity to redescribe Deleuze’s philosophy, while the problems at 
stake in Deleuze’s philosophy allows us to redescribe design and treat design in a more 
 v 
 
comprehensive manner.  
In the end, I propose that we understand agencement as the interaction between 
coinciding, heterogeneous considerations or perspectives of the same substance; a living 
room is a series of activities, a spatial configuration of things, a collection of ideas, an 
arena of feelings and affects, and so on. We can tell a similar story with design, which 
explains why intentional design decisions can have unintended consequences.  I arrange 
furniture while considering quantity, but unbeknownst to me, the change in quantity 
results in a change in quality. Both agencement and design are ways of describing how 
considerations which are different in kind can nevertheless coincide and affect one 
another. 
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CHAPTER I 
TRANSLATING AGENCEMENT 
I think assemblage is a convenient word precisely because it’s so vague. If we 
think about assemblage in a Deleuzian context, however, it has a more specific 
meaning which often didn’t seem to be closely related to the ways I heard it 
being used at the conference. My criticism of “assemblage” in this context is 
that it is in danger of losing any specificity at all and becoming a convenient 
catch-word to talk about whatever you want to talk about. 
N. Katherine Hayles1 
 
 
This is a philosophical treatment of design. Or it will be; until then, we begin with 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s concept of agencement. Several readers have 
expressed concern that “assemblage” may be an inconvenient translation of the term. 
This inconvenience is potentially significant inasmuch as agencement is reportedly 
central to Deleuze’s philosophy and certainly central to his wide, interdisciplinary 
reception. The lack of better alternatives to “assemblage” might justify its preference, but 
I wager that the situation highlights something about the work of translating philosophy. 
Our hand is forced in favor of “assemblage” only if we see it our task to translate the 
language of the author, the words he or she has committed to paper. In translating or 
interpreting Deleuze, or any philosopher, I argue that the words matter less than the 
problems which drive them and motivate their choice, and that translating these problems 
faithfully matters more than the accurate rendering of agencement itself, as a word. 
                                                          
1 N. Katherine Hayles with Stephen B. Crofts Wiley, “Media, materiality, and the human: a conversation 
with N. Katherine Hayles,” in Communication Matters: Materialist Approaches to Media, Mobility and 
Networks, eds. Jeremy Packer and Stephen B. Crofts Wiley (New York: Routledge, 2012), 18-19.  
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In the chapter that follows, I will first describe the situation of agencement’s 
translation. This will include a survey of the decisions made by different translators of 
Deleuze’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s work. As we will see, the problem also warrants 
that we consult general dictionary definitions and etymological accounts to better assess 
the word’s specificity and the natural connotations it may have for a francophone 
audience. But because we are more interested in problems and motivation than we are in 
the word itself, this overview only serves to frame our engagement with Deleuze and 
Guattari. We must establish how agencement might appear to readers of French, how it is 
used in different contexts, and what sets it apart from other similar French words. Then 
we will have a better sense of what to look for as we consult Deleuze and Guattari’s work 
to see how agencement appears, and the sort of general problems it implies or addresses. 
Ultimately, the concept offers them at least four advantages or serves at least four 
purposes: it is flexible enough to handle different “semiotics” at different scales, it 
demands that the terms of analysis be considered as interdependent and continuous rather 
than discrete, it combines heterogeneous descriptions without dissolving their difference, 
and it is amenable both to thinking about how things hold together and how they fall 
apart. The hesitation some authors have felt over “assemblage,” along with these general 
problems motivating agencement, will suggest a way forward—circumventing these 
translation difficulties and offering other advantages to boot: design will be our escape 
route.  
A READER CAUGHT UNAWARES 
Suppose I had never read Deleuze, and had no knowledge of the French language. 
Perhaps I study literature, geography, architecture, anthropology, sociology, or 
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philosophy. My first contact with Deleuze could take many forms, but the literature I 
consult would almost certainly mention, if not privilege, the term, “assemblage.” Even if 
my guide does not go as far as Manuel DeLanda and claim assemblage as the cornerstone 
of Deleuze’s philosophy, I would assume that getting a better handle on the concept 
would pay off in a better understanding of Deleuze.2  
What does the scholarship tell me? I am told that an assemblage “could be defined 
as a loose affiliation of individual components that have come together to form a single 
body—but a body that is never stable or unified.”3 That although this collection of things 
shares a single context, it “resists stratification.”4 We also discover that an assemblage is 
not a “collection of individual terms,” since it is “neither a unity nor a totality but a 
multiplicity,” and a multiplicity, in principle, “actively resists unification.”5 An 
assemblage is defined as that which “entails a consistency of elements that is irreducible 
to a traditional dualism,” as a “multiplicity that is drawn into a plane of consistency that 
maintains itself without being reduced to either side of a dualistic relation.”6 Other 
commentaries tell us that it is a machine, “a kind of Rube Goldberg machine, one made 
                                                          
2 Manuel DeLanda, Assemblage Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016). 
3 Neil Leach, “Machinic Processes,” in [En]Coding Architecture, ed. Liss C. Werner (Pittsburgh: Carnegie 
Mellon University, 2013), 34. 
4 Ibidem. 
5 Robert Cooper, “Assemblage Notes,” in Organized Worlds: Explorations in Technology and Organization 
with Robert Cooper, ed. Robert C. H. Chia (London: Routledge, 1998), 103. 
6 Jeffrey Bell, “Assemblage + Architecture,” in The Deleuze Dictionary: Revised Edition, ed. Adrian Parr 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 19. 
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up of incongruous parts in ad hoc, shifting relations of widely varying degrees of 
efficiency and probability.”7 
Where does that leave me, as a new reader? I have learned that an assemblage is a 
loose body that resists stratification and dualism, that is never unified, that is neither 
collection, nor unity, nor totality, but a multiplicity, and that relates incongruous parts 
like a Rube Goldberg machine ad hoc. We will eventually discover the merit of these 
descriptions, but for the moment it is difficult for me to look out “into the world” and 
understand what “assemblage is meant to describe. In general, there are three strategies 
for making sense of an unfamiliar or opaque word in a philosopher’s vocabulary. The 
word might be a non-technical term used in new or technical ways, a concept on loan 
from another philosopher, past or present, and whose historical pedigree contextualizes 
the force or direction of the author’s work, or else it might be a neologism, coined to 
meet unique conceptual demands. 
In the first case, the new technical use of a word often plays on its non-technical 
usage, its history, or its etymology, and consulting any of these can shed light on its 
proposed meaning. A reader comes closer to the meaning of différance, in the work of 
Jacques Derrida—technically neologism—if she knows that -ence and -ance are 
pronounced the same, and that -ance is a French suffix that indicates an ongoing 
condition or process. In the second case, that of borrowed terms, the reader, if she is 
aware of the term’s history, can consult its place and function in the hands of its previous 
owners. If Vilém Flusser refers to something as noumenal, or as a thing-in-itself, his 
                                                          
7 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze’s Way: Essays in Transverse Ethics and Aesthetics (New York: Routledge, 2007), 
145. 
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meaning will remain impenetrable for a reader without cursory knowledge of the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In all cases, finally, although especially in the case of 
neologism, the reader relies on context and the author’s own definition to make sense of 
an unfamiliar word. 
With any luck, someone in the literature will alert us to the fact that “assemblage” 
is the translation for agencement, and our difficulty in reading Deleuze for the first time 
becomes a symptom of this fraught translation. If we ask where assemblage and 
agencement fall in the above categories—repurposed words, borrowed terms, 
neologisms—they are classified similarly. Neither word is a neologism. Nor are either of 
them featured in the history of philosophy or in the work of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
predecessors. Both are “regular words,” i.e. non-philosophical terms that have been put to 
philosophical purposes.  
The problem is that the relevant strategy, consulting standard definitions, common 
uses, and etymology, yields different results for assemblage, on the one hand, and 
agencement, on the other. As a new reader, I would have a different experience and 
understanding of Deleuze, in accordance with whether I encounter this word in English or 
in French. The words are defined differently, are used differently, and have different 
etymologies and histories. Perhaps of more consequence is the fact that the Francophone 
reader is bound to be more acquainted with agencement, outside of reading Deleuze, than 
the Anglophone reader is with assemblage.8 Semantic discrepancy aside, then, the French 
                                                          
8 While this claim is merely the product of my intuition, I might refer the reader to two authoritative word 
databases which track word frequency in French and English, respectively. The Lexique project, now 
Lexique 3, draws on a large corpus of books, web page results, and subtitle information to rank 135 000 
individual French words. Agencement appears 1.89 times in every million French words, while different 
forms of the verb agencer appear 2.91 times (http://www.lexique.org). Brigham Young University’s massive 
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text is equipped to appeal to the reader’s intuition, to bank on their prior knowledge and 
use of agencement. For the reader of English caught unawares, however, one is for all 
intents and purposes forced to treat assemblage as a neologism, or to seek out its uses in 
English which are perhaps no less unfamiliar— “assemblage” as an artistic form, or a dig 
site’s “assemblage” of fossils or artifacts.   
The translation assumes an air of technical sophistication, whereas agencement, 
even if it is not exactly common, is more accessible to the average reader. Without 
intervention, in the form of a new translation or careful exposition, “assemblage,” or 
agencement, may be doomed to remain jargon, misleading Deleuze’s interpreters or else 
barring access to his would-be readers.  
THE TRANSLATION OF AGENCEMENT 
While a philosopher’s work is still in the process of being translated, 
disagreement over turns of phrase and conceptual fidelity is inevitable. When a word in 
the source language lacks an obvious counterpart in the target language, translators and 
subsequent commentators are charged with the double task of both rendering the term’s 
conceptual significance for the philosopher in question and signaling to readers in the 
target language, as accurately as possible, the associations readers of the source language 
would make with the term. 
Early English translations of Deleuze and Guattari’s work saw little controversy 
with the term agencement, at least at a conceptual level. The term appears sporadically in 
                                                          
corpus of 14 billion words includes 15,596 instances of “assemblage,” which means it appears only 1.114 
times per million English words (https://corpus.byu.edu/iweb/). Naturally this only applies to written French and 
English and does not demonstrate the average vocabulary of regular speakers.  
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Anti-Oedipus; in their translation, Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane have it 
as “arrangement” and ostensibly did not see a need for a translator’s note on the matter, 
as you will not find any.9  Nearly a decade prior, Mark Seem rendered the term as “set-
up” when translating his interview with Guattari—the “collective set-ups of analysis or of 
enunciation relative to desire and its production.”10 The brief respite from arguing over 
translation may reflect the fact that, in its early appearances in Anti-Oedipus, agencement 
did not yet figure as an independent technical term but was a turn of phrase used to 
describe other, then more central, terms in Deleuze and Guattari’s vocabulary. In a few 
places they describe desire not only in terms of machines, but with reference to 
“machines and agencements of machines.”11 Or the word might appear in a series of 
phrases meant to characterize the then larger concept of “desiring machines”: “The 
schizoanalytic argument is simple: desire is a machine, a synthesis of machines, a 
machinic agencement—desiring-machines.”12   
Translations varied after the appearance of Kafka: pour une littérature mineure in 
French and before the full English translation of the same in 1986. A partial translation of 
the work by Robert Brinkley shows “arrangement,” a common decision and at one time 
                                                          
9 It should be said, however, that according to either Dosse or his translator, Deborah Glassman 
(unfortunately the text does not specify, nor does it cite its source), “arrangement” was approved as a 
translation by Deleuze himself. François Dosse, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, 
trans. Deborah Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 527n43. 
10 Mark D. Seem and Félix Guattari. “Interview: Félix Guattari,” in Diacritics 4.3 (Autumn 1974), 41. 
11 For example: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and 
Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 324. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
L’Anti-Œdipe (Paris: Minuit, 1972), 388. Henceforth, AO. 
12 AO, 296/352. 
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assemblage’s major competitor.13 Compare this to Marie Maclean’s translation of 
Chapter Four of Kafka, wherein she translates agencement as “organization,” noting that 
the French term “implies an interlocking system or arrangement basic to both organism 
and organization.”14 In his overview of the duo’s turn to literary discourse and related 
developments in schizoanalysis, Charles Stivale describes the concept of “arrangement” 
as the “minimal unity” of both “states of things, of bodies” and of “regimes of statements, 
signs.”15 Stivale refers to the 1977 translation of Deleuze’s Dialogues with Claire Parnet, 
but chose not to follow Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam in their preference for 
“assemblage.”16 A few years later, however, he conceded; his translation of the end of 
Mille Plateaux for the journal SubStance uses “assemblage,” with no mention of 
arrangement or agencement and no translator’s note.17 
                                                          
13 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Robert Brinkley. “What is Minor Literature?” in Mississippi Review 
11.3: Essays Literary Criticism (Winter/Spring, 1983), 13-33. Despite Brinkley’s detailed commentary on 
the translation and philosophical context for Deleuze and Guattari’s work, he does not mention agencement 
nor the reasons for choosing “arrangement” as its translation.  
14 Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and Marie Maclean, “Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature: The Components 
of Expression,” in New Literary History 16.3: On Writing Histories of Literature (Spring 1985), 607n12. 
15 Charles J. Stivale. “Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari: Schizoanalysis & Literary Discourse,” in SubStance 
9.4 (1980), 54.  
16 See Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987). Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues (Paris: Flammarion, 
1977). 
17 Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Charles J. Stivale. “Concrete Rules and Abstract Machines,” in 
SubStance 13.3/4: Gilles Deleuze (1984), 7-19. In fact, we find the struggle between assemblage and 
arrangement on display in this special issue of SubStance. Those who opt for “assemblage” include Paul 
Patton, “Conceptual Politics and the War-Machine in ‘Mille Plateaux,’” 61-80; Stivale again in “The 
Literary Element in ‘Mille Plateaux’: The New Cartography of Deleuze and Guattari,” 20-34, and Stivale 
yet again in his translation of part of Deleuze’s Cinema 1, “Image-Movement and Its Three Varieties: 
Second Commentary about Bergson,” 81-95. The sole proponent of “arrangement” is Alice Jardine, 
“Woman in Limbo: Deleuze and His Br(others),” 46-60. Stivale, in his introduction to the issue, briefly 
offers “arrangement” and “assemblage” as alternatives, but with no further commentary on the matter: 
Charles J. Stivale, “Introduction,” 3.  
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Simultaneously with Kafka and the passage into Deleuze and Guattari’s next 
major joint-publication, agencement took on new life. After the publication of Mille 
Plateaux, Deleuze is candid about the shift in their vocabulary: “When a term is 
introduced and has the least bit success, as has been the case for ‘desiring-machine’ […] 
either one circulates it, which is already rather pernicious […] or one renounces it and 
seeks other terms to upset the order.”18 Out with desiring-machines, in with agencements. 
Not only did a once incidental term in the definition of desiring machines come to replace 
the latter concept entirely, but agencement would feature prominently throughout 
Thousand Plateaus and became strongly associated with a new turn in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s career: the collective agencement of enunciation, the machinic agencement of 
desire, the concrete agencements which express a diagram or abstract machine, the 
agencement between the planes of consistency and organization, agencement as contrary 
to stratification, etc. Even if the reader cannot make sense of these phrases, agencement’s 
sudden frequency in their writings makes it clear that there is indeed something at stake, 
conceptually, in the “battle” over agencement’s translation.  
The architects behind “assemblage” were likely Paul Foss and Paul Patton in their 
1981 translation of Rhizome, what would eventually become the introduction to Mille 
Plateaux.19 In their provided glossary, we are told that assemblage translates agencement, 
but not the reason for this decision. While he was not the first to render it as 
                                                          
18 Gilles Deleuze, “Five Propositions on Psychoanalysis,” in Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953-1974, 
ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 278. Gilles Deleuze, 
“Cinq propositions sur la psychanalyse,” in L’Île déserte: textes et entretiens 1953-1974, ed. David 
Lapoujade (Paris: Minuit, 2002), 387. Where both English and French editions were consulted, both will be 
cited, in that order, e.g., 278/387. 
19 Paul Foss and Paul Patton, “Notes for a Glossary,” in Ideology and Consciousness 8 (Spring 1981), 41-
48. 
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“assemblage,” the tremendous interdisciplinary influence—especially in recent years—of 
Brian Massumi’s translation of A Thousand Plateaus has resulted in consensus among 
Deleuze’s translators: agencement means “assemblage.” The word appears often enough 
in A Thousand Plateaus to warrant consistent verbiage, and, as we will see, there are 
certainly issues with assemblage’s primary alternative, arrangement. However, the 
decision to invariably render agencement as “assemblage” results in a few regrettable 
turns of phrase completely removed from their French equivalents. A prime example is 
“musical assemblage,” which translates agencement musique. Undoubtedly, the phrase 
occurs in the technical context of Deleuze’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, and thus 
obtains new valences and nuances. But whereas any francophone reader would be hardly 
surprised to hear music discussed in terms of its agencement, no anglophone reader 
would recognize “musical assemblage” other than as ostensibly the application of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical concept.20 Would we render agencement de couleur 
(something like “color scheme”) as a “color assemblage”? Would the common phrase, 
“agencement de magasin” (something like “store layout”) become a “store assemblage”?  
Some have expressed concern at this development. Those like Erin Manning and 
Francis Bangou find agencement untranslatable, to the extent that it should be left in the 
original French. Manning argues that Brian Massumi “translates the untranslatable” with 
“assemblage,” that the concept has “too often been read as an object or existent 
                                                          
20 In addition to the long discussions of music and agencement in A Thousand Plateaus, see references to 
“agencements musicaux,” like that in Gilles Deleuze, “Eight Years Later: 1980 Interview,” in Two Regimes 
of Madness, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 
2006), 177. Gilles Deleuze, “Huit ans après: 1980 entretien,” in Deux régimes de fous, ed. David Lapoujade 
(Paris: Minuit, 2003), 163.  
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configuration, rather than in its potentializing directionality.”21 Manning wants to 
preserve the word’s sense of process, agency, movement, and connection. Bangou, on the 
other hand, takes “assemblage” to task for not capturing the “unpredictability and 
consistent reinvention” essential to agencement.22 Manning may be right about its being 
untranslatable, but “potentializing directionality” takes us even further from 
agencement’s immediate impression on the French reader. 
While many use “assemblage” with neither endorsement nor disapproval, a few 
defend the choice explicitly. Some approve it because it sounds like it comes from the 
domain of machines and engineering, appropriate given Deleuze and Guattari’s reference 
to agencements machiniques.23 Jon Roffe defends assemblage because it is a substantive, 
has spatial connotations, and because it communicates a sense of activity.24 For similar 
reasons, translators like Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam follow Patton’s and, 
later, Massumi’s decision: they note that “the French word has both an active and a 
                                                          
21 Erin Manning, The Minor Gesture. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 123. To be clear, despite the 
claim that Massumi translated the term, she admits in a footnote that he had “opted for the already-existent 
translation” for want of better alternatives (246n13). 
22 Francis Bangou, “Reading ICT, Second Language Education and the self: An Agencement,” in 
Cartographies of Becoming in Education, ed. Diana Masny (Rotterdam: Sense, 2013), 146. Bangou offers 
by contrast an assembled piece of furniture—“if the instructions are not followed correctly, then the final 
result would not be what it was meant to be […] an agencement refers to the arrangement of various 
elements that were not necessarily meant to be put together,” (Ibidem). Bangou’s criticism of assemblage 
may be warranted, but as we will see, however, agencement may apply to both scenarios he describes.  
23 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Deleuze and Language (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 186.  
24 Jon Roffe, “The Concept of Assemblage and the Case of Markets,” in Assembling Consumption: 
Researching Actors, Networks and Markets, eds. Robin Canniford and Domen Bajde (New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 45.  Roffe points to agencement’s suffix, -ment, for evidence of its inherent dynamism. 
On the basis of these three criteria, he opposes “assemblage” to words like “organization” and 
“arrangement,” but does not elaborate why they wouldn’t fit the bill. I fail to see why arrangement 
wouldn’t work as well as or perhaps better than assemblage according to Roffe’s own criteria. Arrangement 
is a substantive, has spatial connotations, and has the advantage over assemblage of sharing agencement’s 
suffix.  
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passive sense, ‘a way of assembling or arranging’ as well as the resulting ‘ordering or 
arrangement.’”25 However, they do not explain what makes “assemblage” most qualified 
for the job. John Macgregor Wise briefly notes a discrepancy between the French and 
English, but then, surprisingly, proposes that we “get a sense of the term assemblage by 
seeing how it is used in different contexts”—English contexts.26 Wise discusses fossil 
assemblages, for example, even though these are not referred to in French as 
agencements, but as assemblages. On the other hand, Wise does not share others’ 
reservations over terms like “arrangement” and “organization,” and recruits these related 
words to help bring out the original French meaning of agencement more fully.27 
While assemblage dominates the field, there are a few hold outs. In a frequently 
cited article on the subject, John Phillips notes that, as we’ve seen with Wise’s 
description of fossil assemblages, assemblage is a French word with a “more restricted 
range of uses” than agencement.28 Phillips may not come to the table with an alternative 
in hand, but he stresses that assemblage risks compromising important aspects of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s philosophy. Ian Buchanan criticizes the choice of “assemblage” for 
reasons not the least of which concern DeLanda and assemblage theory. He does not 
mince words in his final assessment: “Instead of a new way to understand the problem, 
                                                          
25 Deleuze, Dialogues, xiii. Only in English edition. 
26 J. Macgregor Wise, “Assemblage,” in Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts, ed. Charles J. Stivale (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 77.  
27 “Assemblages are particular arrangements of elements, organized, which have their own patterns of 
movement and rest” (Ibid., 77). Emphasis mine.  
28 John Phillips, “Agencement/Assemblage,” in Theory, Culture and Society 23.2-3 (2006), 108. 
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[assemblage] simply gives us a currently fashionable way of speaking about it.”29 
Buchanan argues that, “if everything is or must be an assemblage,” the term’s lack of 
specificity compromises its critical traction; agencement loses the “cutting edges” that 
normally justify the use of new concepts.30 But perhaps the problem with assemblage is 
not its universal application. If assemblage has lost its cutting edge, it may be due to 
neglect for agencement’s meaning, and the conceptual problems it addresses.  
For example, Bernd Frohmann has other reasons for deciding against assemblage 
in favor of “arrangement.” He writes,  
Agencement suggests design, a sense missing from the French assemblage, 
which refers to assembly lines, building construction, and various setups 
of material things […] A Deleuzian agencement has design but no 
designer, because the design is immanent and emergent.31 
 
It may appear odd to emphasize design, given that Deleuze’s few remarks on the 
subject are anything but laudatory.32 But as we will see below, design is indeed a 
                                                          
29 Ian Buchanan, “Assemblage Theory and Its Discontents,” in Deleuze Studies 9.3 (2015), 391. 
30 Ibid., 383. 
31 Bernd Frohmann, “The documentality of Mme Briet’s antelope,” in Communication Matters: Materialist 
Approaches to Media, Mobility and Networks, ed. Jeremy Packer and Stephen B. Crofts Wiley (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 180n3. 
32 “Finally the most shameful moment came when computer science, marketing, design [le design], and 
advertising, all the disciplines of communication, seized hold of the word concept itself and said: ‘This is 
our concern, we are the creative ones, we are the ideas men! We are the friends of the concept, we put it in 
our computers!’” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 10. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (Paris: Minuit, 1991), 15. Henceforth WP. 
It’s worth noting that the French use of the English, design, refers to the industry of design—hence it 
belongs to the “disciplines of communication” alongside marketing and advertising. The English is broader 
and more ambiguous than the French, which distinguishes between design, dessein, and dessin. Tomlinson 
and Burchell do not flag such a distinction in their translation of Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? Deleuze and 
Guattari, in this passage, mean the sort of design in cahoots with advertising in marketing; later, when they 
specify that they do not understand “plan” as a design (Ibid., 41/44) they write dessein, a program or 
intended plan-of-action.  
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common thread to agencement’s French definition and to nearly all of its uses and 
contexts. Notably, while language of design is salient in agencement, it is far less 
pronounced not only in “assemblage” but also in many similar terms which would have 
been available to Deleuze and Guattari. Dispositif was already on the table, and certainly 
on Deleuze’s radar, given that he discusses Foucault’s use of the term on several 
occasions. I claim that, among other things, one of its distinguishing features is that 
neither dispositif, nor assemblage, nor structure, nor arrangement are as closely or as 
significantly associated with design as agencement.  
This fact is perhaps less instructive, for the moment, since we have yet to see 
what it is about design that lends itself so well to the different senses of agencement, nor 
have we seen why it warrants suspicion over “assemblage.” Why is design worth 
discussing in this context at all, given Deleuze’s attitude toward it? We will save these 
questions for later, but for now it is worth noting that assemblage fails to capture a good 
part of agencement’s definition. To get a firmer grip on what assemblage misses, we will 
need to turn to the wider and non-technical life of agencement in French, as well as its 
philosophical employment, such that we might reconstruct what may have motivated 
Deleuze and Guattari’s word choice. This will entail a thorough inquiry into the term’s 
definition and use, a reflection on its etymology, and a search for context clues in the 
work of Deleuze, Guattari, and Deleuze and Guattari.  
THE MEANING OF AGENCEMENT IN GENERAL 
One might expect to encounter the word, agencement, in the fields of architecture, 
painting, music and composition, geology, biology, interior decorating—in addition to its 
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less technical uses.33 A bilingual metallurgist might translate agencement as “fitting,” e.g. 
aluminum fitting. In economics and accounting, and along with implantation, it might 
refer to the arrangement of buildings, installations, and machines involved in a business, 
especially in production. In marketing and retail, however, we might understand it as 
“store layout” or “retail design,” since one account describes it as “the way a store has 
been laid out or set up (furniture, displays, gondolas, shelves, boxes, offices, inventory) 
for the purposes of sales and advertising.”34 
Apart from these technical senses of the term, dictionaries generally define 
agencement as the “act of organizing the diverse elements of an ensemble, of adapting 
them, of combining them to be convenient or pleasant”; in the arts, as the “act of 
arranging, harmoniously ordering the parts of an artistic or literary work”; in a more 
pejorative sense, agencer can also mean “to combine in a shrewd way and often to 
dishonest ends.”35 Even before consulting the philosophical backdrop of Guattari and 
Deleuze’s respective careers and the definitions they offer for the term, agencement poses 
tremendous difficulty for any careful English translator. L’agencement d’une boutique, 
d’un appartement. L’agencement des couleurs d’un tableau. Une escroquerie bien 
agencée. A boutique’s or an apartment’s layout. The placement or arrangement of colors 
                                                          
33 ATILF, Le Trésor de la langue française informatisée (le TLFi) (http://atilf.atilf.fr/tlf.htm) Accessed on 
3/6/2017. 
34 The metallurgical, economic, and retail definitions come from Le grand dictionnaire terminologique 
(www.granddictionnaire.com) Accessed on 8/10/2017. Translation mine. 
35 Louis Guilbert, René Lagane and Georges Niobey, Grand Larousse de la langue française, vol 1 (Paris: 
Larousse, 1971). The following are the original French passages, respectively: “Action d’organiser les 
divers éléments d’un ensemble, de les adapter, de les combiner en vue de la commodité ou de l’agrément”; 
“Action de disposer, d’ordonner harmonieusement les parties d’un œuvre artistique ou littéraire”; 
“Combiner de façon astucieuse et souvent à des fins malhonnêtes.” Translation is mine. 
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in a painting. A well-planned scam. The examples could go on—we would be hard-
pressed to find an English word equal to the task of translating agencement. This is in 
part due to the variety of its domains and uses in French, in part due to its unique 
etymological history. The difficulties will explode, of course, when we turn to the word’s 
role in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. 
Beyond dictionary entries, we turn to that “specifically philosophical athleticism” 
of etymology, since there “must be a strange necessity for [a philosopher’s] words and 
their choice, like an element of style.”36 Etymological reflection is also worthwhile as 
Deleuze scholars are often mistaken about agencement’s. As the story goes, agencement 
is related to agencé, or agency. We will see that, indeed, “collective agencement of 
enunciation” was originally termed a “collective agent,” and thus some association 
between terms is warranted. For the moment, though, it is worth mentioning that these 
two French words have different roots and distinct histories.37  
The connection to agency may be fruitful—and indeed, many interpretations or 
applications of assemblage make hay on this confusion. However, the word’s actual 
etymology will shed light on how agencement has come to mean what it does, bringing 
us closer to approximating the valences it carries for French readers and offering us new 
ways to speculate on its role in Deleuze’s thought. Besides, even if Deleuze and Guattari 
                                                          
36 Deleuze and Guattari, WP, 8/13. 
37 Guattari’s phrase, “collective agent of enunciation,” from La Révolution Moléculaire to Les Écrits Anti-
Oedipe, might trouble agency’s privilege in the reception of agencement. After all, if, as the argument 
might go, the word agencement signals the distribution of agency such that there is no longer one agent or 
subject, it remains to be seen why Guattari wrote for so long and so consistently on the collective agent of 
enunciation. Very occasionally he would treat agent and agencement interchangeably. An explanation for 
his use of “agent” and for its interchangeability with agencement comes from the realm of scientific logic. 
See our discussion of Marcel Boll, below.   
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chose the term exclusively or primarily for its connection to agency, this play on words 
would lose its critical traction were we to lose sight of its standing meaning as a regular 
piece of French vocabulary. If some scholars are to be believed, the word is Deleuze and 
Guattari’s invention, and might be better rendered as “agencing.”38 But nothing prevented 
the authors from coining a new word—let us presume that their word choice is motivated.   
Agence, agency, comes from the Latin for “to act”: ago, agire. “Acting”/agens  
agence. One French dictionary notes that the verb, agencer, was synonymous to orner or 
“decorate, adorn” from its appearance in the 12th century until the 17th century, after 
which it took on a more robust sense of “arranging” or putting things in order.39  Whereas 
agence comes from the Latin for “to act, acting,” agencer’s Latin components include 
prefix ad, “to, toward,” and a contraction of genitus: adgentiare.40 Genitus/genus has a 
variegated afterlife in the French language, lending itself to words related to being 
(genre, générer, engendrer), kindness or niceness (gentil), and people (gens, gent). The 
etymology of agencement comes to life in the word’s forerunners in Middle French. 
Agentir/agensir/ajentir meant to make something pleasant, nice, to decorate or embellish. 
As an adjective, something or someone agensi was well-dressed, arranged, pleasing, 
agreeable, noble, valiant—had a well-groomed or well-polished look about it. Something 
agencif was proper, suitable. In describing the layout and décor of a home’s interior, one 
might have referred to its agencissement.41 
                                                          
38 Hayles, 25.  
39 Albert Dauzat, Jean Dubois, and Henri Mitterand, Nouveau dictionnaire étymologique et historique. 
(Paris: Larousse, 1964). Under “agencer.” 
40 Ibidem. 
41 Frédéric Godefroy, Dictionnaire de l’ancienne langue française, vol 1 (Paris: F. Vieweg, 1881), 159-60.  
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While the word has since taken on a more commercial character, referring to store 
branding and the arrangement of facilities, the etymology and early forms of agencement 
still square with what we’ve seen of its modern usage. Ad-genitus; ad-gendré, ad-gentil. 
Agencement appears to carry a double sense of creation, as both material and expressive; 
more so than similar terms, such as arrangement. In other words, an agencement marks 
an effect, intentional or unintentional, material or expressive; as I agence the items in my 
living room, I change the impression it makes on visitors, how certain items will be used 
or interpreted, the flow of traffic through the house, my future cleaning regimen, etc. In 
English, the word would lie somewhere between adjust (ad-just: altering something so 
that it approaches a standard) and engender (en-gender: causing something to come into 
being); like the former, agencer means to arrange things such that they are nice, suitable, 
appropriate. But like the latter, one often creates something in their agencement or makes 
it possible—production, sales, a painting, a melody, or an effective scam.42 
ACCORDING TO DELEUZE AND GUATTARI 
Putting our dictionaries aside, what does agencement mean for Deleuze and 
Guattari? In what context does the word appear and what conceptual role did it perform 
in their individually and jointly written work? In what follows we will address these 
questions in three ways. First, we will survey agencement’s “competition,” i.e. the terms 
and concepts for which Deleuze and Guattari claim agencement is a better alternative, 
and describe its relevant advantages in each case. We will then move from such a 
                                                          
42 I am not interested in coining new terms, as it would only add to the problem of jargon in Deleuze 
scholarship, but one could perhaps imagine the English equivalent of agencer as “adgender.” 
 19 
 
negative definition to a positive account, how they define and use agencement at various 
points in their career(s). Lastly, in synthesizing the insights gained from both negative 
and positive definitions, we will see why design is well-suited for our project.  
SUBSTITUTIONS: WHAT AGENCEMENT IS NOT 
So long as we assume that philosophical terminology is deliberate, and that it is 
motivated by problems and the conceptual, historical context for which it is appropriate, 
it is a good idea to consult failed contenders for the role. A clearer view of what 
agencement is not, the terms it was intended to replace or displace and the advantages 
Deleuze and Guattari believed it held over them, will offer us surer footing when 
examining how it operates in their philosophy. Whatever an agencement is, we know that 
it is not a set [ensemble], desiring-machine, behavior [comportement], complex, or 
subject. 
Our first clue, often overlooked, comes from an interview with Guattari, where he 
claims that he and Deleuze had repurposed agencement, which “originally belonged to 
the domain of scientific logic.”43 Guattari does not cite his sources, and one is hard-
pressed to find a French logic textbook from the early to mid-20th century which includes 
the concept in any meaningful way—with the notable exception of those written by 
Marcel Boll, a frequent author on scientific logic. According to Boll, scientific logic is 
concerned with two basic features: facts and statements. A fact is an actual relation 
                                                          
43 Félix Guattari, “1980 – Petites et grandes machines à inventer la vie: Entretien avec Robert Maggori,” in 
Les Années d’hiver 1980-1985 (Paris: Bernard Barrault, 1986), 155. 
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between entities, e.g., objects, components, and wholes. Statements are expressions of 
facts, exemplified in “propositions preceded by the locution, ‘the fact that.’”44  
Scientific logic distinguishes between two primary logical operators or ways in 
which sets [ensembles] can join together. A liaison converts one or more sets into a new 
set, e.g. by addition or subtraction, but there is nothing necessary in the relation between 
these sets. The result of a such a liaison is a set of sets, or a whole made up of wholes 
[ensemble d’ensembles]. On the other hand, sets may enter into interdependent relations 
with other sets; such relations render them into facts.45 The operator for such a relation is 
not a liaison, but an agent, and it distinguishes an agencement d’ensembles rather than a 
mere set of sets. Boll offers the following example to illustrate the distinction. 20 + 27 is 
not yet a fact, since although we can add 20 to 27, nothing commits us to doing so; this is 
only the liaison between two wholes. 20 + 27 = 21 + 26, however, is a fact, or an 
agencement. The equals sign, as the agent of the agencement, renders the pair of liaisons 
interdependent: each commits us to the other.46 
In a short introduction to an essay by Pierre Bénichou in Les Temps Modernes, 
titled “Sainte Jackie. Comédienne et Bourreau,” Deleuze relates his and Guattari’s notion 
of desiring-machines to Bénichou’s reflection on masochism.47 Deleuze replaces the 
paradigmatic psychoanalytic question, “What does it mean?” with one rooted in the 
                                                          
44 Marcel Boll. Manuel de logique scientifique: remplaçant et complétant les Éléments de logique 
scientifique, 1942. (Paris: Dunod, 1948), 9-12. 
45 Ibid., 58. 
46 Ibid., 64-65. 
47 Gilles Deleuze, “Your Special ‘Desiring Machines’: What Are They?” in DI, 242-244./337-339.  
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analysis put forward in Anti-Oedipus: “How does it work? How does it function?” If 
desire is here presented as a matter of production and a function of machination, Deleuze 
specifies that it consists in an agencement of little desiring-machines, in a particular 
relationship with larger social and technical machines.48 Thus, not only is desire the 
function or product of such machines, but machines of different scales in different 
domains are agencées together, such that their agencement forms the backbone of 
analysis or diagnosis: What are your machines, and how are they arranged? Indeed, 
Deleuze characterizes the fundamental task of anti-psychoanalytic analysis as the 
discovery of the “collective agencements of enunciation, the collective bonds, the peoples 
within us who make us speak, and on whose basis we produce statements.”49 Where the 
psychoanalyst looks to interpret the meaning of the masochist’s account, the anti-
psychoanalyst asks what agencements of machines or what collective agencements are in 
play. 
Agencement has always been of central concern to the definition of machines in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work, as evidenced by what would become an appendix for Anti-
Oedipus.50 A 1973 text titled “Bilan-programme pour machines désirantes.” This essay, 
meant to remediate the misunderstandings of their recent book, includes a few examples 
of machines that will later be rewritten as examples of agencement.51 Throughout, the 
                                                          
48 Ibid., 244/338. 
49 Deleuze, “Five propositions,” 275-276/383-384.  
50 This appendix does not appear in the English version of the book. 
51 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1987). Originally published as Mille Plateaux (Paris: Minuit, 1980). Henceforth ATP. 
The ensemble [later: agencement] homme-cheval-arc itself appears in ATP 404/503, but similar 
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question of machine is one of communication and recurrence; something, a quality or a 
characteristic, is communicated or recurs in the different levels of a machine, or between 
machines in their agencement. Deleuze and Guattari write that “the man-horse-bow 
ensemble forms a nomadic war machine in the conditions of the steppe,” in the same way 
that a labor machine forms under the bureaucratic conditions of an empire.52 The point is 
that the Hun does not merely project or extend himself via horse and bow as tools, but 
they, along with the Hun himself, function as parts of a machine that follow each other 
around in their interrelations, that together take on a certain consistency, in the sense we 
will soon discover. The Hun outside the man-horse-bow machine is different from the 
machined Hun. 
By the time of their second joint venture, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, 
agencement had already come to eclipse machine désirante, figuring into their 
interpretation of Kafka, the critical literary method their interpretation inaugurates, as 
well as the general political and metaphysical system such a method implies. Deleuze is 
clear in an interview that agencement was intended to replace desiring machines.53 What 
advantage did agencement have over desiring-machine? In a discussion following his 
“Cinq propositions sur la psychanalyse,” Deleuze expresses a sentiment which might 
resonate with those frustrated with the current reliance on jargon in the literature:  
When a term is introduced and has the least bit success, as has been the 
case for “desiring-machine” or “schizo-analysis,” either one circulates it, 
                                                          
formulations crop up throughout the chapter devoted to the problem this example represents, entitled 
“1227: Treatise on Nomadology—The War Machine.” See ATP, 351-423/434-527. 
52 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “Bilan-programme pour machines désirantes,” in L’Anti-Œdipe, 464.  
53 Deleuze, “Eight Years,” 177/163.  
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which is already rather pernicious, a sort of co-optation, or one renounces 
it and seeks other terms to upset the order. There are words that Felix and I 
now feel it urgent not to use: ‘schizo-analysis,’ ‘desiring machines’—it’s 
awful, if we use them, we’re caught in the trap. We don’t know very well 
what they mean, we no longer believe in the words; when we use a word, 
we want to say, if this word doesn’t agree with you, find another, there’s 
always a way. Words are totally interchangeable.54 
 
The move away from desiring machines appears to be motivated less by the shortcomings 
of “desiring machines” than by the shortcomings of an audience which over-circulated 
the term.  
There were other concepts in agencement’s cross hairs. Deleuze, as well as 
Deleuze and Guattari, shifts emphasis from ethics to ethology, an emphasis concomitant 
with the substitution of agencement for behavior [comportement]. Deleuze claims that 
this reversal allows us to avoid any nature-culture distinction; ethics and behavior 
concern one’s individual activity, and thus questions of what aspects are “natural” and 
which are “cultural” are seldom far behind.55 Before one can discuss behavior, however, 
Deleuze tells us to consider the particular way things hang together, since an agencement 
is precisely “ce qui fait tenir ensemble des éléments très hétérogènes, un son, une 
couleur, un geste, une position, etc.”56 Ethology, after the spirit in which it was founded 
by Jacob von Uexküll, evaluates a tick’s behavior only in the context of the signs and 
                                                          
54 Deleuze, “Five Propositions,” 278/387. 
55 We will have the occasion in Chapter Three to briefly discuss the work of mathematician, René Thom, 
whose catastrophe theory offers a similar proposal to overcome isolated notions of behavior. In one of the 
more famous varieties of catastrophe, the so-called “crest model,” we find that what appears to be 
discontinuous at the level of an individual’s behavior is ultimately continuous in a broader view of its 
constitutive factors.  
56 Deleuze, “Eight Years,” 179/165. 
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circuits which the tick encounters and in which the tick dwells.57 There is no behavior 
outside of such an agencement.  
Elsewhere, Guattari claims that agencement stands in for the Freudian term, 
“complex.” He argues that his and Deleuze’s alternative has the advantage of being “at 
once a notion poorer in comprehension than complex and richer in extension.”58 Beyond 
a Freudian complex, which Guattari understands to be limited to the unconscious, their 
agencement involves “imaginary representations, linguistic chains, economic, political, 
aesthetic, microsocial semiotics, etc.”59  
That agencement should contrast with psychoanalytic concepts like “complex” 
should come as no surprise, given Guattari’s training and history with Jacques Lacan. A 
hallmark of Lacan’s theoretical outlook is the subject’s split, in language, into the sujet 
d’énonciation and the sujet d’énoncé—I, as a speaker, and “I” as a signifier which is 
spoken. As Lacan puts it, “the right way to answer the question ‘Who is speaking?’” is at 
stake.60 And perhaps the earliest appearance of agencement is in Guattari’s intervention 
on just this aspect of Lacan’s work. The model of subjectivity split between the speaking 
and spoken “I” has the double fault of first, like behavior, emphasizing the individual 
                                                          
57 Jakob von Uexküll, A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, with A Theory of Meaning, trans. 
Joseph D. O’Neil (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
58 Félix Guattari, “1980,” 156. In his glossary, Guattari reaffirms his intention for agencement to displace 
the Freudian concept of complex. “Glossaire de schizo-analyse,” in Les Années d’hiver: 1980-1985 (Paris: 
Bernard Barrault, 1986), 287. 
59 Guattari, “1980,” 155. 
60 Jacques Lacan, “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,” 
in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink, 677/800. Original pagination following Fink. 
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over the context on which it depends and second, like complex, being limited to discourse 
or signification.  
 In a 1966 essay, “Le Groupe et la personne,” Guattari finds the ego and its 
individual identification processes to depend on a “structural agencement of a-subjective 
statements [énoncés].”61 Lacan had asked “Who’s speaking?” in the unconscious, and 
famously claims that the unconscious is structured like a language. Guattari’s 
“desubjectivation” and his motivations behind agencement culminate in his riposte to 
Lacan’s claim. Structured like a language? “Sure! But by whom? By family, by school, 
by the barracks, by the factory, by cinema, and, in special cases, by psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis.”62 Splitting the subject doesn’t go far enough for Guattari; for him, there 
is no subject responsible for any statement—a statement is only possible as part of an 
agencement, comprised “of semiotic constellations of all sorts, of connections of flows of 
all sorts, of relations of forces and constraints of all sorts.”63 
THE POSITIVE DEFINITION OF AGENCEMENT 
Here we will begin with a series of paired terms that together form what they call 
the tetravalence of an agencement: bodies and statements, territorialization and 
                                                          
61 Félix Guattari, Psychanalyse et transversalité (Paris: [Re]découverte, 2003), 169. Not only did 
agencement displace the role of desiring machines in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, it also supplanted 
the emphasis on “groups” in Guattari’s solo work. Individual acts and statements are fundamentally 
mediated by one’s relation to groups and the relations between groups—groups constituted from within 
(groupes-sujets) and from without (groups assujetis). 
62 Félix Guattari, “Le divan du pauvre,” in Communications 23 (1975), 99.  
63 Ibidem. Emphasis in the original. Elsewhere, in the “Programme” for La Révolution Moléculaire, 
Guattari’s position is more to the point. Among the tasks necessary for his molecular revolution: 
“CONCEVOIR DES AGENCEMENTS COLLECTIFS D’ÉNONCIATION QUI DÉPASSENT LA 
COUPURE ENTRE SUJET DE L’ENONCIATION ET SUJET DE L’ÉNONCÉ.” Guattari, “Programme,” 
in La Révolution moléculaire (Paris: Les Prairies Ordinaires, 2012), 363. (Note: Majuscule in the original).  
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deterritorialization. That an agencement brings together such heterogeneous series or 
tendencies is our next concern: despite being incommensurable, heterogeneous elements 
somehow communicate, coordinate, co-function in an agencement. This leads us to a 
final theme of consistency; an agencement-informed analysis asks how things hold 
together or follow each other around, such that a change in dimension amounts to a 
change in nature. 
The “tetravalence” of agencement describes the two axes along which it is 
structured or according to which it forms and develops. The passage is among the most 
cited in the literature: 
On a first, horizontal, axis, an agencement comprises two segments, one of 
content, the other of expression. On the one hand it is a machinic 
agencement of bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies 
reacting to one another; on the other hand it is a collective agencement of 
enunciation, of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations 
attributed to bodies. Then on a vertical axis, the agencement has both 
territorial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and cutting 
edges of deterritorialization, which carry it away.64 
 
We will pick apart this tetravalent model and see the parts of its definition recur 
elsewhere in Deleuze and Guattari’s work. The first thing to note is that rather than a hard 
distinction between different types of agencement,65 they present the same agencement as 
simultaneously composed of bodies, actions, and passions on the one hand and 
statements, incorporeal transformations, on the other. Kafka describes these as the first 
agencement’s “two faces.”66 The simultaneous composition of bodies and statements, 
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University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 81. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Pour une littérature 
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content and expression, marks the aspect most celebrated in the scholarship: 
heterogeneity.  
As quoted above, Guattari reminds us that an agencement draws together flows of 
all kinds, semiotics of all kinds. It is a reminder that heterogeneity must be understood in 
terms of difference in kind, irreducibility or incommensurability. From the perspective of 
chemistry, a mixture is heterogeneous if it resists complete combination or assimilation, 
or if one can distinguish some of its components. In such a view, concrete is often 
heterogeneous because one can discern particles of different size, color, and texture. The 
elements of an agencement are different in kind. It brings together both content and 
expression—an agencement is required to adjust one to the other, despite their being 
mutually irreducible.67 One either considers bodies or statements; these are distinct 
considerations, and yet each presupposes the other and both describe the same 
agencement. Louis Hjelmslev, from whom they borrow this terminology, held that 
content and expression could only be defined in the context of their relative roles in the 
same sign function, and that while they constitute entirely distinct planes or 
considerations, there can be no content without expression and no expression without 
content.68 
                                                          
mineure (Paris: Minuit, 1975), 145. Henceforth Kafka. The account of agencement in Kafka in many ways 
prefigures the tetravalent model in Mille Plateaux. Cf. Kafka, 81-86/145-154. 
67 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 86/109. 
68 Louis Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, trans. Francis J. Whitfield (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press), 45. Original pagination, as provided by Whitfield. 
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Hjelmslev claims that languages arrange their content differently, as well; each 
language “stresses different factors in it in different arrangements, puts the centers of 
gravity in different places and gives them different emphases.”69 The same goes for 
expression: languages express content with different phonemes, syntagmas, paradigms, 
and so on. To take the example of color—blue’s situation in a larger color scheme is a 
consideration of content; the spelling and pronunciation of “blue,” as well as the rules 
according to which this word is formed and the rules which inform its place among other 
words is all a consideration of expression. The color corresponds to the word, despite the 
difference in kind between colors and words. As part of his treatment of Lewis Carroll in 
The Logic of Sense, Deleuze describes a similar situation between things and events, 
bodies and words: “you either eat what is presented to you or you are presented to what 
you eat.”70 This only apparently a dualism, though, as is Hjelmslev’s; the series of edibles 
and legibles may be heterogeneous, but are “two sides of a frontier represented by sense,” 
an “articulation of their difference.”71 There is an agencement between both series or 
plans. This recalls the advantage agencement was purported to have over “behavior,” as 
we saw above. It was a “problem of consistency”: “How do things take obtain 
consistency? Between very different things, there can be an intensive continuity.”72 
Something holds bodies and events, things and words, together. 
                                                          
69 Ibid., 49. 
70 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1990), 23. Gilles Deleuze, Logique du Sens (Paris: Minuit, 1969), 36. Henceforth LS. 
71 Ibid., 24/37. 
72 Deleuze, “Eight Years,” 179/165. 
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What is more, despite the irreducibility of their plans or considerations, one side 
of an agencement is able to affect the other. According to Hjelmslev’s linguistic 
framework, “permutation” is defined as the shift on one plan that results from a shift on 
the other: because expression and content are commutative, changing the order of the 
expressive linguistic chain, “man bites dog,” results in a change in content, even though 
content and expression are different in kind.73 Deleuze and Guattari describe the causal 
relationship between heterogeneous elements which characterizes the concept of 
agencement as transversality. As part of a round table discussion of Marcel Proust, 
Deleuze recalls his and Guattari’s most famous agencement—that of the wasp and 
orchid—to describe the function of Proust’s narrator of communicating non-
communicating elements: 
There is communication, but it is always between non-communicating 
vases. There are openings but they always take place between closed 
boxes. This communication does not occur within any dimension usually 
included in the dimensions of communicating things: it could be called an 
aberrant communication. […] There is communication, but it is always 
between non-communicating vases. […] We know that the orchid presents 
the image of an insect drawn on its flower, thereby ensuring the 
fertilization of the female flower by the male flower: to indicate this type 
of crossing, of convergence between the evolution of the orchid and the 
evolution of the insect, a contemporary biologist has spoken of an 
aparallel evolution, which is exactly what I mean by aberrant 
communication.74 
 
                                                          
73 See Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, 66-67. It should be noted that although Hjelmslev was a linguist and his 
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Transversality or transversal communication explains why Deleuze and Guattari 
so often claim that agencements cannot change in dimension without also thereby 
changing in nature. They have thresholds, lines of flight or escape which, if followed, 
could lead to collapse or transformation—Deleuze and Guattari describe the alcoholic’s 
“last drink,” beyond which the agencement could change radically, a point of no return 
beyond which lies intervention, violence, a trip to the hospital, or death.75 It is so 
important to understanding the concept that they sometimes single it out as what defines 
or characterizes an agencement: “An agencement is precisely this change of dimension in 
a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature to the extent that it increases its 
connections.”76  
On this note, we arrive to the next two faces of agencement, in the language of 
Kafka, or the second axis of the tetravalent definition in Mille Plateaux. On the one hand, 
we can describe an agencement as “segmental” since it comprises “several contiguous 
segments or [divides] into segments that become agencements in turn.”77 In this view it is 
appropriate to talk about its parts and their organization, or the extent to which these parts 
may in turn have parts and internal relations, i.e. may themselves be agencements. But on 
the other hand, an agencement pulls together a space or consistency that remains distinct 
from its organization, a “field of immanence,” so it includes “points of 
deterritorialization”: the possibility of breaking down, or else drifting off to become 
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something else, is from this vantage an inalienable condition.78 On this face, we are not 
concerned with labeled segments and interconnected parts as much as with breaking 
points, thresholds, tendencies—internal difference, the “style” in which an agencement 
behaves, transforms, or perishes.  
So the story goes in Kafka. By Mille Plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate this 
second axis in somewhat different terms. If the first axis of the tetravalent model 
specifies that an agencement is both one of bodies and one of statements, the second 
reminds us that an agencement comprises both reproductive means and a tendency to 
drift. The first allows it to accommodate change by appropriating elements according to 
its organization or segmentation; the second marks the margin at which things can escape 
the agencement, forcing it to adjust or dissolve.  
The tetravalent definition—bodies and statements, reterritorialization and 
deterritorialization—does not tell the whole story. In addition, one ought to consider the 
relationship between agencements and strata, as well as that between agencements and 
abstract machines. We will briefly consider the first relationship with an eye toward both 
geology and linguistics; the second we will review on the basis of Deleuze’s 
understanding of what it means to be “abstract.” 
Guattari asserts that the notion of a “concrete machine,” a forerunner to the 
agencements concrets of Mille Plateaux, signals a “politics of interstratification”; it 
marks the potential for an agencement either to close back up and stratify or else to open 
onto “diagrammatic lines of flight,” opportunities for drift and transformation consistent 
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with the agencement’s form.79 The language of strata and stratification likely comes from 
the work of Louis Hjelmslev, in an essay titled “La stratification du langage.”80 Strata 
play a prominent role in Mille Plateaux, and agencement’s first appearance there depicts 
it as a multiplicity between strata on the one hand, which “make it into a kind of 
organism,” and a body without organs on the other, which undoes this organism.81 In a 
passage which combines Hjelmslev’s terms—strata and interstratification—with 
geological stratigraphy, Deleuze and Guattari present the nature and function of 
agencement in condensed form. They write: 
Challenger quoted a sentence he said he came across in a geology 
textbook. He said we needed to learn it by heart because we would only be 
in a position to understand it later on: “A surface of stratification is a more 
compact plane of consistency lying between two layers.” The layers are 
the strata. They come at least in pairs, one serving as substratum for the 
other. The surface of stratification is a machinic agencement distinct from 
the strata. The agencement is between two layers, between two strata; on 
one side it faces the strata (in this direction, the agencement is an 
interstratum), but the other side faces something else, the body without 
organs or plane of consistency (here, it is a metastratum).82 
 
The language of this passage can be interpreted both in geological terms and in 
the framework of Hjelmslev’s work in linguistics. According to the former, the “surface 
of stratification” refers to what geologists call a “stratification plane” or, more commonly 
in English, a “bedding plane.” Bedding planes are the lines used to distinguish strata, and 
even though they reflect transitions between one round of sedimentation and another 
                                                          
79 Félix Guattari, “Les machines concrètes,” La Révolution moléculaire (Paris: Les Prairies Ordinaires, 
2012), 526.  
80 Hjelmslev, “La stratification du langage,” in Essais Linguistiques (Paris: Minuit, 1971), 44-77. 
81 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 4/10.  
82 Ibid., 40/54. 
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(thus geologists do not refer to bedding planes as strata in their own right), they are 
nevertheless distinct from strata. This is because bedding planes are described according 
to their particular consistency—gradational, wavy, sharp, sutured. These planes, or 
surfaces of stratification, may prove instructive for our understanding of agencement: 
they serve to distinguish and relate strata (interstratum), their individual character is 
impertinent since the stratigrapher only consults them to make sense of a geological 
formation; considered in themselves (metastratum), what matters is the consistency of 
their surface, and the plane extends only as far as does this consistency (a change in 
consistency likely signals a change in plane, a distinct sedimentation event).  
In the case of Louis Hjelmslev’s linguistics, “the stratification of the semiotic 
system” refers to the division of signs, linguistic or not, along two axes into four aspects: 
form of content, substance of content, form of expression, and substance of expression. 
The “first” distinction is between the different plans of expression and content, to which 
the second distinction between form and substance is subordinate.83 Although 
Hjelmslev’s semiotic theory extends beyond linguistic phenomena, language offers the 
most immediate examples. If I want to express something, I have to do so in a certain 
form: the form of letters on a page, or the sounds which make up a spoken word—
“potato.” But what substance is formed in expression? The continuum of vocalizations, 
writing tools, i.e. the kind of substance which lends itself to form expressions: some 
surfaces and materials simply won’t do if we want to express “potato” in braille. The 
relevant content likewise takes a certain form; a history of use and web of connotations 
                                                          
83 Hjelmslev, “Stratification,” 53. 
 34 
 
lead us to understand “potato” in very particular ways, and different languages will place 
the potato differently on a culinary continuum, a vegetative continuum, etc. The 
substance formed as content might be a memory, a reference to something starchy or 
planted, a “thought-mass.” 
Form and substance exist only as relative terms, and un-formed substance often 
appears in Hjelmslev under the guise of “material,” “purport,” or “sens.”84 While 
Hjelmslev defines form as “the total set of marks which, in a given axiomatic, constitute 
definitions,” while anything not included in this form “but which would clearly belong to 
an exhaustive description of the object in question” he names the substance relative to 
form.85 Taken together, we can say that an expression refers to a state of affairs or 
mixture of bodies while expressing a sense, a substance whose independent existence is 
only ideal, since sense “only has existence through being substance for one form or 
another.”86 Hence the union of the plans of content and expression concerns denotation, 
while the selection of a suitable form according to substance or sense is a matter of what 
Hjelmslev calls manifestation.87 
With these distinctions in mind, we can see Deleuze and Guattari’s tetravalent 
model in another light. On the one hand stratification involves the distinction and mutual 
presupposition of content and expression, bodies and marks or sounds. On the other hand, 
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it is a question of form and substance—the latter the residue of the former, and yet the 
determinant for the selection of form, which always “remains” for the benefit of new 
forms.88 Stratification is the complex relationship between denotation and manifestation: 
it involves relations between strata (interstratum) whereby one strata projects onto 
another and acts at a distance, and the intrinsic character and internal relations of any 
given stratum (metastratum). 
Beyond the tetravalent model, there is furthermore the relationship between 
concrete agencements and abstract machines. While conceptually distinct from 
agencements, an abstract machine only exists and operates “within” concrete 
agencements.89 These machines are something like the an agencement’s unique profile or 
consistency, according to which the latter can take form or drift away, the program for 
how content and expression correspond, as well as the differential logic of both the 
agencement’s territory and its undoing. Thus, we might find the “same” abstract machine 
at work in the prison, in the school, in the factory.90 It applies to the agencement as a 
whole, as its “diagram.” So, with language, for example, “[i]f external pragmatics of 
nonlinguistic factors must be taken into consideration, it is because linguistics itself is 
inseparable from an internal pragmatics involving its own factors.”91  
The relationship between an enveloped abstract machine and the agencements that 
perform it is important for the kind of analysis proposed in Mille Plateaux. The 
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91 Ibid., 91/115. 
 36 
 
relationship between consistency and organization, or between an abstract machine and a 
concrete agencement, poses the methodological question: “Given a machinic 
agencement, what is its relation of effectuation with the abstract machine? How does it 
effectuate it, with what adequation?”92 We will come back to the concrete and the 
abstract in Chapter 3.  
For now, we identified four of agencement’s characteristics to develop and 
“translate” into other words: it is well-suited to many registers on different scales of 
analysis; it resists any discrete analysis by emphasizing interdependence; it concerns 
heterogeneous plans which nevertheless interact or communicate; it simultaneously 
accounts for how things gain traction and come to appear as essential as well as how 
things fall apart or change into something else. We will now sum up our findings and 
consider the advantages of pursuing design in translating Deleuze. 
GENERAL PROBLEMS, TRANSLATION 
What matters more: words or problems? That is, if it is so difficult to translate 
agencement, we have the option on the one hand to insist on Deleuze’s terminology and 
search for the most faithful and effective translation possible, or on the other hand to 
abandon agencement and other jargon in favor of what these words were intended to 
describe. In reviewing our account of agencement’s appearance in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
work, the fact that it replaced the concept of desiring machines in their work points the 
way for our research. If agencement is poorly translated by “assemblage,” and if we have 
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no alternatives, and if Deleuze scholarship seals itself off with an overreliance on jargon, 
then we ought to take Deleuze’s advice: there is always another way around, we can 
always put things in other words.93 What are we putting in other words? Our summary 
above indicates several problems or themes which we will have to address in the rest of 
the dissertation.  
First, in addition to replacing desiring machines, agencement displaces the notion 
of behavior and the Freudian complex. Its alleged advantages over these terms are 
instructive. In subordinating the activity and behavior of an individual to the field of 
bodies and statements that are its condition of possibility, Deleuze claims to bypass any 
nature-culture distinction. Among Guattari’s issues with the Freudian understanding of 
“complex” is the fact that it is strictly the complex of personal, psychic elements. An 
agencement, on the other hand, brings together elements on smaller and larger scales than 
the personal, and combines flows or semiotics of different stripes—biological, 
geological, historical, linguistic, political, libidinal, etc. Whether as a substitute for 
behavior or for complex, agencement betrays an ambition for maximum extension; rather 
than a natural or cultural account, or a libidinal account, agencement addresses any of 
these accounts and an account of accounts.94 Hence Guattari purports it to be “infinitely 
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M. Raphael (New York: Noonday, 1970), 36.  
 
 38 
 
richer in extension” than complex, even if its comprehension is less clear.95 
Second, an agencement is distinct from a liaison, in the domain of scientific logic, 
and from a subject, in the domain of psychoanalysis and structuralism. These items 
together recall Guattari’s response to Lacan’s claim about the unconscious: if it structured 
like a language, who or what is responsible? Consider what changes in shifting from “the 
subject of enunciation” to the “agent/agencement of enunciation.” Even if the former is 
split between enunciation and énoncé, it in any case refers to the speaker; nothing of 
enunciation, the statements themselves, or their relation to the speaker is implied. To 
borrow Boll’s terms, the relation between statements and the relation to the speaker might 
as well be one of mere liaison. As the agent or agencement of enunciation, on the other 
hand, we come to consider the above in terms of transformation and interdependence. 
Third, as per the first axis of Deleuze and Guattari’s tetravalent model, the notion 
of agencement is characterized by heterogeneity. It is heterogeneous insofar as it is 
composed of heterogeneous elements: the “same” agencement is both one of bodies and 
one of statements, i.e. is composed along two irreducible plans—that of content and that 
of expression. It is also heterogeneous insofar as it comprises (at least) two 
incommensurable considerations or plans: from one angle, it is a matter of organized 
parts and segments; from another angle, it is a question of consistency, singularity and 
haecceity. Not only is this a general problem in association with agencement, but it 
appears as a motif throughout Deleuze’s career. In The Logic of Sense he pursues the 
relationship in Stoic logic between mixtures of bodies on the one hand and incorporeal 
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events on the other, a relationship he rediscovers through the work of Lewis Carroll: one 
speaks with words, not things, and one eats things, not words; somehow, the edible and 
the sayable coincide. The heterogeneous relationship between bodies and statements 
recurs, obviously, in the notion of agencement, but we find it still elsewhere, as in 
Deleuze’s writings on Foucault in which he describes the relation between the visible and 
the sayable, for example.96 
Fourth, according to a second axis, the same agencement has both the tendency to 
establish or stabilize its claim on different elements and its consistency, and the potential 
to drift off or dissolve according to constitutive thresholds or parameters. A frequent 
refrain in Deleuze and Guattari’s account: a change in dimension results in a change in 
nature.97  Again, this facet of the concept also extends farther into Deleuze’s work 
generally considered. The relationship between organization and consistency, the 
dimensions or layout of a form and what the form can do or become, finds a succinct 
expression in the idea of threshold. Thresholds and limits are features of organization, 
and yet point to the developments beyond which organization is undone or drifts off to 
become something else.  
If we give up on translating agencement and instead pursue “other words” with 
which to describe Deleuze’s philosophy, these will be our desiderata. First, we need a 
wide-encompassing account that is open or flexible enough to handle different registers, 
separately and in conjunction especially—as Guattari puts it, we need our account to be 
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“rich in extension.” Second, our account ought to involve several scales in terms of 
interdependence and transformation; Guattari’s language avoided talking only about 
society or only about the individual, and he strove to talk about the agencement of micro- 
and macroscales, pre-personal, personal, and interpersonal. Third, we would want an 
account of coinciding and communicating plans, or considerations, which we would 
otherwise find incommensurable. Lastly, our account should describe how things assert 
and reproduce themselves, on the one hand, and on the other hand how things have an 
inherent tendency to drift and/or destruction.  
A tall order, perhaps, but we might take our cue from Frohmann’s footnote about 
design, mentioned above: what agencement has, which assemblage lacks, is a reference 
to design. In terms of definition and use alone, design captures the senses of the French 
word rather well: design can refer to a process or a product, and often it means both. Like 
agencement, design involves making things pleasant, useful, or suitable. Furthermore, as 
the etymology of agencement suggested, design is inseparable from creation, creativity. 
We shouldn’t be surprised that a typical German translation for agencement outside 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is “Layout,” and on at least one occasion this was the 
preferred English translation for the term. 98 
These admittedly superficial similarities are bolstered by concepts found in 
Deleuze, Guattari, and Deleuze and Guattari. We find a panoply of terms related to 
design: diagrams, lines and points, architecture, cinema, painting, musical composition, 
drama and dramatization, problems, and so on. We saw that Deleuze and Guattari 
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describe agencement as joining together two plans, that of transcendence and that of 
immanence, or organization and consistency: at one point they describe the first as a 
teleological dessein, the second as an abstract dessin.99 These two French words each 
capture different senses of the English, “design”: on the one hand design (dessein) refers 
to intentions, plans, and a subjective creative process; on the other hand, design (dessin) 
is a diagram, a sketch of the designed product which includes both intentional and 
unintentional features. Agencement connects dessein and dessin; design will help us 
bridge a similar divide, in addition to resonating with Deleuze’s expansive design 
vocabulary.  
Finally, design meets all four of our desiderata outlined above. It is ambiguous in 
its comprehension but rich in extension, reaching from practical applications in the 
production and use of videogames to its controversial place in conversations surrounding 
form and function in evolutionary biology, to take only two examples. Like agencement, 
we could call design multi-scalar, since it involves the sub-personal, personal, and supra-
personal. Like agencement, design brings heterogeneous elements or considerations into 
communication. Finally, design, no less than agencement, has the potential to break 
down, transform, operate or drift off in unintended ways. 
CONCLUSION 
What began as a quibble over the translation of agencement has brought us to a 
new theoretical venue. “Assemblage” did not sit well with us in view of the uses and 
                                                          
99 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 265-7/325-6. 
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connotations of agencement, but we have no alternative translation. Deleuze invited us to 
“find another” word, if we did not agree with his and Guattari’s terms, since “words are 
totally interchangeable.”100 Our issue was with translation and the wide reception of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s thought; rather than translate agencement, we briefly laid out 
some of the main issues motivating the concept and a few of its primary aspects as 
they’ve appeared throughout both authors’ careers.  
To conclude, let us consider the potential advantages of this approach before 
delving further into the concept of design. Approaching design in light of agencement’s 
problems in order to recast the latter, rather than “applying” the concept of agencement to 
design, offers us at least three general advantages. First, it allows us to approach design in 
a comprehensive way, since we seek the broadest extension possible, with an eye to 
aspects brought out by agencement that otherwise we may not have had the occasion to 
conjoin. Second, it allows us to bring disparate design fields into dialogue: Deleuze and 
Guattari, agencement in hand, were able to compare capitalism, geological formations, 
and the complex relationship between wasps and orchids; in a similar fashion, we might 
be able to bring together biological morphology, interior decorating, procedurally 
generated videogame worlds, etc., in meaningful ways. Finally, it allows us to think about 
Deleuze in ways that do not overly depend on his and Guattari’s verbiage. Considering 
how often Deleuze, even more than Guattari, played with his vocabulary and framework 
and theoretical references, it is somewhat ironic to ossify his and Guattari’s vocabulary 
into industry terms. Turning a new stream onto Deleuze’s career from the perspective of 
                                                          
100 Deleuze, “Five Propositions,” 278/387. 
 43 
 
the theory and practice of design might uncover new aspects of his philosophy, along 
with a perspective on how to “be Deleuzian”—with no regard for what he said but in 
terms, rather, of why he said it.   
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CHAPTER II 
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI’S PLAN FOR POTTERY: FROM 
STRATIGRAPHY TO CERAMIC RUDIMENTS 
Our discussion of agencement focused on one of Deleuze and Guattari’s more 
widely quoted definitions of the term, a “tetravalent” model formed along two axes: on 
the one hand, it is the arrangement between the plans of content and expression, such that 
the same agencement can be described both in terms of content and in terms of 
expression; on the other hand, it is simultaneously a plan of organization, with adaptive, 
conservative processes of stability and reproduction, and a plan of consistency that opens 
the agencement up to avenues for drift, fault lines, and new points of departure. The 
concept’s complexity, in addition to its lack of a direct equivalent in English, makes it 
difficult to translate. 
In the last chapter, we found that we were better served by translating the ideas 
that motivate Deleuze and Guattari’s word choice rather than translating the word itself. 
A frequent term in the tetravalent definition offers another cue for how to organize the 
ideas involved. If we want to understand agencement through design, we begin by noting 
that it is an agencement of plans. The concept of plan as such, apart from its associated 
terms (plan d’organisation, plan d’immanence, etc.), is largely uncharted territory, since 
the scholarship rarely discusses the term in isolation.101 This chapter has two main tasks. 
                                                          
101 The extent and significance of plan’s omission varies. Bell’s otherwise excellent guide to What is 
Philosophy? overlooks the term entirely, even though Deleuze and Guattari’s book involves multiple plans 
as well as a discussion of the term in relation to their understanding of “concepts” (esp. WP 19). Cf. Jeffrey 
Bell, Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2016). Many commentaries mention the different senses of plan in French but 
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First, we will evaluate the concept of plan in our initial transition away from 
agencement—the meaning and translation of plan, its role in Deleuze’s work, and what it 
inherits from some of Deleuze’s noteworthy influences. The second main task of this 
chapter will be to develop these problems and themes in the context of designed artifacts. 
While I maintain that any design ought to meet our criteria, our discussion will focus on 
methods and concepts from the archaeological study of artifact types. An archaeological 
lens will help demonstrate how design exhibits the different relevant meanings of the 
word, plan, in several ways: the use of stratigraphy, frequency, and morphology to study 
artifact type requires several different plans; the different senses of “function” at work in 
artifact type—as use, as an index for fitness, as opposed to form, style, or ornament—also 
prevent us from reducing artifact design to a single plan; lastly, the peculiar place of 
“skeuomorphism” in archaeology will also paint design in a complex, stratified light.  
PLAN AND ITS TRANSLATION 
It does not share the level of scrutiny and commentators have fewer reservations 
with it than with agencement, but plan offers its fair share of translation difficulties. The 
                                                          
pay no further attention to the fact that Deleuze draws on so many of its senses in so many turns of phrase 
on so many occasions. See for example Mark Bonta and John Protevi, Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A 
Guide and Glossary (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006). Those writing on Deleuze’s cinema 
books have more of an impetus to treat plan on its own, since plan (as “shot”) is ubiquitous in those texts, 
but they make little or no effort to connect this sense of plan up with plans from elsewhere in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s career(s). See for example Anna Powell’s excellent reference to “mixed planes” in “The 
Daemons of Unplumbed Space: Mixing the Planes in Hellboy,” in Deleuze and Film, eds. David Martin-
Jones and William Brown (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 173-191. Also see Ronald 
Bogue’s careful and thorough definition of plan in Deleuze on Cinema (New York: Routledge, 2003), 44f. 
Felicity Colman is among the few, writing on cinema, who faintly indicates a broader cross-textual reading 
of plan, or rather, she appears to assume such a reading exists and likely does not pursue it further since it 
would be beyond the scope of her project. After noting plan’s place in Cinema 1 and 2, Colman refers to 
Deleuze’s larger career and notes that, “[i]n philosophical terms, Deleuze describes the plan in terms of its 
affective organizational (and political) terms of the planes of immanence and transcendence” (45). Deleuze 
and Cinema: The Film Concepts (New York: Berg, 2011).  
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situation is deceptive, since the word has an English twin. In French, plan can mean, e.g., 
a plan of action intended to realize a goal, a program or project. It also refers to a layout 
or blueprint: in building a house, there is the electrical plan, the site plan, and so on. 
Unlike its twin, however, the French can also mean “plane,” as in geometry; it is 
furthermore the word for a “shot” in cinematography: a long take [plan-séquence], close-
up [gros plan], an establishing shot [plan d’ensemble], etc. Finally, it means a level of 
consideration: discussing a situation sur le plan économique means considering it “in 
economic terms” or “at the level of the economy.” 
Thus, plan resists translation despite its resemblance to the English, “plan.” Some, 
like Massumi, attempt to sustain the word’s ambiguity by letting context dictate whether 
to translate it as plan, plane, or as plan(e). The current standard in the scholarship is to 
consistently render it as “plane,” except when discussing Deleuze’s later work on cinema, 
where it is often translated as “shot.” The translators of the cinema books had their work 
cut out for them, and it is especially in the context of those books that plan resists any 
clean translation.102 Take for example a plan d’ensemble, an establishing shot—before 
transitioning to a scene of dialogue, the camera pans to a shot of a hospital, establishing 
the scene’s place in the world and in the film. So far, so good. But both plan and 
ensemble feature as technical concepts in Cinema 1: L’image-mouvement. A careful 
translator is left with two bad options: she can render plan d’ensemble as “establishing 
shot,” preserving the cinematic definition but obscuring ties to both plan and ensemble; 
                                                          
102 In their introduction, Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam write: “The French word for ‘shot’ is 
‘plan,’ which also means ‘plane.’ Deleuze occasionally plays on the two senses of the French word and we 
have sometimes translated it as ‘plane.’ The two senses of the word should be borne in mind whenever the 
word ‘shot,’ in any of its many variants, appears in the translation” in Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The 
Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlone Press, 1986), xii.  
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or else she can opt for something like “plane of the whole,” signaling the technical value 
of the term’s individual components but forfeiting any cinematic connotation. 
Even if we bracket, as most do, the question of whether and how to reconcile the 
use of plan in Deleuze and Guattari’s jointly written texts with Deleuze’s cinema books, 
the famous opposition between the plan de consistance and the plan d’organisation is no 
simpler. Massumi opts for “plan(e)” whenever it seems that Deleuze and Guattari intend 
both “plan” and “plane,” as he believes to be the case with plan d’organisation.103 This 
helps preserve some of plan’s complicated character, but problems arise even for 
Massumi’s careful approach. For instance, Deleuze and Guattari claim that plan de 
consistance has roots in both linguistic and geological stratification, and plan 
d’organisation is unmistakably borrowed from the writings of French naturalists Georges 
Cuvier and Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire. “Plan(e)” faithfully renders aspects of the 
original French but might elide any geological, linguistic, or biological connotation. In 
biology, plan d’organisation is typically translated as ‘body-plan” or “Bauplan.”104 
Different phyla are distinguished by the basic patterns of morphological features: the 
number of limbs and segments, lines and patterns of symmetry, the nervous system and 
skeletal structure, etc.  
In plan the translator finds a tangle of possible definitions, drawing on both 
historical and technical references. Translators have tried splitting the French into “plan,” 
“plane,” and “shot,” depending on the context, but this might cover over the connections 
                                                          
103 Deleuze, ATP, xvii. 
104 I have chosen to keep body-plan hyphenated in order to emphasize it as a potential translation for plan 
d’organisation. 
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between plan’s different uses which the author might have intended. Even clever 
typography (such as “plan(e)”) is hard-pressed to suggest every relevant meaning to the 
reader: as project, layout, surface, register or level of consideration, and as 
cinematographic shot or take. Rather than choosing between these in order to translate the 
word, we will treat the word specifically regarding how it appears in Deleuze’s work.   
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI’S PLANS 
In order to prepare our approach to design, I will catalog some of the significant 
instances of plan in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. Part of our difficulty in 
understanding agencement in the last chapter was its ambiguous reference; if the word is 
often translated as “arrangement,” “set-up,” or “layout,” what is it that is arranged, set up 
or laid out? In other words, what is the term or object of an agencement? The tetravalent 
definition is evidence that, whatever an agencement is, it is an agencement of plans: the 
plans of content, expression, organization, and consistency. Our inquiry of course 
requires a discussion of each of these plans, but ideally their comparison will suggest 
what they have in common, what might have motivated Deleuze and Guattari to put 
things in terms of plan so often and so consistently. Along the way, we will note concepts 
of plan from some of their forerunners. 
CONTENT AND EXPRESSION 
Our earlier discussion of agencement centered around a popular definition from A 
Thousand Plateaus with a “tetravalent” format: two axes each divided into pairs of plans. 
The first axis comprises two plans, “one of content, the other of expression”: according to 
the first plan, we have an agencement “of bodies, of actions and passions, an 
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intermingling of bodies reacting to one another”; according to the second, it is one of 
“acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies.”105 While the 
terms themselves come from the linguistic framework of Louis Hjelmslev, the 
relationship and opposition between content and expression, or bodies and statements, 
should remind the reader of earlier and later formulations in Deleuze’s career, where he 
treats this opposition first in his work on sense and then in the context of discussing 
Michel Foucault.  
How are we able to attribute words to things? Deleuze’s development in The 
Logic of Sense begins with a dichotomy borrowed from the Stoic tradition of logic, 
between bodies and mixtures of bodies on the one hand, and incorporeal events on the 
other. Like Hjelmslev, Deleuze is after the “essential relation” which makes language 
possible, which grounds the possibility of attributing words to things in the sign 
function.106 Sense is the privileged domain of his inquiry. Rather than denoting an 
“external” thing or state of affairs, manifesting the motivations and assumptions on the 
part of the speaker, or signifying conceptual conditions and consequences, sense is that 
which is expressed in the statement.107 For Hjelmslev, sense or purport was an unformed 
matter that only “exists” as the formed substance of content or expression. Deleuze’s 
sense similarly lacks any “independent” existence, as it “does not exist outside its 
expression.”108 
                                                          
105 Deleuze, ATP, 88/112.  
106 Deleuze, LS, 12/22. 
107 For discussion of denotation, manifestation, and signification, see Ibid., 12-4/22-4. 
108 Ibid., 21/33. 
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Deleuze’s title suggests the aim of his project: it concerns the logic of sense, 
understood as a sort of “non-existent entity.”109 An alternative approach to language and 
logic might focus on syntactic structure, the relationship between words and words, or 
semantic structure, the relationship between words and what they mean. A logic of sense, 
however, concerns among other things the relationship between different ways of 
expressing the same meaning, or different possible meanings for the same expression. I 
can define a term’s meaning with other terms, but the sense of my use of the term does 
not exist as a distinct linguistic entity but inheres in the place and context of my use. A 
logic of sense might require us to ask how sense is decided, negotiated, applied, how it 
changes and how it persists. When told that someone or something “looks green,” I 
understand that there are several senses of this word. But by what right do I apply one 
and not another of these senses? What in the word accounts for the continuity or 
contiguity of its different senses? The “green” of “looking green” might imply sickness, 
inexperience, ecological sustainability, overall coloration, or financial benefit. Deleuze is 
concerned with how certain senses of a word corresponds to certain aspects of a thing, 
that is, how sense is selected and communicated. “Green” is among Deleuze’s own 
examples. The sense of green wholly belongs neither on the side of a proposition nor on 
the side of the designated state of affairs; it is “not a quality in the thing, but an attribute 
that is said of the thing,” an attribute that cannot “exist outside of the proposition.”110 The 
sense of green is not reducible to denotation, nor to manifestation, nor to signification, 
and neither is it “in the thing itself,” on the order of bodies and bodily mixtures. Sense 
                                                          
109 Ibid., xiii. 
110 Ibid., 21/33. 
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resides between bodies and words; it belongs to neither and exists nowhere but in its 
expression,  which relates one series to the other. Despite its mediating role, sense does 
not prevent the plans of things and events, bodies and statements—content and 
expression—from remaining incommensurable or heterogeneous.  
Turning to a later chapter in Deleuze’s career, in the part of his 1986 book on 
Michel Foucault devoted to “stratification,” Deleuze reads his subject through 
Hjelmslev’s stratified terminology.111 We find Foucault depicted as a theorist of 
stratification, of strata “made from things and words, from seeing and speaking, from the 
visible and the sayable […] from contents and expressions.”112 Furthermore, content and 
expression each have both form and substance: prison as a form of content with prisoners 
for its substance; delinquency an expressive substance that takes form in the penal law. 
His comments on Foucault’s stratification reveal an important aspect of the part plan 
plays in Deleuze’s approach—he notes two basic aspects of Foucault’s stratified plans: 
first, each stratum “implies a distribution of the visible and the sayable which acts upon 
itself”; second, “from one stratum to the next there is a variation in distribution, because 
visibility itself changes in style, while the statements themselves change their regime.”113 
We will eventually have the resources necessary to refer these two aspects to two distinct 
“problems of consistency.” For the moment, what matters is the fact that these plans are 
                                                          
111 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sean Hand, with foreword by Paul Bové (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988), 47-69. Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (Paris: Minuit, 1986), 55-75.  
112 Ibid., 47/55. 
113 Ibid., 48/56. 
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heterogeneous but bisociated, to borrow Arthur Koestler’s term.114  
NOTE 1: LOUIS HJELMSLEV115 
Among Deleuze and Guattari’s many plans, content and expression present the 
most obvious historical reference, to the work of Danish linguist, Louis Hjelmslev. I will 
dwell on the details of Hjelmslev’s project, since his use of plans and the reasons for 
which his work was innovative will help us understand Deleuze’s plans and Deleuze’s 
innovation. Hjelmslev was not the first to describe language in terms of heterogeneous 
plans; in many ways, he interpreted his own work as an extension of Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s research, and content and expression in many ways stand in for Saussure’s 
signifié and signifiant, respectively. And like other Saussure-inspired linguists of the day, 
he sought out in his Prolegomena to a Theory of Language to furnish linguistics with its 
proper object of study and found it as a science. It is true, Hjelmslev notes, that his peers 
were very motivated to study language, but language remained a “means to a 
                                                          
114 Koestler’s bisociation describes when a situation or idea, L, is perceived in “two self-consistent but 
habitually incompatible frames of reference, M1 and M2. The event L, in which the two intersect, is made to 
vibrate simultaneously on two different wavelengths, as it were.” He claims to have coined the term “in 
order to make a distinction between the routine skills of thinking on a single ‘plane,’ as it were, and the 
creative act, which […] always operates on more than one plane.” Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation 
(London: Hutchinson & Company, 1964), 35-36. 
 
115 I have included four brief notes on Louis Hjelmslev, Jakob von Uexküll, Georges Cuvier, and G. W. 
Leibniz in order to complement and contextualize some of the ideas we encounter in Deleuze’s own texts. 
Naturally there are other influences and references at work in his and Guattari’s use of plan, but these 
authors are the most relevant for explaining distinct aspects of the term.  
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transcendent knowledge […] not the goal of an immanent knowledge.”116 It was widely 
believed that language held the “key to the system of human thought,” to the profile of 
society, to the “distant vicissitudes of bygone generations”—even if these beliefs are true, 
Hjelmslev worries at the fact that so rarely is language studied on its own terms.117 
Glossematics begins with the idea that 
physical, physiological, psychological, and logical phenomena per se are 
not language itself, but only disconnected, external facets of it, selected as 
objects of study, not for language’s sake, but for the sake of the 
phenomena towards which language is oriented. The same holds true 
when language is further considered, on the basis of these descriptions, as 
a key to the understanding of social conditions and to the reconstruction of 
prehistoric relations among peoples and nations. This is not said to 
minimize the value of all these points of view and all these efforts, but to 
point out a danger: the danger that in our zealous haste towards the goal of 
our knowledge we may overlook the means of knowledge—language 
itself.118 
 
Despite his obvious debt to Saussure’s framework, Hjelmslev’s discrepancies 
follow from his ambition for an immanent119 study of language, an ambition which is 
crucial for understanding Guattari’s enthusiasm for Hjelmslev’s work. To begin with, 
language cannot be defined as a system of signs; sign systems will only do for so-called 
transcendent approaches to language that interpret it as a means for other kinds of 
knowledge. Since a “sign” is traditionally understood as a sign of something for 
someone, defining language as a sign system can only concern “the external functions of 
a language, its relation to the non-linguistic factors that surround it, but not its proper, 
                                                          
116 Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, 6. 
117 Ibidem. 
118 Ibidem 
119 Hjelmslev will sometimes say “empirical” or “inductive.” 
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internal functions.”120 At the very least, the relations between signs will not be enough to 
understand how language operates qua language. Naturally, such an approach works well 
if we look to language for the logical grammar reflected in a tribe’s kinship structures, or 
the historical changes in psychic disposition marked by shifts in vocabulary. When it 
comes to language itself, Hjelmslev points out that the analysis of “all hitherto observed 
languages” will fumble entities that “can no longer be said to be bearers of meaning” and 
thus do not qualify as signs, and yet which are not incidental to the structure and use of 
language.121 
Hjelmslev asks us to consider the example, from English, “activates.” If we really 
want to treat English as a system of signs, then it “will be of interest to try to carry out the 
analysis as far as possible.”122 Thus we break up this single word and discover that it is 
composed of five distinct signs, that is, “five distinguishable entities which each bear 
meaning”: in-act-iv-ate-s.123 But just because a phoneme or syllable can qualify as a sign, 
so understood, does not mean that all phonemes and syllables are or can be signs. 
Hjelmslev thus arrives at two different views of the same linguistic phenomenon: 
From one point of view the s in in-act-iv-ate-s is a sign-expression, from 
another point of view a phoneme. The two points of view lead to the 
recognition of two different objects. We can [admit] that the sign-
expression s includes one, and only one, phoneme, but this is not the same 
as identifying the sign-expression with that phoneme; the phoneme enters 
into other combinations where it is not a sign-expression (e.g. in the word 
                                                          
120 Ibid., 44. 
121 Ibid., 41. 
122 Ibid., 40. 
123 Ibidem. 
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sell). […] [W]e are led to recognize that a description in accordance with 
our principles must analyze content and expression separately.124 
 
Thus, once he moves on from the idea of language as a sign-system, Hjelmslev is 
led to repurpose Saussure’s two-plan schema. While Saussure may have had “an open 
eye for the two-sidedness of the linguistic sign,” as split between signifier and signified, 
he almost exclusively considers the form of the signifier as characteristic of language.125  
The most conspicuous contribution in the Prolegomena for our purposes is 
Hjelmslev’s emphasis on what Bertha Siertsema calls “heteroplane functions.” For all 
intents and purposes, the sign-system view of language puts signs all on the same plan, 
whereas Hjelmslev begins with the recognition of linguistic functions “between an entity 
in one plane and an entity on the opposite plane;” Siertsema continues, “To this relation 
de Saussure only pays attention in one respect, viz. for his well-known statement that the 
relation between ‘signifié’ and ‘signifiant’ is an arbitrary one. But he fails to see it as a 
functional relation.”126 
It is also notable that, in contrast to Saussure’s famous claim that language is “a 
                                                          
124 Ibid., 42. 
125 Bertha Siertsema, A Study of Glossematics: Critical Survey of its Fundamental Concepts (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 15-6. 
126 Ibid., 19. Siertsema adds that “functional” ought here to be “taken in the ordinary sense.” She 
summarizes a key point in Uldall’s presentation. He and Hjelmslev distinguish two types of units central to 
glossematic analysis: first, there are “intrinsic units, which are terminals of functions the other terminal of 
which belongs to the same stratum, and projected units, which are terminals of functions the other terminal 
of which belongs to another stratum”; they add that the difference between plans or strata makes it “clear 
that the different strata of a description do not necessarily all have the same number of effective operations” 
or functions (31). Louis Hjelmslev and H. J. Uldall, Outline of Glossematics: A Study in the Methodology 
of the Humanities with Special Reference to Linguistics (Copenhagen: Nordisk Sprog-og Kulturforlag, 
1957).  
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form, not a substance,”127 substance is still semiotically determined for Hjelmslev, and 
like the strata of content-form and expression-form, content-substance and expression-
substance will be distinct and require distinct linguistic analyses. Recalling Guattari’s 
ambition for a flexible, multi-semiotic analysis, we can see why he appreciated how 
much more comprehensive and complex Hjelmslev’s stratified framework is.  
Language has both form and substance, and substance, as one historian of 
structuralism puts it, “is the manifestation of form in matter.”128 The purport or unformed 
matter is formed as the substance of content or expression. Barthes claims that substance 
refers to “aspects of linguistic phenomena which cannot be described without resorting to 
extra-linguistic premises,” which squares with Hjelmslev’s and Uldall’s description of 
expression- and content-substance via a series of examples that each “can be described 
from some non-linguistic point of view.”129 Barthes’s definition is incomplete, though, 
unless we add that otherwise non-linguistic substance becomes linguistic, since the forms 
of a sign function require substance in order to be materially realized. Siertsema clarifies: 
Many substances will do for the “realization matérielle,” but there are 
kinds of substances which will definitely not do, viz. every substance that 
would fail to show up the value of the units in question, which is to 
distinguish them from others. Water, for instance, would never do for 
                                                          
127 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin, ed. Perry Meisel and Haun 
Saussy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 113.  
128 Oswald Ducrot and Tzvetan Todorov, Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences du language (Paris: 
Seuil, 1972), 38. 
129 Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1967), 40. “The expression substance varies—it may be speech-sounds, which have been described 
both physiologically and physically, it may be writing of various kinds, dots and dashes, signal flags, 
buzzing noises, flashes of light, etc. [Content substance is] a sort of ethnic philosophy, a Weltanschauung, a 
“climate of opinion,” a set of hypotheses or attitudes or beliefs about epistemology, ethics, economics, 
religion, manners, politics, geography, history, mathematics, the sciences, music, arts” (Hjelmslev and 
Uldall, 26).  
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chessmen. Language depends on substance in as much as its existence 
depends on the availability of a substance which is able to realize language 
[, one that] must not only be able to manifest that these units differ but 
also how they differ.130 
 
In other words, non-linguistic phenomena become content-substance and 
expression substance by “virtue of the content-form and the expression-form, and only by 
virtue of them,” as the result of “the form’s being projected on to the purport, just as an 
open net casts its shadows down on an undivided surface.”131 On the one hand we have 
the unformed, “undivided” surface of substance itself. On the other hand, this substance 
is formed into different substances, sliced according to the respective form. In another 
context, Deleuze and Guattari will say: different plans are “slices” of an unformed chaos.  
BETWEEN CONCEPTS AND CHAOS 
While a full account of what Deleuze and Guattari mean by “concept” extends 
beyond the reach of our current project, a few of their remarks in What is Philosophy are 
noteworthy. In particular, we will consider the relationship between the concept of 
concept and that of plans, especially with the plan of immanence. Indeed, we are told 
elsewhere that a concrete agencement draws and is drawn by an “abstract machine”—the 
subject of our next chapter—and in this text concepts and plans are likened to the former 
and latter, respectively.132 The components of a concept “populate” a plan, but the plan is 
not something given in advance; if a concept involves bodies from the plan of content, 
                                                          
130 Siertsema, 8. 
131 Hjelmslev, Prolegomena, 52.  
132 Deleuze and Guattari, WP, 36/39. “Concepts are concrete agencements, like the configurations of a 
machine, but the plan is the abstract machine of which these assemblages are the working parts.” 
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for example, these bodies live on a plan with “no other regions than the tribes populating 
and moving around on it.”133 Deleuze and Guattari’s best example here is the concept of 
the Other, or the Other Person. Like any concept, the Other involves several components: 
e.g., a face, the possible world it implies. The components of a concept may themselves 
considered as concepts, such “that the Other Person has the face among its components, 
but the Face will itself be considered as concept with its own components.”134 The 
components of a concept are inseparable as components: “distinct, heterogeneous, and 
yet not separable.”135 Deleuze and Guattari call this the concept’s “endoconsistency.” 
Thus, “each concept will therefore be considered as the point of coincidence, 
condensation, or accumulation of its own components.”136  
There is good reason to understand plan and concept in this framework as relative 
terms, since the concept appears to functions as a plan for its components. Like the plan 
which extends only as far as the tribes that populate it, the concept “rises and falls” with 
its components.137 Plan is described as a bridge between concepts, a function of the 
concept’s “exoconsistency.” The internal consistency of the concept means that the 
concept’s components are inseparable despite their distinction: “the possible world does 
not exist outside the face that expresses it” in the concept of the Other Person, “although 
it is distinguished from it as expressed and expression”; “there is an area ab that belongs 
                                                          
133 WP, 36-7/39. 
134 WP, 19/24. 
135 Ibid., 19/25. 
136 Ibid., 20/25. 
137 Ibidem. 
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to both a and b,” such that a and b can hold together in the concept they comprise.138 But 
the concept is also said to imply the “construction of a bridge” with other concepts “on 
the same plan.”139 
A relative understanding of plan and concept would hold that otherwise external 
concepts have internal consistency as components of a concept, since (1) conceptual 
components can be grasped as concepts in their own right but are (2) rendered consistent 
internal to the concept that composes them. We are also told that the plan of immanence 
is like a slice, a cut, or a “section of chaos and acts like a sieve”; chaos is 
undifferentiated, with nothing to connect different determinations, and a plan is a 
selective function that makes it possible to bridge one determination to the next.140 Given 
its plastic character and its selective/bridging function, a plan has a relationship to 
concepts, in their exoconsistency, that is analogous to the concept’s relationship with its 
components, in its endoconsistency. 
The rest of What is Philosophy notwithstanding, this much we can surmise about 
the plan and the plan of immanence: it is something like a cross-section or filter that 
selects aspects of “chaos” and enables otherwise heterogeneous determinations or 
concepts to condense, coincide, and cooperate. This is, after all, why David Lapoujade 
says that the plan is what allows one to see: “the plan is first of all a transversal cut, 
section, or intersection. That it has strata confirms that plans are sectional views, just as 
                                                          
138 Ibid., 19-20/25. 
139 Ibid., 20/25. 
140 Ibid., 42/44. 
 
 60 
 
geological slices allow us to see the stacking of strata. How would strata be perceptible 
otherwise?”141 The understanding of plan as a slice of chaos, one which allows one to 
perceive and to do, is not unique to Deleuze and Guattari; it is very possible that they had 
the idea on loan from Jakob von Uexküll, one of Deleuze’s enduring references and 
influences.  
NOTE 2: JAKOB VON UEXKÜLL 
There is no disputing Jakob von Uexküll’s impact on Deleuze’s philosophy, if for 
no other reason than that Deleuze so often rehearses his example of the tick and the tick’s 
world. Beyond that, one will find, particularly in Uexküll’s Theoretische Biologie, 
extensive developments of many terms and concepts Deleuze and Guattari would later 
borrow or repurpose: territory, thresholds, internal and external melodies and rhythms, 
and so on. After having devoted much of the book to “single forays in different 
directions,” to the question of how the worlds [Umwelten] of different organisms are 
constituted and navigated, Uexküll closes A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and 
Humans with a consideration of “the interrelations of environments.”142 To do this, he 
turns to a subject common to multiple environments, an “oak tree, which is populated by 
many animal subjects and is called upon to play a different role in each environment.”143 
The forester, the small child, the fox, the squirrel, the beetle, the ant—each has a different 
plan or perspective onto the oak tree. Their perception of the tree and the tree’s meaning 
                                                          
141 David Lapoujade, Deleuze, les mouvements aberrants (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 2014), 182.  
142 Uexküll, A Foray, 126. 
143 Ibidem. 
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for them will change in accordance with their difference in what activity the tree affords 
them.  
In the hundred different environments of its inhabitants, the oak plays an 
ever-changing role as object, sometimes with some parts, sometimes with 
others. The same parts are alternatively large and small. Its wood is both 
hard and soft; it serves for attack and for defense. If one wanted to 
summarize all the different characteristics shown by the oak as an object, 
this would only give rise to chaos. Yet these are only parts of a subject that 
is solidly put together in itself, which carries and shelters all 
environments—one which is never known by all the subjects of these 
environments and never knowable for them.144 
 
The oak tree is a chaos from which individual organisms—the beetle, the child, 
the oak tree itself—cut out pieces, or constitute different environments.145 I believe that, 
in accordance with the brief schema we encountered above for Deleuze and Guattari’s 
“concept,” we can interpret this to mean that the chaos of the oak tree is sectioned by 
different plans: each is an Umwelt with internal consistency for its respective individual 
organism, and collectively the Umwelten are externally consistent since they express the 
same oak-tree-chaos, and since this belongs to an ultimate continuum of chaoses.  
Uexküll often describes the final configuration of Umwelten, vis à vis the solid chaos on 
which they all depend, as “The Plan of Nature.” According to this reading, Nature’s Plan 
is the plan of “external consistency,” the continuity and consistency of all Umwelten.  
Of course, such an interpretation runs counter to popular readings of Uexküll as 
an anti-Darwinian vitalist, according to which his reference to “plan” attributes a final 
                                                          
144 Ibid., 132. 
145 Ibid., 130. See also Deleuze and Guattari’s description of plans and plans of immanence in What is 
Philosophy? They claim there that the plan of immanence “is like a section of chaos and acts like a sieve” 
(42).  
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purpose for biological forms or an intended direction to biological development. While 
there might be other evidence for Uexküll’s teleology, but his reference to “nature’s plan” 
isn’t to blame. His own sense of plan is more in line with the depiction of Uexküll 
Deleuze offers us in his work on Spinoza: there, he presents Nature as a single affective 
continuum, a plan of immanence whereby everything “is defined by the agencements of 
motions and affects into which it enters, whether these agencements are artificial or 
natural.”146 Deleuze registers Uexküll as part of a tradition that describes biological 
phenomena according to “affects and capacities for affecting and being affected,” 
predicated on such an affective continuum or plan of immanence.147 
The mistaken interpretation of Uexküll’s “Plan” is understandable given the 
word’s ambiguity. “Plan,” as project or intended program, would lend it credence. 
Uexküll repeatedly insists that we “consider the vital expressions of animals from the 
point of view of the plan,” the overall plan of nature.148 Be that as it may, he goes to some 
length in dissociating “plan” from “goal.” In Theoretical Biology, the more rigorous and 
detailed presentation of his thought, Uexküll complains that 
men have spoken of ‘purpose’ and ‘purposefulness’ in Nature; and this 
introduced the idea of Nature as a sort of human being, foreseeing future 
events and acting accordingly. But just where conformity with plan is 
easiest to detect, we can find no trace of any such human-like being.149 
 
The situation is reversed. It is not that seemingly random biological developments 
                                                          
146 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 
1988), 124. Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Philosophie pratique (Paris: Minuit, 1981), 167. Henceforth SPP. 
147 Ibidem. 
148 von Uexküll, A Foray, 86. 
149 Jakob von Uexküll, Theoretical Biology (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1926), 270. 
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ultimately belong to nature’s grand, preordained vision, but rather that even the explicitly 
intentional acts and decisions of higher mammals have their place in the unity of nature’s 
non-intentional plan. For Uexküll, the activity of an individual organism expresses a plan 
insofar as it belongs to a system; the interaction of functions or activities renders them as 
parts of a whole, and thus conforms systematically to a larger arrangement or plan of 
functions.150 Perhaps Uexküll uses the word “plan” with regard to nature much in the 
same way that other biologists discuss the “body-plans” of organisms.151 In step with our 
overall sketch of plan, he defines it as an indivisible whole that is both an abstract total 
constituted by its members and the principle expressed in the laws and functions of its 
“internal” relations. Uexküll writes: 
A plan, whether a spatial plan or a mechanical plan, always forms an 
indivisible whole. It can repeat itself in any number of objects and is 
largely independent of the volume of the object. Via its reign over the 
spatial or mechanical relations which it expresses, it is a self-contained 
unity totally blind to other plans, and neither influences them nor is it 
influenced by them.152 
 
Although Uexküll defines plan in a general way, we can discern two sorts of 
plan—plan—in his definition, and we will find each of these developed in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy as a plan d’organisation and a plan de consistence, or as the two 
sides of design: dessein and dessin. If it is true that each individual plan is an “indivisible 
whole” that reigns over a set of relations in a “self-contained unity” that is “totally blind 
                                                          
150 Ibid., 106. 
151 Evidenced by the fact that his Theoretical Biology is primarily dedicated to the problem of conformity 
with plan, and the significance of this idea for biological research. There the reader will find explicit 
mention of animal (body) plans. Given his insistence that “plan” has nothing to do with goals or purposes, 
the reference to body plans might inform our understanding of nature’s plan. 
152 Jakob von Uexküll, “Plan und Induktion,” in Wilhelm Roux’ Archiv für Entwicklungsmechanik der 
Organismen 116 (1929), 37.  
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to other plans,” such individual plans are in turn supposed to belong together in the 
ultimate “plan of nature.” In one sense, then, they are hermetically sealed and mutually 
irreducible; in another sense, they do fit together and cooperate in another, different sort 
of plan.  
DESSEIN AND DESSIN 
Thus far we have seen that plans, such as those of content and expression, or 
bodies and statements, are heterogeneous, and that their agencement articulates their 
difference, distribution, and relationship. An agencement brings incommensurable plans 
into communication, and elsewhere we saw plan, in turn, defined as the bridge between 
incommensurable concepts or determinations; plan was a slice, a filter for distributing or 
selecting something out of chaos. Two agencements may involve their own plans of 
content, may be variable in their own way, but in What is Philosophy we can posit a plan 
of these plans of content, the variation of variability, or the continuum of all plans of 
content such that they form a plan of immanence for all agencements. This last point is 
perhaps clearer in view of other plans from Deleuze and Guattari’s work: the plan 
d’organisation153 and the plan de consistance.154 We said that one of plan’s meanings, in 
French, was map or blueprint, and so we will consider the difference between Deleuze 
and Guattari’s two plans through the example of a house. Our doubled house’s two plans 
involve two different senses of “design” which correspond to the French dessin and 
dessein, and it will warrant a brief note on the debate between Étienne Geoffroy Saint-
                                                          
153 As noted above, this is often translated as “plane of organization.” Here it will remain in French or else 
be rendered as “body-plan.” 
154 Henceforth “plan of consistency.” 
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Hilaire and Georges Cuvier. 
We first justified design for the design-connotations unmistakable in agencement 
but absent or markedly less prominent both in its translations (assemblage, arrangement) 
and in its competitors (dispositif). Second, we noted that in general Deleuze’s vocabulary 
has connotations to design. To name a few: lines, marks, figures, plans, composition, 
rhythm, diagrams, images, refrains, style, dramatization, and “lines of flight.”155 As it 
stood, this evidence was only circumstantial; to demonstrate design’s affinity for 
Deleuze, we need to be certain that it shares his concerns.  
The word’s history begins in writings on painting and architecture in the Italian 
Renaissance, as disegno, an ambidextrous term for both the project which the painter 
intends to realize in her painting and as “the part of the painting that is distinct from 
color,” for example the lines, marks, shapes, ratios, or composition.156 Design’s forked 
meaning was preserved in its transmission into English, by the Earl of Shaftesbury, as 
“the unity of a project and a drawing,” but it suffered a fracture on the way to French, 
where it split into dessein and dessin, “project” and “drawing,” respectively.157  
Do we not find a similar “split” in the concepts of plan and agencement? Our 
                                                          
155 Ligne de fuite, like most of Deleuze’s terms, is tough to pin down, but the term has a non-philosophical 
association with painting and composition, as the horizon line of perspective drawing where things 
disappear or emerge. The horizon line suggests a beyond-the-painting within the painting, the “vanishing 
line” rather than English’s “vanishing point.” For a French electrician, insulation is necessary to maximize 
the length of possible leakage currents, to slow them down; this length is called the ligne de fuite, 
“creepage distance.” Finally, it can be used to mean “escape route.” With these non-philosophical uses in 
mind, the term is arguably less mysterious.   
156 Cf. Jacqueline Lichtenstein, “Disegno,” in Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon, ed. 
Barbara Cassin, trans. Steven Rendall, Christian Hubert, Jeffrey Mehlman, Nathanael Stein, and Michael 
Syrotinski. Translation ed. Emily Apter, Jacques Lezra, and Michael Wood (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004) 224-7.  
157 Ibid., 224.  
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initial difficulty with plan was that it could refer to a program and/or a map, and that 
Deleuze appears to call on both senses of the word—perhaps simultaneously, at times. If 
we were to understand the concept of plan in isolation, it was crucial that we understand 
the way Deleuze brought the word’s valences together. Were we to understand plan 
solely as geometric plane, we would miss the fact that an agencement combines both a 
dessein, an intentional or normative plan, and an abstract dessin of its surface and 
consistency.158 In Chapter One we saw that some translators and commentators approved 
of “assemblage” as a translation, however misguidedly, because they believed it to render 
an important feature of agencement in French: the fact that it can be read both as an 
activity or process and as the state of affairs which results from this process; it was 
important for them that agencement’s translation handle both interpretations.  
NOTE 3: CUVIER AND GEOFFROY 
Plan d’organisation, or “body-plan,” is a concept on loan from the history of 
French naturalism and is central to a famous dispute between Georges Cuvier and 
Étienne Geoffroy Sainte-Hilaire. “Plane of organization” can be a misleading translation, 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, because it gives the impression that it is a technical term 
devised for the purposes of Thousand Plateaus. But as “body-plan” is a concept still used 
among biologists, in addition to having a place in the history of comparative anatomy.159 
                                                          
158 N.B. This is how Deleuze and Guattari characterize the difference between the “body-plan” and the plan 
of composition in A Thousand Plateaus. The former, the plan d’organisation, is a dessein, the teleological 
perspective on or hidden principle of form and development: “L’arbre est donné dans le germe, mais en 
function d’un plan qui n’est pas donné.” The latter, a “wholly different plan, or a wholly different 
conception of plan,” is an “abstract dessin” (ATP, 266-7/325-7).  
159 See, for example, a standard francophone textbook on evolutionary biology. Thierry Lefevre, Michel 
Raymond, Frédéric Thomas, Biologie évolutive, 2nd Édition (Paris : De Boeck Supérieur, 2016). The 
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Both Cuvier and Geoffroy were comparative anatomists interested in the diversity of 
biological structures; the question was whether and how ostensibly different forms of life 
could be made continuous. Cuvier had proposed four embranchements for the animal 
kingdom whose irreducibility precluded any possible continuity: Vertebrata, Articulata, 
Mollusca, and Radiata.160 It is one thing to compare the anatomy of a crocodile and a 
rabbit—after all, they both have spines and a tetrapodal skeletal body-plan. But 
exceeding the bounds of an embranchement would exceed the bounds of comparative 
anatomy: there was no point, for Cuvier, in comparing crocodiles and crickets; their 
body-plans are simply too different.  
Geoffroy was not content to remain within these bounds. He “could not believe 
that nature would follow entirely different designs to generate those that, ultimately, are 
none other than different species belonging to the one and only animal kingdom.”161 Thus, 
he was unwilling to accept that the structural differences separating the body-plans of 
different embranchements were insurmountable; there must be a single body-plan, a plan 
d’organisation uniting all animal composition. Cuvier was the first to recognize the 
continuity of forms within each embranchement. Such was the characteristic endeavor of 
comparative anatomy; within Vertebrata, we can pass easily from a rabbit’s foot to a 
crocodile’s, from a seal’s flipper to a sparrow’s wing: these are all “limbs” in the basic 
vertebrate body-plan. But how could Geoffroy claim to reconcile the endo-skeletal 
                                                          
concept of body plan, or “plan d’organisation” comes up throughout, but see especially the chapters on 
typology (341-372), development (423-450), and constraints (491-512). 
160 See Cuvier’s 1817 Le Règne animal distribué d’après son organisation. It is worth noting that Cuvier’s 
four branches were distinguished on the basis of the nervous system’s structure. 
161 Alessandro Minelli, Forms of Becoming: The Evolutionary Biology of Development, trans. Mark Epstein 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 6.  
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structure of vertebrate organisms with the exoskeletons of the Articulata?  
Simple: he proposed that we look at Articulata’s body-plan as that of Vertebrata, 
folded inside-out: they share the same basic longitudinal nervous system, with the 
exception that what is dorsal in the vertebrate (the spinal cord) is ventral in the insect (the 
gangliar chain).162 Some of his students proposed a similar folding operation in the 
comparison of cephalopods (as Mollusca) and human beings (as Vertebrata): 
The squid […] has neither a skull nor a spinal column, but only a very thin 
internal shell. And the general arrangement of the internal organs in the 
two animals is also different, because in the squid, as in other 
cephalopods, the digestive tube, which is relatively short, is folded into a 
U shape, the anal opening relatively close to the mouth. But it is precisely 
this arrangement of the organs that particularly concerned [Meyranx and 
Laurencet, Geoffroy’s students], by showing that the “simple” bending of 
the main body axis of a vertebrate, folding the animal in on itself, greatly 
reduced the difference between he structural design of cephalopods and 
that of vertebrates.163 
 
Although Geoffroy and Cuvier share terminology, their dispositions belie 
different understandings of plan. Cuvier’s body-plans are forms of resemblance between 
concrete anatomical structures, forms that dictate the parts and part relations that 
categorize animal skeletons, for example. Geoffroy’s plan is more abstract; instead of 
parts and part relations, it maps the forces and movements necessary to explain the 
differences separating actual animal forms. As it were, Cuvier’s plan represents the 
condition for possible description—the criteria an organism must meet before we can call 
it a vertebrate or a mollusk—while Geoffroy’s describes the condition for actual 
existence—what conditions must be like in order for “mollusks” and “vertebrates” to be 
                                                          
162 See Ibid., 6-7.  
163 Ibid., 8. 
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possible at all.  
TWO HOUSES IN ONE 
The plan d’organisation of a house might be understood as “form,” in the sense 
of this term that most frequently comes under scrutiny: not form as it appears, but form as 
ideal, as the standard against which apparent forms are judged and interpreted. Deleuze 
explains that this plan concerns both form and development, that it is both “structural and 
genetic.”164 It is not the plan of the house that we see, but the one that “explains” what we 
see, the hidden principle behind the house’s structure and development, its function and 
use. Because this principle is not “given for itself but must always be concluded, inferred, 
induced on the basis of what it organizes,” Deleuze also calls it a plan of transcendence,” 
that is, “a dessein, in the mind of man or in the mind of God.”165 We step into the house 
and recognize it as a house, with everything that entails. Just as a William Paley might 
presume a designer responsible for his watch’s design, we attribute intention and purpose 
to the house. From the perspective of its plan d’organisation: we know that these are 
windows; we know the purpose of windows and can infer the intent behind these in 
particular; we know how the house was built or how it arrived at its current state, by its 
submission to harsh weather or via the renovation efforts of its previous tenants; the 
house is divided into “rooms,” and we know them to be intended as “bedrooms,” a 
“kitchen,” a “bathroom,” and so on. To recall our discussion of Louis Hjelmslev, the plan 
                                                          
164 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 91. 
165 Ibidem. 
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d’organisation concerns “form and substance,”166 the stratification of pure unformed 
matter.  
The house’s pure matter, on the other hand, belongs to its plan of consistency. We 
approach this same house with no supplement from the plan d’organisation, without 
anything that transcends this house “itself,” with no regard for purposes, intentions, 
history, or construction. We do not know that it is a house; we do not know about 
windows or rooms or renovations. This perspective is from a plan of immanence rather 
than transcendence. According to the plan d’organisation, the house might not live up to 
the architect’s intentions. In other words, the architect and her dessein transcend, are in a 
way external to the house as actually constructed. Approached from the immanent plan of 
consistency, though, the house “is what it is”; it is “this” house, and it only extends as far 
as it does, from “here” to “there”; it has a certain consistency that holds it together, such 
that its different parts all feel like “a home” or “a prison.”  
The use of indexicals and demonstratives (it, this, here, there) as well as indefinite 
articles (a home, a prison) is instructive for understanding the second plan because 
Deleuze so often describes it in terms of what he calls “haecceity.”167 If plans operate, as 
we said before, by selection and distribution, then the plan of transcendence does so from 
                                                          
166 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 507/632. 
167 This is one of John Duns Scotus’ terms for individuating difference. The difference between this and 
not-this is among what he calls “ultimate differences,” which are simple irreducible differentials for 
determining concepts [conceptus simpliciter simplices]. It may be clear why genus and species fail to 
qualify as simple concepts, since “man” is the determinable concept “animal,” determined by its being 
“rational.” But haecceity, or individuating difference, demonstrates why the individual or singular is not an 
ultimate determination, as well. The “this” in “this man” determines the determinable “man.” For Duns 
Scotus’ account of the principle of individuation, see his Ordinatio, Book II, Distinction III, Part 1, 
Questions 1-6; Question 2 in particular.  
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the outside, while the plan of consistency is one of immanence because it “possesses no 
dimension supplementary to what occurs on it; its dimensions grow or decrease with 
what occurs on it.”168 The house’s haecceity extends as far as it does; “this house” has as 
many rooms as it has, even if I build additional rooms. We could describe this as the 
sketch or dessin of its affects and intensities rather than a dessein of its structure and 
development. To say that it is “a” home or “a” prison indicates a degree of homeness or a 
prisonness. A home or a prison cohere in such a way that they render certain activities, 
affects, and elements consistent. Billy Dean and a lawnmower, as haecceities, have 
different consistencies and behave differently: whatever these two things are, pushing on 
them or filling them with gasoline will yield different results.  
The house’s plan d’organisation concerns its structure and genesis, its purpose 
and construction. The plan of its consistency, on the other hand, presents us with the 
unformed substance that consolidates or holds together the house’s heterogeneous 
elements, the relations of haecceities and their “corresponding intensive affects.”169 To 
invoke more of Deleuze and Guattari’s jargon, we can understand these plans of the 
house as its “ecumenon” and “planomenon,” respectively. These terms are perhaps not as 
obscure as they appear. It is first noteworthy that the house is split into ecumenon and 
planomenon much as Kant divided things into noumena and phenomena: the same thing 
can be considered both as it is in itself (noumenon) and as it appears (phenomenon). 
Second, a look at these terms’ Greek roots goes a long way toward their definitions and 
their relationship to the plans d’organisation and de consistance. Œcoumène, outside 
                                                          
168 Deleuze and Parnet, 93. 
169 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 507/632. 
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Deleuze and Guattari, means the inhabited or inhabitable world, and comes from the 
Greek οἰκουμένος: it is the world as structured, inhabited, or developed. Planomène is a 
neologism, but a few of Deleuze’s comments on planets and planetary movement are 
helpful. In Deleuze’s review of his book, he praises Kostas Axelos’ “planetary thought,” 
and decades later the “aberrant movement” of the planets will play a special role in 
Cinema 2.170 Both series of remarks come back to the Greek basis for “planet,” πλανάω, 
which means to wander, or stray. Rather than as intelligible, inhabited space, we might 
see the earth as a planet: regarding its actual position in space, it has no top and bottom, 
and drifts along with no concern for how it is interpreted or carved up. On the plan 
d’organisation, we have the house as ecumenon, as inhabited, inhabitable, and 
intelligible. On the plan of its consistency, we have the house as planomenon, as a 
wandering, lawless haecceity that is only as large as it is.  
NOTE 4: LEIBNIZ 
Imagine a city. You could think of it from at least two sorts of “perspective,” 
corresponding to two sorts of city plans. G. W. Leibniz offers this example on several 
occasions to account for how the concept of an individual substance can have infinite 
comprehension, or how a monad’s relations can express the entire universe, without 
collapsing the multiplicity of substances into Many or One.171 First, there is the city 
                                                          
170 See Gilles Deleuze, “How Jarry’s Pataphysics Opened the Way for Phenomenology,” DI, 75. Aberrant 
movement is the privileged term in David Lapoujade’s reading. See David Lapoujade, Deleuze, les 
mouvements aberrants (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 2014).  
171 In addition to §57 of The Monadology (cited below), cf. §9 of The Discourse on Metaphysics, as well as 
Leibniz’s letter to Des Bosses dated February 15, 1712 (cited below). 
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“looked down upon from the top of a great tower placed upright in its midst”; second, 
there are the “almost infinite horizontal perspectives with which it delights the eyes of 
travelers who approach it from one direction or another.”172 The city appears in two ways; 
“the difference between the appearance of bodies with respect to us and their appearance 
with respect to God is in some way like the difference between a drawing in perspective 
[scenographium] and a ground plan [ichnographium].”173 A beetle, a falcon, and I all 
have different perspectives of the city, and in a way our drawings depict many different 
cities, even though they all express one and the same ground plan; God’s plan of the city 
is of the city “itself,” as well as all possible perspectives of it. 
Leibniz recalls these views of the city, the difference and relationship between 
plans, for the sake of explaining what he means by “expression,” a high capacity concept 
in Leibniz’s metaphysics but one criticized for its ambiguity. He specifies that “one thing 
expresses another […] when there is a constant and regular relation between what can be 
said about one and about the other. It is in this way that a projection in perspective 
expresses a geometric figure.”174 Like other philosophical uses of plan, such as what we 
found in Hjelmslev, the expressive relationship between perspective and a geometric 
figure is one of mutual presupposition and interdependence. The reason for this is not 
immediately clear, for while a perspective seems to imply something of which it is the 
                                                          
172 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, trans., ed. Leroy E. Loemker (Boston: 
Kluwer, 1989), 142. 
173 Leibniz, “Leibniz to Des Bosses: February 15, 1712,” in The Leibniz-Des Bosses Correspondence, 
trans., ed. Brandon C. Look and Donald Rutherford (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 233. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty translates Leibniz’s “scenograph” and “ichnograph” into perspective and 
géométral, respectively. See his Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 81.  
174 From a letter to Arnauld on October 9, 1687. As quoted in Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 
339. 
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perspective, can we not think of something apart from any perspective? In what way does 
the latter presuppose or depend upon perspectives of it? 
We find our answer in what Leibniz does with the concept of expression, with 
another rehearsal of the city and its plans, in his Monadology. Leibniz writes: 
The same town, when looked at from different places, appears quite 
different and is, as it were, multiplied in perspectives. In the same way it 
happens that, because of the infinite multitude of simple substances, there 
are just as many different universes, which are nevertheless merely 
perspectives of a single universe according to the different points of view 
of each monad.175 
 
In other words, Leibniz will say that each simple substance, i.e. monad, expresses 
every other monad, as a “perpetual living mirror of the universe.”176 Whether the world is 
intelligible apart from any perspective will depend on how we understand perspectivism; 
following Deleuze’s interpretation of Leibniz makes it easier to discern in what sense a 
geometric figure—the expressed—presupposes or depends upon its projection in 
perspective—its expression. When Deleuze ascribes to Leibniz a kind of perspectivism, 
he is careful to specify that this “does not mean a dependence in respect to a pregiven or 
defined subject,” but that the subject “will be what comes to the point of view, or rather 
what remains in the point of view.”177  
                                                          
175 Leibniz’s Monadology: A New Translation and Guide, trans. Lloyd Strickland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2014), §57. 
176 Ibidem. §56. 
177 Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (London: Athlone Press, 1993), 
19. Gilles Deleuze, Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque (Paris: Minuit, 1988), 27. Henceforth FLB. As this project 
proceeds, it will not bother me that my treatment of design—and of affordance, in particular—appears to 
nudge Deleuze closer to a traditional theory of form; our caveat is that we ought to reevaluate “form” and 
its conventional relationship with “essence.” This project does not find the opportunity to develop this point 
fully, but a place to start rethinking essence and form comes to us from Deleuze’s Nietzsche and 
Philosophy. As with Leibniz, it requires us to think about perspective. Deleuze does not reject essence but 
rather recasts it; rather than defining essence in terms of the question “What is…?” he reformulates it 
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If Jon and I, as different monads, perceive the same house from different 
perspectives, we express the house differently according to our respective distances and 
relations. “Perspective” here is less a function of our subjective identity than it is of these 
distances and relations, mapped out and harmonized in advance by God. The existence of 
the world already implies an infinity of possible horizontal perspectives, and although the 
world enjoys an “antecedence to monads,” it depends on them in that it does not “exist 
outside of the monads that express it.”178 
THE MEANING OF PLAN 
Generally considered, plan can be translated as program, layout or blueprint, and 
as plane or level of consideration, among other things. Thus far in our overview we have 
encountered philosophically motivated uses of the word, and this will help us render it in 
a way consistent with its place in defining Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of agencement. 
First (1.1), in the context of Louis Hjelmslev’s distinction between content and 
                                                          
according to “Which…?” questions. This leads Deleuze to claim that “essence is merely the sense and 
value of the thing” (77/87). He explains: “The question ‘what is it?’ is a way of establishing a sense seen 
from another point of view. Essence, being, is a perspectival reality and presupposes a plurality [of senses 
or perspectives]. When we ask what beauty is, we ask from what standpoint things appear beautiful” 
(Ibidem). Elsewhere, Nietzsche says (through Deleuze), that the value of values and the meaning of sense 
derive from a perspective, from “perspectives of appraisal [points de vue d’appréciation]” (1/1). Gilles 
Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone Press, 1983). Gilles Deleuze, 
Nietzsche et la philosophie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962).  
178 Ibid., 60/81. On the ontologically status of perspective as a “real” part of things themselves, see Zizek’s 
reference to parallax. “The common definition of parallax is: the apparent displacement of an object (the 
shift of its position against a background), caused by a change in observational position that provides a new 
line of sight. The philosophical twist to be added, of course, is that the observed difference is not simply 
‘subjective,’ due to the fact that the same object which exists ‘out there’ is seen from two different stations, 
or points of view. It is rather that, as Hegel would have put it, subject and object are inherently ‘mediated,’ 
so that an ‘epistemological’ shift in the subject’s point of view always reflects an ‘ontological’ shift in the 
object itself. […] as if the building, in its very material existence, bears the imprint of different and 
mutually exclusive perspectives” (255). Slavoj Zizek, “The Architectural Parallax,” in The Political 
Unconscious of Architecture: Re-opening Jameson’s Narrative, ed. Nadir Lahiji (Burlington: Ashgate, 
2011), 255-94.  
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expression, a plan names a “series” of forms/substances—“series,” to recall that the same 
unformed substance is doubled, formed in the plans of content and expression, in the 
same way as Deleuze describes sense doubled in the “series” of bodies and statements in 
The Logic of Sense. Consulting What is Philosophy (1.2) led us to think of plan as a 
“slice of chaos” which bridges heterogeneous concepts and endows them with a so-called 
“exoconsistency.”  
From there, there were several ways to express two basic understandings of the 
term: plan as map or strategy, and plan as continuum. In a bit of foreshadowing, these 
correspond to the two sides of the word, design: dessein and dessin, respectively (1.3). 
On the one hand, following Georges Cuvier, a plan transcends the logical relationships it 
traces. The Vertebrata is a body-plan that entails a constant relation between its parts, a 
certain organization strategy; the variation in vertebrate strategies is the effect of the 
difference in their functions and purposes. In this view, the vertebrate’s anatomy is 
grounded in something else; the body-plan reflects its conditions d’existence, which are 
non-anatomical—and this it is a “plan of transcendence.” On the other hand, if we follow 
Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, we posit a morphological continuum which unites allegedly 
irreducible body-plans, a plan of composition that describes form alone, immanently, and 
which is irreducible to an external consideration of conditions d’existence. Uexküll gave 
a similar account of “nature’s plan,” as the chaos which is “solid enough” to support the 
perspectives or Umwelten of different organisms, the “affective continuum”179 which 
allowed Umwelten to correspond and “fit” together. 
                                                          
179 As noted above, Deleuze attributes this phrase to Uexküll’s view. SPP 124/167. 
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PLAN AS PERSPECTIVE 
Given what we’ve seen from Leibniz and von Uexküll, our first candidate for how 
to understand plan is as perspective, so long as we do not mischaracterize perspective as 
merely “subjective.” If we are to attribute something like “perspectivism” to Deleuze’s 
work, we ought to carefully repeat his similar remarks on Leibniz. If we hear that 
someone’s philosophy privileges the concept of perspective, this might mean one of 
several things, and could suggest a conventional sort of relativism that renders impossible 
any “objective” account of reality, since nothing can occur outside of some perspective. 
We could interpret perspective to mean the point of view of an individual, the perspective 
of a so-called “subject position,” or the vantage afforded by a particular time and place.180 
I intend something else with perspectivism and encourage the reader to think of 
“perspective” in a sense primary to the above. It is not simply “what varies with the 
subject,” but the real condition according to which the subject remains in variation.181 The 
subject’s relationship to perspective indeed entails a sort of relativism, but “not the 
relativism we take for granted. It is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but 
the condition in which the truth of a variation appears to the subject.”182  
François Zourabichvili and David Lapoujade, among Deleuze’s best readers, have 
                                                          
180 For example, respectively: from Jon’s perspective, from the perspective of a black woman, this 
photograph shows the perspective view of the house’s entrance. 
181 Deleuze, FLB, 20/27. 
182 Ibidem. One can discern Deleuze’s distinction in the difference between “This is true from my 
perspective” and “It is true that this is my perspective.” The first statement lends itself well to the idea that 
truth is “relative,” i.e. the relativism according to which nothing is true since something is true only relative 
to one’s perspective. The second statement concerns the truth of perspective, i.e. the recognition that 
perspective is an important dimension of the truth and how it appears.  
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both characterized his work under the rubric of perspective. Zourabichvili appeals to a 
sense of perspective that we are in a better position to understand now that we have come 
to think of plans as heterogeneous qua irreducible. Zourabichvili writes: 
[T]he relative exteriority of the represented world—not only of things 
exterior in relation to a subject, but the respective exteriority of things 
amongst themselves—is overcome in the direction of a more profound, 
absolute exteriority: a pure heterogeneity of plans or of perspectives.183 
 
The references to homogeneity and heterogeneity should be carefully parsed. A 
homogeneous subjective position subordinates the heterogeneity of bodies, postures, and 
aptitudes, such that the external world, no matter how variegated, is united in being 
relative to a point of view. At this level of the analysis, it suffices to understand 
heterogeneity as “diversity” rather than more thoroughgoing difference in kind. Without 
going any further, perspective would appear to be a determination of the subject, 
relegated to what Zourabichvili calls here “relative exteriority.” However, Deleuze 
warned against understanding “perspective” as synonymous to “the subject,” if one wants 
to grasp the meaning of Leibniz’s perspectivism, for example.  Zourabichvili takes 
similar precautions with Deleuze’s perspectivism. He says that the heterogeneity of the 
external world— “the diversity of the panorama”—is not at all heterogeneous, or is 
heterogeneous (diverse) only relative to a homogeneous point of view, unless we “bring 
into play the differences of point of view.”184 These differences in point of view are 
heterogeneous plans, heterogeneous in the sense I defend, as irreducible.  
The connection David Lapoujade draws between plan and perspective is the most 
                                                          
183 François Zourabichvili, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event, trans. Kieran Aarons, eds. Gregg Lambert 
and Daniel W. Smith (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 66. 
184 Zourabichvili, 65. 
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direct, and appears in his definition of plan with regard to Deleuze’s thought. Echoing 
Deleuze and Guattari’s use of “cut” in What is Philosophy, he writes that  
the plan is first of all a transversal cut, section, or intersection. That it has 
strata confirms that plans are sectional views, just as geological slices 
allow us to see the stacking of strata. How would strata be perceptible 
otherwise? What Deleuze and Guattari call plan (even before 
distinguishing between the different types of plan) is what allows us to 
see, sense, or think: it is a perspective. 
185 
Thus, again, perspective is not the neutral projection of a subjective identity given 
in advance, but the stratified slice or plan without which something like subjective 
identity would not be possible. It is the slice of the town according to which the town can 
appear to me in the way it does. I can slice the town along different plans, my perspective 
or Jon’s, the perspective of content or of expression, organization or consistency, and so 
on. These plans remain heterogeneous, and yet work together in the agencement that 
articulates their difference. 
What’s imperative is that, being a plan “of” the town, perspective be understood 
as a real aspect of things and not something brought to things by a discrete subject. It 
might help to recall the history of the term, plan, in cinema, and how this term came to 
refer both to what is called “shot” and what is called “take” in English. In the first 
decades of French cinema, one did not evaluate a term’s cinematography in terms of its 
plans but its vues or tableaux.186 According to film theorist Emmanuel Siety, these words 
prefigure different aspects of the settled term, plan, which is a continuous block of space 
                                                          
185 Lapoujade, 182. Deleuze and Guattari at times describe the plan of immanence as “cutting” sections out 
of chaos. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, WP 156/147. 
186 I will translate these respectively as “view” and “tableau” (in the sense of an arranged scene, e.g. in 
painting).  
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and time.187 Reviewing both terms individually, Siety identifies two distinct aesthetics, or 
“two distinct ways of conceptualizing plan.”188 According to the first aesthetic, that of the 
view, the camera “traps” the activity of a given moment, as an “extraordinary submission 
to the aleatory,” such that the guerilla camerawork on the streets of Paris might capture 
the annoyed face of a passerby in stumbling upon the camera as an obstacle, forced to 
deviate course and walk around.189 On the other hand, the tableau characterizes the 
director’s effort to compose a scene, the process of planification, to prepare the world 
such that it can meaningfully set the stage for the events of the film.  Plan came to 
replace tableau by way of metonymy: when framing the scene of a tableau, the filmmaker 
arranges the background [arrière-plan], foreground [avant-plan], and so on. The 
foremost plan, the premier plan, eventually referred not to the figures or subject of the 
foreground, but the frame of the shot itself, such that “it is no longer a scene that one 
frames, but a [premier] plan that one chooses.”190 Plan covers both of these aspects or 
aesthetics in its modern usage: the capture of a single moment (no matter how long), and 
the selective nature of composition.  
PLAN AS ATTRIBUTE 
Rather than an indeterminate object which conforms to the subject, a perspective 
is that which the subject “occupies,” and which is built into the abstract but real profile of 
                                                          
187 Several of Deleuze’s readers, like Bogue, cited above, point out that the French plan names both “shot” 
and “take,” which explains Siety’s description of plan as a block of space and time. 
188 Emmanuel Siety, Le Plan: au commencement du cinema (Paris: Cahiers du cinema, 2001), 47.  
189 Ibid., 48-50.  
190 Ibid., 54-6. 
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the object itself. “Perspective” captures a lot of what we have encountered with the 
general concept of plan. If Deleuze’s meaning is crowded out by more popular 
understandings of perspective or relativism, we might additionally recruit terms like 
consideration or “aspect.”191 Or, to borrow from Spinoza’s vocabulary, we might also 
define plan as “attribute.” 
Content and expression do not have essential or general forms; they only form as 
the substance or material of a function. Deleuze and Guattari had a name for the 
formation and distribution of plans, a term that speaks to their mutual presupposition and 
double articulation: agencement. The difference between plans and their coarticulation of 
the same unformed substance explains why Deleuze and Guattari call Hjelmslev a 
“Danish Spinozist geologist.”192 In Deleuze’s book on expression and Spinoza, he 
mentions an important aspect of the latter’s alleged “parallelism.” In an infamous passage 
in The Ethics, Spinoza claims that the “order and connection of ideas is the same as the 
order and connection of things.”193 According to Deleuze’s reading, not only do things 
and ideas—content and expression, in our case—share the same order and connection, 
but they “are the same things, distinguished only by the attribute whose concept they 
                                                          
191 “Aspect” is a major contender for translating plan, since it offers an opportunity to read Deleuze through 
Dutch philosophers other than Spinoza: Abraham Kuyper, Dirk Hendrik Theodoor Vollenhoven, and 
especially Herman Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd distinguishes independent and coterminal aspects of being, 
and his “aspect theory” holds that these aspects are united in God’s eternal perspective but are necessarily 
distinct in the spatiotemporal experience of finite creatures. He describes 15 aspects, or ways of being, 
according to which being is meaningful for human beings. Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of 
Theoretical Thought, v. 2. The General Theory of the Modal Spheres, trans. David H. Freeman and William 
S. Young (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1953). 
192 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 43/57-8. 
193 Spinoza, E2P7. 
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involve.”194 The same ceramic jar is both an idea, understood according to the substantial 
attribute of thought, and a body, understood according to the substantial attribute of 
extension. 
As Deleuze puts it, Spinoza’s is less a parallelism than a doctrine of identity; 
attributes express different essences of the same substance, the same reality, the same 
things. No wonder, then, that Hjelmslev is described as a Spinozist: the same matter is 
expressed as content and as expression, formed differently according to either plan. Via 
Hjelmslev and Spinoza, I claim that the first way to understand plan in Deleuze’s work is 
as “attribute.” In The Ethics, Spinoza considers the only two attributes of substance 
available to us, thought and extension, though substance itself may have infinite further 
attributes. Likewise, Hjelmslev writes on content and expression, but only because these 
are the plans involved by the sign function. Other semiotics might involve matter as other 
substances, formed along other planes. An agencement is substantially formed on the one 
hand according to the attribute of content and on the other hand according to the attribute 
of expression.  
THE AGENCEMENT OF PLANS 
We are trying to lay out the problems that motivate or inform the concept of 
agencement: both in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s word choice and regarding how 
                                                          
194 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone, 1990), 
109. Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza et le problème de l’expression (Paris: Minuit, 1968), 96. Henceforth EP. See 
Spinoza, E2P7S: “[S]ubstance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, 
comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea 
of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways. […] Thus, whether we conceive 
nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we 
shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes—that is, the same things following in either 
case.” 
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they describe and develop it. There is no good way of translating agencement, and our 
hope is that design will offer a way to express these same problems. Although we have 
risked leaning on a good deal of Deleuze’s other jargon, plan makes long strides toward 
an understanding of agencement and toward an expectation for what design will need to 
furnish. We are dealing with an agencement of plans, a multiplicity of perspectives, 
attributes, or considerations. We have left agencement in French, so far, as a sort of 
place-holder for our sketch of design; in conjunction with what we discussed in the first 
chapter, our review of plan helps fill in the details.  
Recall the tetravalent definition we have focused on: suppose we wanted to 
illustrate its components and their relations, for the reader, with a diagram. There are 
perhaps more options, but we might go with one of the following (Figures 1, 2): 
 
  Horizontal Axis 
  Plan of Content Plan of Expression 
Vertical (Re)territorializing
195 Sides 
– Organization 
Organization of 
Content 
Organization of 
Expression 
Axis Deterritorializing Points – Consistency 
Consistency of Content Consistency of 
Expression 
 
Figure 1 – One way to visualize the “tetravalent definition” 
 
                                                          
195 We will treat the concept of “territorialization” in Chapter Four. For now, simply note that the term 
belongs to agencement’s definition. 
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A more precise description of plan helps us decide between these diagrams, or to 
understand the problems with each. How, for example, ought we to understand the two 
“axes” of the tetravalent definition? The first axis indicates that the same substance can 
assume different forms on heterogeneous plans: bodies or statements, content or 
expression. An agencement implies that these plans are not simply grouped together in an 
ensemble, but are somehow interdependent, despite their heterogeneity.196 There are 
relations between bodies and relations between statements, but these relations belong 
together in an agencement, what Siertsema called a “heteroplane function.” As we 
learned from Hjelmslev’s notion of commutation, there is not a one-to-one 
correspondence between plans, and thus, second, agencement implies the idea that the 
relation between plans is variable; there are different agencements of content and 
expression. 
If agencement is variable, and if there are different agencements, then we might 
                                                          
196 Cf. Chapter One for the discussion of agencement and ensemble as these terms appear in Marcel Boll’s 
presentation of scientific logic.  
 
Expression Content 
(Re)territorializing Sides - Organization 
Deterritorializing Points - Consistency 
Figure 2 – Another way to visualize the “tetravelent definition” 
 85 
 
need to account for why or how it endures, or, what amounts to the same, how it 
dissolves or changes. Enter the “second axis” of the tetravalent definition. Regarding the 
first axis, the agencement we call science brings together bodies and statements, content 
and expression. Upon discovery of something new, science has a grammar, a method, 
that prescribes how this novelty will be articulated, and thus there is an inertia 
agencement that lends it stability—it “territorializes” or “reterritorializes.” But the very 
same agencement of science can lend itself to “non-scientific” consequences, or even 
undermine its own structure and development—if, for example, a particular scientific 
tradition supports and flourishes in the context of a democratic citizenry which votes to 
stymie its operation.  
The simultaneity of its inertia and drift—how we will later come to understand 
reterritorialization and deterritorialization, respectively—on the second axis, follows 
from the idea that, on the first axis, an agencement is understood as the function of 
heterogeneous plans as a multiplicity, that it articulates their difference and implies their 
consistency.197 First, then, we have the “endoconsistency” of heterogenous plans, and the 
question is how the perspectives of content and expression hold together. But as variable, 
as an agencement which could be otherwise, it opens up to a continuum of such 
consistencies: there is an “exoconsistency,” a consistency of consistency. The second axis 
thus comprises two further plans, beyond those of content and expression: first, the 
                                                          
197 In the same way that sense—nota bene that sens was Hjelmslev’s proposed translation for mening, pure 
matter or “purport”—is both “of” bodies and propositions. Sense “does not exist outside of the proposition 
which expresses it, [but] it is nevertheless the attribute of states of affairs and not the attribute of the 
proposition. The event subsists in language, but it happens to things. Things and propositions are less in a 
situation of radical duality and more on the two sides of a frontier represented by sense. This frontier does 
not mingle or reunite them (for there is no more monism here than dualism); it is rather something along 
the line of an articulation of their difference: body/language” (LS, 24/37).  
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transcendent perspective or plan of the agencement’s distinction, function, or essence; 
second, the perspective of the agencement’s consistency, where it’s clear how far and in 
what directions it can go, its thresholds and limits.  
In an interview on the publication of A Thousand Plateaus, Catherine Clément 
asks Deleuze about nature and culture, since she has the impression that their distinction 
has disappeared in his and Guattari’s work. He notes two ways of getting around the 
nature-culture distinction. The first is to reduce one plan to the other, e.g. to “liken 
animal behavior to human behavior.” If agencement is a substitute for behavior, this is 
because it embraces the multiplicity of heterogeneous plans. Deleuze continues: 
with respect to the idea of agencement, the nature-culture distinction no 
longer matters. In a certain way, behavior is still a contour. But an 
agencement is first and foremost what keeps very heterogeneous elements 
together: e.g. a sound, a gesture, a position, etc., but natural and artificial 
elements. The problem is one of ‘consistency’ or ‘coherence,’ and it is 
prior to the problem of behavior. How do things take on consistency? How 
do they cohere? Even among very different things, an intensive continuity 
can be found.198 
 
We are thus dealing with two problems of consistency. To recall only two of the 
figures discussed above, we can articulate both problems in the language of von 
Uexküll’s and Spinoza’s work. In the following table (Figure 3) I indicate how both of 
these authors might understand the problem of consistency and the problem of the 
consistency of consistency. 
 
 
 
                                                          
198 Deleuze, “Eight Years,”179.  
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Consistency of Heterogeneous Plans.  
Uexküll: The animal’s Umwelt is the agencement of two heterogeneous worlds, the plan of perception 
[Merkwelt] and the plan of activity [Wirkwelt]. 
Spinoza: The consistency of attributes in substance. Thought and extension coincide and commutate by virtue 
of their consistency as attributes of the same substance.  
Consistency of Consistency.  
Uexküll: The plan of an oak constructed by a squirrel’s Umwelt implies its consistency with the plan of the 
oak itself, which needs to be “solid” enough to support the squirrel’s plan. Leads to a consideration of 
the plan of plans, what Uexküll calls the “unity of nature’s plan.” 
Spinoza: The consistency of attributes and substance. Substance lends itself to the attributes of thought and 
extension in a certain way, such that both attributes share the same order and connection.199 Leads to 
the abstract consideration of the modes of substance itself in Part III of the Ethics, as “affect.”200 
 
Figure 3 
Two Problems of Consistency, according to Spinoza and von Uexküll 
 
These two problems of consistency form the backbone of the “tetravalent” 
definition of agencement, and they will be crucial for our approach to design: the plans of 
design will need to exhibit both the “internal” and “external” sorts of consistency at work 
in an agencement. These aspects will not be negotiable, since, as I have indicated in the 
chart below (Figure 4), the non-philosophical definitions of agencement we discussed in 
the previous chapter can all be said to involve both internal and external consistency. 
                                                          
199 Spinoza, E2P7. 
200 Although this part of the Ethics is ostensibly written on the emotions, the development and description 
of the emotions there relies on the identity of thought and extension. Anything that “increases or 
diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, 
helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind” (E3P11). As a result, it becomes a matter of nature’s 
order and connection, or a logic of how its modes increase or diminish in their capacity, since “there should 
be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature’s 
universal laws and rules” (E3P2S). It is on this point that we might mention Spinoza’s marriage to 
Nietzsche in Deleuze’s work, particularly in his early so-called “historical” writings. Spinoza claimed that 
we do not know what a body can do, and with Nietzsche, we’re not even sure what the body is. Or, rather, 
the body—as a distinct, dualistic term—gives way to force relationships. Nietzsche describes a continuum 
of forces just as Spinoza describes an affective continuum. “Every force is related to others and it either 
obeys or commands. What defines a body is this relation between dominant and dominated forces” 
(Nietzsche, 40/45).  
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Definition of Agencer 
 
 
Internal 
 
 
External 
 
“The act of organizing diverse 
elements of an ensemble, of 
adapting them, of combining 
them to be convenient or 
pleasant.” 
 
The consistency of the 
diverse elements which 
are organized, adapted, 
and combined 
 
The consistency of the 
agencement and someone 
or something such that it is 
deemed convenient or 
pleasant.  
 
“The act of arranging, 
harmoniously ordering the parts 
of an artistic or literary work.” 
 
The consistency of the 
arranged, ordered parts of 
an artistic or literary 
work. 
 
The consistency of the 
artwork and someone for 
whom it is harmonious. 
 
“To combine in a shrewd way 
and often to dishonest ends” 
 
The consistency of what 
is combined. 
 
The consistency of the 
scam with its ends, such 
that the combination is 
shrewd and the scam is 
effective. 
 
 
Figure 4   
Both problems of consistency read through three dictionary definitions of agencement. 
 
A GENERAL LOGIC: PLAN PHILOSOPHY 
Whereas the conventional reading of Deleuze considers plan only as part of set 
phrases like “plane of immanence” and “plane of organization,” isolating the term 
changes the tenor of our discussion of agencement. Rather than considering the 
relationship between two plans in particular—content and expression, or organization 
and consistency—we are led to a general logic of heterogeneity and the superposition of 
incommensurable considerations or perspectives. The same substance considered as 
content, as expression, regarding its body-plan or its plan consistency, considered from a 
point of view, considered yesterday, tomorrow, and from the perspective of eternity.  
It may seem inappropriate to ascribe Deleuze a general project, but he and 
Guattari have expressed just such an ambition. On several occasions, Deleuze mentions 
future projects on the horizon in his and Guattari’s collaboration: he claims that the 
analysis of agencement which they initiated “opens up the way to a general logic,” one 
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they had only begun to explore and develop.201 He believes this general logic could have 
resulted in a “sort of philosophy of Nature,” an engagement with Nature “now that any 
distinction between nature and artifice is becoming blurred,” by virtue of the emphasis on 
consistency under our review.202 We saw in the last chapter that Guattari preferred the 
term, agencement, over others in part because it is “rich in extension,” and this was 
reflected in his repeated effort to accommodate as many different semiotics of different 
natures as possible.203 
We turn to one last influence on Deleuze and Guattari, one who shared some of 
their influences and commitments: Gregory Bateson. Much as Guattari and Deleuze both 
sought as extensive an analysis as possible, Bateson’s cybernetic view had far-reaching 
aspirations. The cybernetic logic of schizophrenia and alcoholism, intercultural contact, 
grammatical and botanical structure, learning in both animals and humans, evolutionary 
adaptation, and morphogenesis—Bateson’s explanatory framework operated, in 
cybernetic terms, by identifying homologies in disparate systems.  
For example, as part of his “Minimum Requirements for a Theory of 
Schizophrenia”—presumably the sort of theory Deleuze and Guattari pursue in their 
collaboration—Bateson emphasizes what he sees as a necessary connection between 
schizophrenia and the structure of communication. He claims that part of what 
characterizes the schizophrenic’s situation is that he or she cannot decipher the context of 
                                                          
201 Deleuze, “Eight Years,” 177.  
202 Gilles Deleuze, “On Philosophy,” in Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995), 155. 
203 Félix Guattari, “Le divan du pauvre,” 399. 
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context, or meta-communicational information; normally context would dictate how I am 
to understand my friend’s meaning when he claims that he is “going to get me someday.” 
He might mean that he intends to buy my lunch, that he hopes to eventually understand 
me, or perhaps he is announcing his intention to murder me. In order to be certain, I 
require contextual information, but how do I know what information counts as relevant 
context? In order to consult the statement’s context, I require meta-communicational 
cues.  
But the meta-communicational cues are not given as things in the physical world, 
and this leads Bateson to posit two distinct worlds with distinct logics and compositions. 
Getting these worlds straight is part of the precondition for any theory of schizophrenia. 
The first is the Newtonian world of things, while the second is the world of 
communication, of messages. He devotes much of his essay to the latter. What I call the 
reality of a perceived chair only refers to a “message in which I put my trust,” the trust I 
have in sitting on the chair, touching it, lifting it, etc., which is communicated by its 
context.204 In the world of communication, “I, as a material object, have no relevance and, 
in this sense, no reality. ‘I,’ however, exist [in this world] as an essential element in the 
syntax of my experience and in the experience of others.”205 Each of the two worlds 
functions differently, to the extent that what qualifies as “real” differs according to the 
world in question.  
Bateson wondered if a future science would be capable of adequately synthesizing 
                                                          
204 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, 
Evolution, and Epistemology (London: Jason Aronson, 1987), 255. 
205 Ibidem. 
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the two worlds of physics and communication, the chair as physical object and the chair 
as message. It is not the ambition of this essay to decide whether, in final review of his 
career, Bateson’s cybernetic epistemology ultimately succeeded in bridging these worlds. 
However, we have seen reason to suspect that Deleuze and Guattari had such a science in 
mind, and hence Deleuze announced the intent of their “general logic” to combine 
heterogeneous plans, incommensurable perspectives of the “same chair.” 
DESIGN  
Our account of plan, as a concept in its own right and as the privileged term of an 
agencement, is the product of several readings: we saw it explicitly or implicitly at work 
in Hjelmslev, Cuvier, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Leibniz, and Uexküll, in addition to several 
of its appearances in Deleuze and Guattari. In one way or another, this concept’s many 
roles hinge on their plans being heterogeneous, irreducible, and yet nevertheless 
cooperating, coinciding, or commutating. Plans describe heterogeneous forms of the 
same substance, a real substance that nevertheless cannot “exist” outside such formation. 
Hjelmslev considers the same s as both content (as a semantic atom, in act-iv-ate-s) and 
as expression (as a phoneme, /s/), from the “point of view” of different plans. In a sense, 
they are independent since they are mutually irreducible; but in another sense, they are 
inseparable and each presupposes the other. This is because they can affect one another 
while maintaining their independence, each as the quasi-cause of the other: thus, a change 
in content can effect a change in expression, a change in dimension can result in a change 
in nature. 
On the basis of our survey, we arrived at several ways to express the concept of 
plan in other words. Owing in part to Deleuze and Guattari’s own depiction of Hjelmslev 
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as a Spinozist, we might render it as “attribute.” Owing to a series of comments on 
perspective and points of view, we might render it as “perspective” or “consideration.” 
Plans are considerations of the “same object,” which can only exist under one 
consideration or another, can only be considered under one attribute or another. This 
object, an agencement, is the frontier, the purport or sense according to which the 
difference between plans is articulated.  
It is our contention that design offers a good rubric for expressing these same 
ideas, and could be a new cipher for interpreting Deleuze’s philosophy since it would 
translate more than a single term but the general problems that motivated it, theoretical 
currents that sweep most of Deleuze and Guattari’s solo and jointly-written work. As 
“rich in extension” as agencement and with many of the same conceptual features at play, 
design can just as well lead the way to a “general logic” such as Deleuze and Guattari 
aspire to.  
THE WORD “DESIGN” 
Translators and commentators on Deleuze have underscored the fact that 
agencement can be read both as a process and as a state of affairs; as we have seen, ever 
since its start in the Renaissance “design” has posed a similar ambiguity which continues 
to beleaguer theorists of design. When one speaks of “design,” are they referring to a 
process or a product? Does the word designate the form and function intended by a 
designer, regardless of her success in realizing them, or to actual form and function, 
irrespective of any intention? The great historian and theorist of design, Adrian Forty, 
opens his Objects of Desire at the crossroads of this ambivalent word. He considers two 
of its common uses: 
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In one case, it refers to the look of things: saying “I like the design” 
usually involves notions of beauty, and such judgments are generally 
made on that basis. […] The second, more exact use of the word “design” 
refers to the preparation of instructions for the production of manufactured 
goods, and this is the sense meant when, for example, someone says “I am 
working on the design of a car.”206 
 
We could add to this list. After the franchise’s initial impact single-handedly 
launched Sega’s market share of 16-bit consoles to 65% in 1992, Sonic the Hedgehog has 
fumbled through a series of poorly-received games, disappointing both critics and sales 
projections. When relieved critics praise the level design of the most recent installment, 
Sonic Mania, they likely do not intend the designer’s process.207 But “I like the level 
design” is more than an aesthetic judgment as well; here, “design” is the extent to which 
a level can afford the player her intended activity, the communication of this affordance 
by clear perceptual cues, and “the look of things.” 
The split in design explodes upon review of the many contexts and fields for 
which “design” is a relevant term. We could divide the concept even further than has 
been done with French dessein and dessin: design as form, as function, as form and 
function, as intentional, as actual and descriptive—and then, design as in architecture, in 
painting, in software, etc. But we ought to take our cue from agencement. I share Forty’s 
sentiment; he notes that “it might be tempting to separate” the different uses and 
definitions of design and treat them in isolation, but he believes that this “would be a 
great mistake, for the special quality of the word ‘design’ is that it conveys both senses, 
                                                          
206 Adrian Forty, Objects of Desire (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 6-7.  
207 See Heidi Kemps, “Sonic Mania Review,” IGN, August 14, 2017, 
http://www.ign.com/articles/2017/08/14/sonic-mania-review. Matt Espineli, “Sonic Mania Review,” 
Gamespot, August 15, 2017, https://www.gamespot.com/reviews/sonic-mania-review/1900-6416729. 
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and their conjunction in a single word rightly expresses the fact that they are inseparable: 
the way things look is, in the broadest sense, a result of the conditions of their making.”208 
German design researchers Wolfgang Jonas and Uta Brandes have the following to say 
about design’s ambiguous status as theoretical and/or practical: design may be a “fuzzy 
term,” but the fact that it “is continuously oscillating between action (practice) on the one 
hand, and theory and research on the other—meaning between concrete everyday life and 
traditional scientific thinking, both of which influence and change each other—has to be 
considered as an opportunity.”209 In other words, rather than struggle like others do to 
cleanly separate design-use from design-research, Jonas and Brandes suggest that we 
embrace design as uniquely situated between both theory and practice.  
Design is doubled as dessein and dessin, like plan, and as process and product, 
like agencement. Finally, it is doubled by the dual “problem of consistency” discussed 
above. I noted that our several dictionary definitions of agencement implied both 
“internal” and “external” types of consistency: the internal consistency of the elements it 
brings together and an external consistency with someone or something else for which it 
is pleasant or useful. It is the double consistency that we need to provide in order to 
adequately justify an interpretation of Deleuze through design: as we turn to design, we 
ought to take inventory of what we need to find.  
DESIGN’S DESIDERATA 
                                                          
208 Forty, 7.  
209 Uta Brandes, Sonja Stich, and Miriam Wender, Design by Use: The Everyday Metamorphosis of Things 
(Basel: Birkhäuser, 2009), 8. See also Uta Brandes, Wolfgang Jonas, and Meyer Voggenreiter, “Zum 
Designforschungsbegriff in der DGTF. Ein Annäherungsversuch aus 3 Richtungen,” in Design Report 1/2 
(2007).  
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Our review of plan anticipates some important features of design, the features 
necessary for design to speak to the concepts and problems at stake in agencement.  
First Design should comprise heterogeneous considerations or 
perspectives, different attributes that it brings together. 
Second The heterogeneous perspectives must belong to the design; 
they must be “objective” points of view. 
Third Design’s perspectives need to be commutative and inseparable, 
and not merely coextensive. 
Fourth The independence and interdependence of design’s plans 
should imply both Problems of Consistency.   
 
ARCHAEOLOGY: SERIES AND TYPE 
Archaeology may not be the only way to think about design forms, but it has the 
advantage of invoking the different senses of the word, plan, as well as many associated 
terms which came out of our initial discussion: strata, continuum, series, and so on. 
Ambiguities cloud any precise definition of design, but many might intuitively accept the 
terms of Louis Sullivan’s immortal rallying cry: “form follows function.” Whatever 
design is, it is taken for granted that it involves something called “form” and something 
called “function.” The phrase traces back to a text Sullivan wrote to accompany his 
development of the skyscraper. He argues that all things have shape, or form, and that all 
things are distinguished by their form. Because, he claims, the “heart is ever gladdened” 
by how life “seeks and takes on its forms in an accord perfectly responsive to its needs,” 
the art of architecture should mimic nature and strive to fulfill functions necessary for 
life. Hence it is a “pervading law of all things organic and inorganic,” that form ought to 
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follow function.210   
Unfortunately, what is meant by form or function is often no more definite today 
than it was at the outset: form is something like “shape,” while function vaguely refers to 
“what shape ought to accomplish.” Some designers take this motto to task for its 
ambiguity, often as part of their skepticism or critique of the “functionalism” which the 
mantra characterizes.211 As Jan Michl puts it, in the “discussions about the dictum form 
follows function it was in the main verb ‘follows’ that kept attracting attention […] while 
the word function itself was as a rule considered unproblematic.”212 He argues that such 
designers never had a clear notion of function in mind, that it “operated as a carte 
blanche: having been empty the notion made the architects and designers free to define it 
in ways that always legitimized their own aesthetic priorities.”213 
The concept may not be quite as empty as Michl claims, but the fact remains that 
it, along with form, it should be said, is taken for granted as a meaningful dimension of 
design. To get a closer look at these terms, I turn to a perhaps unexpected field of study, 
one for which design is not a matter of practice but only of theory: archaeology. 
Admittedly, design’s role and worth for the archaeological description of artifacts is not 
always clear and it is seldom a methodologically central term. Form, and especially 
                                                          
210 Louis Sullivan, “The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered,” in Lippincott’s Magazine (March 
1896), 407-8.  
211 In his definitive account of modern architecture, for instance, Reyner Banham says that “Form Follows 
Function” is no more than an “empty jingle.” Theory and Design in the First Machine Age (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1960), 320.  
212 Jan Michl, “Form Follows WHAT? The modernist notion of function as a carte blanche,” in Magazine 
of the Faculty of Architecture & Town Planning 10 (1995), 29.  
213 Ibid., 20.  
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function, however, make frequent appearances in the field; where “function” might be 
empty elsewhere and serve as a carte blanche, it has distinct meanings and purposes in 
archaeology. If we want a clearer view of our options for understanding form and 
function in design, we can benefit from an inventory of these meanings and purposes.  
Again, design is an ambiguous term for the archaeologist. In many cases it is 
simply one among others of an artifact’s “stylistic elements,” as superficial decoration or 
ornament, or it is a vague reference to the artifact’s overall aesthetic form.214  In both 
cases the word is far from a technical term and is interchangeable with “decoration” or 
“pattern.” It assumes a clearer and more decisive value in the context of so-called 
functional analysis. We will return to “function,” a cause for confusion in the literature 
because it is defined in at least two ways according to different methods and distinct 
archaeological projects. For the moment, we could define the “function” of functional 
analysis to be more or less as one typically uses the word: an artifact’s function is its 
actual or intended use, what the artifact “does.” 
There are two main approaches to functional analysis, corresponding to the 
alternatives in our provisory definition of function. Examining an earthen pot, we can 
consider its “function” in terms of the intentions it suggests or else regarding its signs of 
wear: either design or use. On the one hand, a design approach to functional analysis 
“involves anticipating certain features that might make a pot more useful for a particular 
task and then testing a hypothesized function by examining pots for the expected 
                                                          
214 Importantly, one should not interpret “style” in this context as a synonym for design: as opposed to the 
style of its production, its dimensions, or its parts, design loosely refers to the artifact’s coloration, texture, 
etc.  
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constellation of attributes and contextual associations.”215 Here the archaeologist 
understands design strictly as dessein, as the purposes realized or intended to be realized 
in the artifact. Therefore, the pot is evaluated according to the demands of such a dessein; 
we know that “a well-designed cooking pot needs to be able to withstand the thermal 
shocks associated with sudden heating and cooling,” and that its size needs to 
“accommodate a typical meal of the type for which it was intended,” and so on.216 On the 
other hand, the archaeologist perhaps will not begin with a hypothesized function; 
instead, her use approach to functional analysis will examine the artifact for traces and 
signs of wear, and from that basis will infer the artifact’s function. As she scans the pot, it 
might “show signs of thermal spalling on parts of the vessel exterior that result from 
drying wet vessels near an open fire and from rapid heating during cooking,” or, if she’s 
lucky, she may find “visible traces of burned food on the interior.”217 
While the sorts of evidence or reasoning in both approaches are important in 
archaeology, the design approach to function more directly implies a notion indispensable 
to archaeological inquiry: type. Whether she is interested in merely classifying and 
ordering the history of human production, in reconstructing an image of past ways of life, 
or in deriving political and cultural context for artifactual evidence, the archaeologist 
must arrange or construct artifact types to make sense of her data. In other words, she will 
expect or catalog regular clusters of morphological or functional attributes (if these are 
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216 Ibidem. 
217 Ibid., 180. 
 
 99 
 
distinct).  
While the debate’s details are not at issue here, it is worth mentioning that the 
nature of “types” was a matter of controversy when so-called “New Archaeology” 
emerged on the scene in American archaeology.218 An artefact type allows the 
archaeologist to track ceramic characteristics that change or remain constant over time, 
according to different dimensions of variation: shape, ornamentation, materials, method 
of manufacture, glaze, and so on. Are such types useful labels constructed by the 
archaeologist, or are they essential groups of features discovered by the archaeologist? 
The question was whether types were “definitionally associated” or “empirically 
associated” sets of attributes.219 
The rise of evolutionary archaeology has led more recent authors to split the 
concept of typology to accommodate both sides of the debate. On the one hand, types 
cannot be discovered, real entities, since there is nothing in the artifact itself to indicate 
which features of its design are typologically significant and which are not; in practice, 
design types are only held together by what they have in common rather than by 
                                                          
218 For the most part New Archaeology now goes under the name “processual archaeology.” Among the 
best accounts of “The Typology Debates” appears in Alison Wylie’s Thinking from Things: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Archaeology (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002), 42-77. See also Michael J. 
O’Brien and Robert D. Leonard, “Style and Function,” in Style and Function: Conceptual Issues in 
Evolutionary Archaeology, eds. Teresa D. Hurt and Gordon F. M. Rakita (London: Bergin & Garvey, 
2001), 1-25. The main representatives for both sides of the debate are James Ford, who argued that types 
were theoretical constructs, and Albert Spaulding, who held that types were real entities. See James Ford, 
“Comment on A. C. Spaulding’s ‘Statistical Technique for the Discovery of Artifact Types,” in American 
Antiquity 19 (1954), 390-391; “On the Concept of Types: The Type Concept Revisited,” in American 
Anthropologist 56 (1954), 42-53; “Spaulding’s Review of Ford,” in American Anthropologist 56 (1954), 
109-12. See Albert Spaulding, “Statistical Techniques for the Discovery of Artifact Types,” in American 
Antiquity 18 (1953), 305-13; “Reply (to Ford)” in American Anthropologist 56 (1954), 112-4; “Reply to 
Ford,” in American Antiquity 19 (1954), 391-3.  
219 Robert Dunnell, “Methodological Issues in Americanist Artifact Classification,” in Advances in 
Archaeological Method and Theory 9 (1986), 166.   
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essence.220 On the other hand, if we believe that certain types are more successful—more 
widely distributed, more enduring—and have been “selected for” during the course of 
history, then surely types have to be “real” enough to have been units of selection. Thus, 
authors argue simultaneously that types, as “theoretical units,” are not real but are 
“products of the mind of the investigator,” while as “empirical units,” they “must be real” 
since they “have evolutionary significance.”221  
The distinction of artefact design types as theoretical constructs and as empirical 
realities is most apparent for the typological method of frequency seriation, which takes 
its cues from stratigraphy on the one hand and evolutionary biology on the other. 
Stratigraphy originates in the work of Danish scientist-turned-bishop, Nicholas Steno. 
After his famous anatomical study of the head of a great white shark in 1666, Steno came 
to the startling realization that its teeth closely resembled the glossopetrae, “tongue 
stones,” used in medicine at the time. If glossopetrae were in fact shark teeth, then 
perhaps the stone seashells discovered at high altitudes were not natural illusions formed 
by the earth but were in fact preserved seashells.222 This led Steno to believe that the 
Earth was formed like a crystal, stratum super stratum, and that excavated series of rock 
layers could be read like historical archives. He worked out the logical consequences of 
having found solids formed within other solids (seashells within rock beds) in his aptly 
titled De Solida Intra Solidum. He there describes the fundamental principles of 
                                                          
220 Michael J. O’Brien and R. Lee Lyman, Seriation, Stratigraphy, and Index Fossils: The Backbone of 
Archaeological Dating (New York: Kluwer, 2002), 51-2.  
221 O’Brien and Leonard, 7.  
222 Alan Cutler, The Seashell on the Mountaintop: A Story of Science, Sainthood, and the Humbled Genius 
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stratigraphy: the principle of original horizontality, that strata are ideally horizontal due 
to the uniform influence of gravity; the law of superposition, that older strata lie beneath 
younger strata; the principle of lateral continuity, that strata extend continuously until the 
end of their deposit basin; and the principle of cross-cutting relationships, that a body is 
younger than the stratum it cuts across.  
With these principles in tow, the archaeologist can track historical variation in the 
distribution and frequency of artifacts and artifact types. She can also note if an artifact 
type is concurrent, or “associated,” with other types or with particular contexts. The so-
called “stratigraphic revolution” of the early 20th century consisted precisely in 
marshalling excavated evidence in view of artifact types, regarding their frequency, 
distribution, association, and context.223 In the case of Nels Nelson, one of the major 
figures associated with this “revolution,” his innovation was that he leveraged this 
information to demonstrate that pottery types developed along “very nearly normal 
frequency curves [that reflect the fact] a style of pottery… came slowly into vogue, 
attained a maximum and began a gradual decline.”224 Frequency seriation, the process of 
ordering artifacts and artifact types according to frequency curve, only involves type as a 
post hoc determination: design types are suggested by their “very nearly normal 
frequency curve”; the fact that several jugs share the same cluster of features is not 
enough, on its own, to demonstrate a distinct pottery type. The archaeologist employing 
this method has no choice but to approach types as theoretical constructs rather than 
                                                          
223 O’Brien and Lyman, 149-74. 
224 Nels Nelson, “Chronology of the Tano Ruins, New Mexico,” in American Museum Journal 15 (1916), 
167. As quoted in O’Brien and Lyman, 163. 
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essential units. 
But typological frequency seriation is often performed by researchers with an 
evolutionary view of archaeological evidence, according to which they distinguish 
between an artifact’s function traits. As opposed to the “function” in functional analysis, 
understood either as a vase’s actual or intended use, depending on whether one takes a 
design or use approach, the “function” of evolutionary archaeology and frequency 
seriation is only a name for those features that contribute to an artifact or type’s fitness. It 
has nothing to do with the purpose of pottery, intended or otherwise; objections that 
stylistic features can still be “functional” are thus misguided, since function in this sense 
is selective by definition.225 Function, fitness, survival—these terms once again describe 
the statistical profile of ceramic features; this typological method does not involve 
speculating whether an artifact is well-suited is for a given purpose or examining it for 
evidence of use. Selective, or functional, traits and adaptively neutral, or stylistic, traits 
are distinguished statistically. Robert Dunnell writes: 
Traits that have discrete selective values over measurable amounts of time 
should be accountable by natural selection and a set of external conditions. 
Traits identified as adaptively neutral will display a very different kind of 
behavior because their frequencies in a population are not directly 
accountable in terms of selection and external contingencies. Their 
behavior should be more adequately accommodated by stochastic 
processes.226 
 
The main difference separating the evolutionary sense of function from that of 
functional analysis concerns the reason for examining artifacts or artifact types. The 
                                                          
225 Robert Dunnell is very clear on this point in his landmark essay “Style and Function: A Fundamental 
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226 Ibidem. 
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evolutionary archaeologist turns to frequency seriation in order to relate artifacts in terms 
of heredity and transmission; the way typological series are associated can help the 
investigator track cultural lifespans or measure the reach of a culture’s influence, for 
example. She might have to assume that clusters of traits are “real” to the extent that 
artifacts comprise evolutionarily significant units, but as the theoretical units of her 
analysis artifact types are strictly provisional. Features of an artifact’s design are deemed 
functional when their presence is statistically correlated with the artifact type’s survival 
and transmission, while other features are merely stylistic. This amounts to saying that, as 
opposed to the functional analysis of artifacts, function and style are only useful 
categories insofar as they “describe and potentially explain distributions, not objects.”227 
Ostensibly, this leaves us with two options when examining an artifact. On the 
one hand, we employ a functional analysis, and whether we take a design or use approach 
“style” will not be a significant category. On the other hand, we can adopt an 
evolutionary approach and employ frequency seriation, for which “function itself” is 
largely irrelevant. Function here describes a successful trend; the evolutionary 
archaeology in this case would be uninterested or unable to describe the function of a 
particular pot, why a trait does or does not contribute to a pot’s fitness, or how functional 
                                                          
227 Ethan E. Cochrane, “Style, Function, and Systematic Empiricism: The Conflation of Process and 
Pattern,” in Style and Function: Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Archaeology, eds. Teresa D. Hurt and 
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traits can convert to/from merely stylistic traits.228 
There is a third alternative: one which concerns particular artifacts rather than 
distributions of traits, and yet which still assumes an evolutionary stance toward heredity 
and transmission. I have been careful to specify seriation as “frequency seriation” in the 
preceding discussion precisely because the word equivocates the American tradition’s 
method of seriation with a different method developed in European archaeology, what I 
will refer to as “morphological seriation.” 
Frequency seriation considers the find circumstances of a ceramic artifact—its 
relative, stratigraphic situation—and compares these circumstances with those of other 
artifacts, similar and otherwise. Morphological seriation, on the other hand, “is based on 
intrinsic properties or attributes of the artifacts and not on their relative vertical positions 
in a column of sediments; the last is an extrinsic property or attribute.”229 Frequency 
seriation and the stratigraphic method it entails concern the external circumstance, the 
frequency and distribution of artifacts; to the statistical trends archaeologists, the 
particular glaze or handle-shape of a ceramic design are irrelevant beyond their 
contribution to the artifact’s classification. Morphological seriation focuses on the 
                                                          
228 This last point by no means escapes the attention of such archaeologists. As discussed above, some 
critics of the style-function dichotomy object that stylistic traits still serve a purpose, and evolutionary 
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legitimate grounds for explanation. What is the function of gray paint? What in its frequency curve proves 
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intrinsic properties of the pottery itself, and conversely, it is the external circumstances 
which become largely irrelevant.  
O’Brien and Lyman remark that the “deceptively simple” method of seriation, of 
ordering items, is “rarely taught anymore except in the most perfunctory manner, with 
minimal effort to explore its roots […] or its interesting epistemological 
underpinnings.”230 While, like many American archaeologists, they strictly have 
American roots and the development of frequency seriation in mind, following these 
roots and underpinnings leads us to distinguish frequency and morphological seriation, 
and this demands a turn to Europe.  
In Europe, too, there have been long debates over the methodological value of 
artifact types. Suppose we order excavated artifacts according to formal resemblance, 
under the assumption that types develop from the morphologically similar to the 
dissimilar. Certainly, there are cases when such a seriation can provide a supplemental 
aid for tidying up an unclear stratigraphic superpositional account, but there were some 
who worried that the contextual circumstances of the dig site could distract from 
important aspects of the artifacts themselves. Perhaps seriation has something to tell us in 
its own right, beyond supplementing stratigraphy. Such was the intuition of General 
Augustus Henry Pitt-Rivers, whose concern in the late 19th century reflected a 
commitment to Darwin’s evolutionary theory. A military man with a passion for the 
history and development of firearms, Pitt-Rivers followed Darwin’s cue when he turned 
his attention to anthropology, or so he says; he resolved “to ignore the geographical, 
                                                          
230 Ibid., 59.  
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temporal, and cultural dimension of artifacts, follow the lead of natural history, and 
arrange his collection in a series of sequences composed of closely related forms” (see 
Figure 5).231 
Pitt-Rivers proposed a method for arranging museum displays of artifacts “in 
sequence,” that is, according to their development “from the simple to the complex, and 
from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.”232 Ultimately these typological series ought 
to tell us something about their geographical and cultural circumstances, “the 
                                                          
231 George Basalla, The Evolution of Technology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 17.  
232 Pitt-Rivers, A. H. L. F, “Principles of Classification (1874)” in The Evolution of Culture, and Other 
Essays, ed. J. L. Myers (Oxford: Clarendon, 1906), 2.  
 
Figure 5  
Plate III from Pitt-Rivers, “The Evolution of Culture”  
“I have arranged […] drawings of nearly all the weapons used by the Australians, placing 
them together according to their affinities in such a manner as to show hypothetically their 
derivation from a single form” (37). 
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development of specific ideas and their transmission from one people to another,” but the 
arrangement itself ought to ignore these dimensions at the outset so that the investigator 
might minimize the prejudice she contributes to the evidence.233 At the time museums 
commonly designed their exhibits according to a “geographical or racial arrangement,” 
whereby all the artifacts associated with a tribe or region were grouped together in a 
display or room of displays.  
Pitt-Rivers believed that the developmental series of material artifacts could better 
communicate a developmental series of human ideas; by bracketing assumptions about an 
artifact’s geographic or cultural context and initially focusing on its morphology, the 
archaeologist can establish relationships and continua where her prejudice may have 
otherwise prevented it. These initial morphological relationships may suggest unexpected 
cultural ties, channels of cultural transmission, functional variation and development, etc. 
This is because material artifacts are the most enduring, and thus most reliable, evidence 
the investigator has of the history of human ideas. 
Human ideas, as represented by the various products of human industry, 
are capable of classification into genera, species, and varieties, in the same 
manner as the products of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, and in their 
development from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous they obey the 
same laws. If, therefore, we can obtain a sufficient number of objects to 
represent the succession of ideas, it will be found that they are capable of 
being arranged in museums upon a similar plan.234 
 
At roughly the same time, Swedish archaeologists like Oscar Montelius were 
independently working out a theory of type and method of typological seriation. 
Renowned for his work on burial sites and on the history of Swedes and other Germanic 
                                                          
233 Ibid., 3. 
234 Ibid., 18. 
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peoples, Montelius had a reputation for the attention to detail in his catalogs of excavated 
evidence.  He thought it essential to examine all available evidence, the set of artifacts 
and other materials in its entirety.235 If one neglects some of the available evidence, one 
risks overlooking the keystone for a systematic view of the origin, order, and 
development of the artifacts under review. The process of seriation involved, as did Pitt-
Rivers’s, ordering artifacts according to their general similarity—in other words, not 
according to a single dimension of variation such as length, handle shape, or ornamental 
motif, but according to “net” resemblance. Montelius held that one could determine type 
by the “inner characteristics” of artifacts, whereby “every ‘member of the chain’ [should 
be] only minimally distinct from the next.”236 
We saw that O’Brien and Lyman distinguished between the intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties of artifacts, and what is notable about Montelius for our purposes is not only 
that he formulates and employs a morphological method of seriation, but that he 
explicitly refers it to the “inner” character of artifact types. What is more, he argued that 
the “inner” and “outer” approaches to artifacts should be simultaneously pursued, and 
that their findings ought to always be in “complete agreement.”237 This claim came at the 
                                                          
235 Oscar Montelius, Die älteren Kulturperioden im Orient und in Europa. I. Die Methode (Stockholm: A. 
Asher and Co., 1903), 2. Credit for my initial discovery of this text belongs to an essay by Priyanka Basu: 
“Ideal and Material Ornament: Rethinking the ‘Beginnings’ and History of Art,” in Journal of Art 
Historiography 9 (December 2013), 1-31. 
236 Montelius, Die Methode, 17. As cited in Basu, 18.  
237 Cf. Montelius, “Den förhistoriske fornforskarens metod och material.” In Antiqvarisk Tidskrift för 
Sverige 8 (1884). For the claim about agreement: Oscar Montelius, “Spännen från bronsåldern och ur dem 
närmast utvecklade former. Typologisk studie,” Antiqvarisk Tidskrift för Sverige 6 Stockholm (1880) 123. 
As quoted in Bo Gräslund, The Birth of Prehistoric Chronology: Dating Methods and Dating Systems in 
Nineteenth-Century Scandinavian Archaeology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 86. 
Gräslund is skeptical of Montelius’s self-assessment, and doubts whether he in fact employed both 
stratigraphy and typology in equal parts (70-85). 
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behest of his most notable opponent, Sophus Müller. Montelius had certainly consulted 
find circumstances, or the contextual relationships among artifacts in an excavated 
assemblage,238 but consistently privileged what we have called morphological seriation 
when describing his own method. Contemporaries like Müller and present commentators 
like Gräslund argue that Montelius exaggerates his use of morphological seriation, and 
that his conclusions owed much more to the “outer” methods of stratigraphy and find 
circumstances than they did to morphological type series.239 
Montelius conceded that both “inner” and “outer” approaches had a place in 
archaeological inquiry and that they agreed on the same object of evidence, but his 
emphasis remained on the inner approach, the arrangement of types by morphological 
development. At least one author today suggests that  
the important question which Gräslund ignores is why Montelius was so 
keen to forget the importance of context in chronology […] Part of the 
answer lies in the growth of Darwinism and the often quoted parallels 
between cultural and natural evolution in typological studies such as 
Hildebrand’s Scientific Archaeology (1873) and Montelius’ Typology or 
the Theory of Evolution Applied to Human Labor (1899). But I think the 
greater reason must lie with the fact that evolutionary typology was an 
explanatory concept […] Indeed, for archaeologists working the late 
nineteenth century, it was far more explanatory and interpretively useful 
than mere find combination. Archaeologists just were not interested in 
why objects were associated except as a means to an end.240 
 
                                                          
238 Not the translation for agencement. 
239 See Gavin Lucas, Critical Approaches to Fieldwork: Contemporary and Historical Archaeological 
Practice (New York: Routledge, 2001). “This question of find association and its relation to typology was 
the basis of a critique by Sophus Müller against Hildebrand and Montelius in his A small contribution to 
the methodology of Prehistoric Archaeology (1884), who argued that their approach could not possibly be 
prior to a contextual analysis; Montelius responded by saying that the two went together in practice, but 
ought to be separated for clarity” (77-8).  
240 Lucas, 78.  
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CERAMIC STRATIFICATION 
The ceramic artifact is subject to different methods, is constitutive of different 
series, and is formed as the substance of different plans. Frequency and morphological 
seriation entail different terms and procedures, as does functional analysis, but as 
procedures they are reducible and often confused in actual fieldwork; the genuine 
heterogeneity belongs less to the methods themselves than to the plans they represent, 
their priorities and their commitments.  The same vase as utility, as ceremony, as an 
index for trends in distribution, as archived in a deposit of sediment, as a material form, 
as an intended design, as an actual object of use, and so on.  
To present these heterogeneous perspectives more clearly, I should review and 
map the various archaeological distinctions and terms of our account as they overlap or 
differ in their references. The same design object is often conceptualized as comprising 
two faces: on the one hand one considers its structure, shape, aesthetic appeal, or in other 
words, its form, while on the other hand one considers the function—activity, utility, or 
purpose—realized by this form.  
There are two approaches to understanding the latter: we can examine its form 
based on how it might have performed its intended function (the design approach to 
function) or else we can examine the artifact itself for evidence of use and wear in order 
to derive its function (the use approach to function). For the most part, both approaches 
concern individual artifacts and it is possible to pursue them without regard for dig site 
circumstances or larger artifact populations. Suppose we bracket the function of our 
ceramic artifacts and instead focus on the form alone, and to understand form we rise 
from individual artifacts to an assemblage or several assemblages of artifacts. Thanks to 
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contextual information such as we gather from stratigraphy, we can map our artifacts in 
space and time and track trends in their formal traits. Some traits will be shared; clusters 
of shared traits will suggest artifact types: the traits that are functional to typological 
determinations are those that trend along “very nearly normal frequency curves,” which 
suggest that “a style of pottery… came slowly into vogue, attained a maximum and began 
a gradual decline.”241 Other traits, which do not exhibit regular trends, are deemed merely 
stylistic. 
The method of frequency seriation does look at form, but only to the extent that 
changes in form are measured in populations, according to the frequency and distribution 
of particular traits over time and space. It would only be somewhat reductive to say that 
this kind of seriation is interested in statistical trends, and that it cannot say anything 
meaningful about the form of artifacts itself, their function (as design or use), or how 
form and function are related; neither can it explain how or why stylistic traits become 
functional, and vice versa.  
Morphological seriation does not fare much better in these regards, but it will 
bring us closer. As another typological method, it too works with large groups of 
artifacts, but unlike frequency seriation individuals can be significant for determining 
series. This is because, whereas frequency seriation looked for continuity in frequency 
trends, we are now looking for morphological continuity; we set aside any external 
consideration (geography, stratigraphy, prior knowledge of cultural milieus) and arrange 
artifacts strictly in order of formal resemblance.  
                                                          
241 Nelson, 167. 
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From the order of gradual formal transformation, the external circumstances of an 
artifact have no bearing on it its membership to a typological series. Its popularity, the 
extent of its production, its transmission across time and space, the actual purposes to 
which it is set: these might be conditions that encourage a line of morphological 
development, but such a line is as it were already implicit in rudimentary forms.242 
Morphological continuity is what binds one member to the next, and it matters little 
whether a given member was widespread, long-lived, or well-adapted. According to the 
perspective or plan of morphology, a type exists wherever a continuum of forms is 
discernible.  
From the other perspective, the only pertinent fact of a ceramic type’s material 
form is its distinction from other types, such that one can mark the extent and duration of 
its appearance across strata and across archaeological sites. As discussed above, a series 
of similarly formed artifacts do not constitute a type in the absence of regular, directional 
trends in frequency and distribution. The priority of frequency over material and shape 
suggests a plan of populations, of extension and distribution, according to which the 
proliferation of ceramic types stems from the habits and movements of human beings 
rather than the potential developments harbored in the material form itself, or the 
development of human ideas reflected in successive material forms.   
SKEUOMORPHS AND RUDIMENTS 
                                                          
242 See Figure 5. 
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Following the chart below (Figure 6), we can approach an artifact’s form with a 
functional analysis (regarding Functionb), ignore its form and classify the artifact in 
morphologically determined series, or statistically derive which formal features are 
functional (Functiona) and which are stylistic. There is a fourth option, absent in our 
figure, which will prove instructive both for our present account and for our future 
discussion of repurposed design. It concerns a phenomenon which is called either 
“skeuomorphism” or “typological rudiment.” To understand these terms, we ought to 
revisit the form-style dichotomy, precisely in the sense disavowed by evolutionary 
archaeologists, i.e. as the distinction between function and ornament. 
Ornament was but one aesthetic term among others until the fervor surrounding 
the birth of Modern Architecture charged it with new meaning. Where it once referred to 
decorative motifs and embellishments in particular, it came to stand in for anything and 
everything in a design’s form that did not “serve a purpose.” The enduring enmity against 
ornament is apparent in the very title of Adolf Loos’s influential essay, “Ornament and 
Figure 6 – Different approaches to “function” in archaeology. 
Functiona refers to function as understood by evolutionary archaeologists 
like Dunnell; as an indicator of fitness or adaptiveness. Functionb is function 
as understood in functional analysis, or as it is more commonly understood: 
as activity or operation. 
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Crime.”243 Just as the human embryo recapitulates and then surpasses its biological 
evolution by the time of birth, Loos felt that the Modern child recapitulated—and ought 
to surpass—the history of its cultural evolution.244 While the drive to decorate surfaces 
with non-functional embellishments was natural in bygone eras or in “primitive” 
civilizations, “what is nature to the Papuan and the child is a symptom of degeneration” 
today: “The evolution of culture is synonymous with the removal of ornament from 
objects of daily use.”245 Function is the purpose or intended activity which ought to direct 
design’s development while ornament refers to any merely “stylistic” element of the 
design, i.e. those features which do not serve its purpose. Although the racial and colonial 
connotations have been disavowed, the thrust of Loos’s argument lives on in both 
descriptive and normative attitudes regarding design: the latter in the belief that design is 
most successful and appealing when it minimizes the ornamental or merely stylistic in 
order to maximize its functionality; the former in the belief that the history of design has 
pursued a progressive arc away from the ornamental toward design as purely functional 
as possible.  
These two modern beliefs resemble the basic terms of contemporary archaeology, 
even if the latter has come to understand “function” in an evolutionary sense. For 20th 
century archaeologists like Dunnell, functions have nothing to do with “purpose” or 
                                                          
243 Adolf Loos “Ornament and Crime (1908),” in Crime and Ornament, The Arts and Popular Culture in 
the Shadow of Adolf Loos, eds. Bernie Miller and Melony Ward (Toronto: XYZ Books, 2002), 29-36. The 
original lecture’s actual date is probably 1910, and the essay was in fact not published until 1913 in French 
and 1929 in German. Cf. Christopher Long, “Ornament, Crime, Myth, and Meaning,” in the 85th ACSA 
Annual Meeting Proceedings, Architecture: Material and Imagined (1997), 440.   
244 Loos, 29.  
245 Ibid., 30.  
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“use,” as he rightly reminds his critics, but they nevertheless sufficiently indicate vectors 
and reasons for typological transmission and distribution: a pottery type survives because 
of its functional traits, while its stylistic or ornamental elements are incidental. 
Unfortunately, such evolutionary archaeology is incapable of explaining the ornamental 
or the functional (in either sense of the term). What circumstances cause an ornament to 
become functional, and vice versa? How do pottery types begin and end, and how do they 
transition? Because these sorts of questions are the most difficult for the evolutionary 
approach, it is only fitting that we turn to an artifactual phenomenon typically understood 
as transitional: the skeuomorph, or what in the German literature is called a typologisches 
Rudiment.   
A skeuomorph is defined by the presence of design features, often ornamental or 
without apparent function, which reproduce or mimic something functional in another 
design, or which borrow characteristics from an altogether different medium. An example 
familiar to most of us is the common design of graphic user interfaces (GUI), made to 
resemble office environments before the advent of computers. “Files” are stored in 
“folders,” accessed on one’s “desktop.” Exemplary is the “Save” icon used by many 
software applications: the representation of a floppy disk.246 But skeuomorphs are hardly 
                                                          
246 Because I am only interested in skeuomorphism as it appears in archeological typology, I am not taking 
sides in debates over skeuomorphism as a design strategy. Some such criticism is mild: “GUI was justified 
using a simplistic idea that since computers are unfamiliar to people, we should help them by making it 
mimic something users are already well familiar with—the physical world outside of a computer (which in 
reality was an office environment with folders, desks, printers, etc.). Surprisingly, even in recent years—
when ‘born digital’ generations were already using computer devices even before they ever set foot in an 
office—this idea was still used to explain GUI.” Manovich proceeds to quote recent Apple developer 
guidelines to that effect. Lev Manovich, Software Takes Command: Extending the Language of New Media 
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 101. A few have harsher words for Apple’s design philosophy. See: 
Austin Car, “Will Apple’s Tacky Software-Design Philosophy Cause a Revolt?” CO.DESIGN, Fast 
Company Design, September 11, 2012, https://www.fastcodesign.com/1670760/will-apples-tacky-software-
design-philosophy-cause-a-revolt; G.F., “User Interfaces: Skeu you,” The Economist, November 8, 2012, 
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new: early pottery mimicked the shape of its predecessors, whether gourd, basket, or 
bowl. It is common to find pottery with skeuomorphic surfaces, textured to imitate 
basket-weave, netting, cords, or leather (Figure 7). The standard understanding is that the 
traits characterized by skeuomorphism are merely ornamental, whereas the borrowed 
design elements were once functional or features of the object’s material constitution. It 
remains to be seen whether skeuomorphism is “merely” ornamental, and, in either case, 
what significance can be made of its regular appearance in past and present design forms. 
  
In the German-language and Scandinavian archaeological traditions, this 
phenomenon (or one closely related to it) is called a typological rudiment, a “shadowy 
                                                          
https://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2012/11/user-interfaces; Tim Worstall, “The Real Problem 
with Apple: Skeuomorphism In iOS,” Forbes/Tech, September 12, 2012, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/09/12/the-real-problem-with-apple-skeuomorphism-in-
ios/#5401b8f1f755.   
 
Figure 7 
museum.girl, “Basketry skeuomorphism on ceramic vessel […] from a male 
grave dated to 550 A.D.” 2007. 
(http://www.flickriver.com/photos/museum_girl/4675084064/)  
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remnant of what once was.”247 When arranging artifacts according to morphological 
complexity or specialization, these rudiments signal the introduction of new design types 
and their ramification from other designs. Within the larger continuum mapped out by 
morphological seriation, these rudiments mark the seeds of eventual discontinuity, the 
moments when different purposes and stylistic trends nudge the same design form in 
different directions. They are valuable evidence for the relationship between instances in 
a series because, as we will see, skeuomorphism and typological rudiment suggests the 
direction and impetus for formal development where a “functionalist” account of purpose 
and use falls short. Standing before a table littered with pottery, an archaeologist or 
design cataloguer would be hamstrung if she were limited to a consideration of function 
alone: every artifact before her might be a “vessel used to hold things.”  
The argument or one of the arguments characteristic of functionalism is that the 
appearance of new design elements is motivated by the appearance of new needs. In such 
a view the transition from gourds and baskets to ceramics was necessary, as was the 
latter’s initial skeuomorphism of the former. Against this, one might instead argue that, in 
the case of ornamentation or the contemporaneous development of designs with similar 
functions, design change is driven by the genius of talented designers who put their 
creative stamp on old forms. Design historian Adrian Forty finds both explanations 
wanting. The functionalist argument fails to account for the immense variety of design 
forms; Forty asks, “Could Montgomery Ward’s 131 different designs of pocket knife be 
                                                          
247 “Typologische Rudimente sind schattenhafte Reste dessen, was einst war.” Nils Åberg, “Typologie,” in 
Reallexikon der Vorgeschichte 13 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1929), 514. 
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said to be the result of the discovery of new ways of cutting?”248 The design genius 
argument, on the other hand, “betrays a misunderstanding of the process of design and 
manufacture, for it attributes to designers a power and autonomy they do not in practice 
possess.”249 Instead, Forty argues that design is in a “direct relationship to the ideas of the 
society in which they are made,” that they bear “silent testimony of the fact that their 
various designs were intended for different groups of people,” and that, therefore, “to 
know the range of different designs was to know an image of society.”250 
If the differences among pots or pocket knives are irreducible to function, then 
ostensibly it is a question of their ornamentation, or, to recall our previous discussion, a 
question of their morphological profile or material form. It is from this perspective that 
the typological rudiment is an invaluable sign.251 Invaluable though they might be, what 
are these rudiments exactly? Typically they take one of three forms: 1) something is 
integrated into a new ornamental design and receives a new function and meaning; 2) 
something is “barbarized,” i.e. something in antecedent design is imitated but 
misunderstood, “retains its function, but loses its meaning”; 3) a meaningful or functional 
design element is retained but loses both meaning and function.252 
Even more so than the difference between frequency and morphological seriation, 
                                                          
248 Forty, 93. 
249 Ibidem. 
250 Ibidem. 
251 Hence the fitting title for one of our sources. Gerhard Dotzler, Ornament als Zeichen: Methodologische 
Probleme der archäologischen Interpretation (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1984). Any 
translation of this text is mine. 
252 Dotzler, 19. 
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the typological rudiment or skeuomorphism reveals the design form to be stratified by 
different plans. There are many ways we could tell this story: we have a continuum of 
material shapes understood apart from any function or meaning, a continuum of material 
shapes that do or do not lend themselves to be used and interpreted in certain ways, a 
continuum of uses or functions, and a continuum of interpretations and associations. 
Somehow all these continua mark the “same” entity, and the skeuomorph is evidence not 
only of their simultaneity, but of their mysterious commutation. The typological rudiment 
marks the ramification of new series as artifacts are put to new purposes, are no longer 
put to others, take on new social roles, or when different techniques or materials interrupt 
business as usual: it implies a compatibility of shape and use, of expectation and 
production, of meaning and function. The plans that stratify the same ceramic object 
must cooperate in a specific way in order for us to say that this is functional and that is 
ornamental, that an artifact design has been “barbarized,” and so on. 
What do skeuomorphs or typological rudiments mean? We have several options 
for how we can use them to marshal archaeological interpretation. According to one 
approach, skeuomorphism marks difficult transition periods in technological 
development: people sometimes require morphological or superficial remnants of past 
technology to ease their transition to new technology; artisans sometimes adapt old styles 
to new materials and methods. Indeed, some archaeologists have insisted that, while most 
“researchers privilege utilitarian or economic factors in the innovation and adoption of 
ceramic vessels and other artifacts,” skeuomorphism was “instrumental in the acceptance 
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of innovations such as pottery.”253 Secondly, if we assume that all ornamental, i.e. 
allegedly non-functional, characteristics of design types stem from typological rudiments 
which were once functional, then the task of typology “is to determine the original 
function for ornaments.”254 
Suppose we took the first approach; consider again the famous example of 
skeuomorphism in early basket-informed ceramics. Such pottery indicates 
not only that people wanted pottery but also that, even while not entirely 
accepting its unique physical properties (surface texture, appearance), they 
manipulated their production and decoration technique in sophisticated 
ways[, which] suggest that potters were well aware of, and versed in, the 
physical properties of fired clay.255 
 
This brings us to a third way of understanding skeuomorphism, since it is unlikely 
that people were baffled by pottery and that their worries were assuaged by its basket-
inspired surface details, or that artisans only got used to new ceramic techniques with the 
aid of such patterns. Instead, these forms 
might have a lot more to tell us about social and technological change than 
whether one material was better, newer, lacking in cultural associations, or 
more valuable. Skeuomorphism allows people to attribute the power, 
meaning, and other cultural associations of one object to a new and 
different one.256 
 
The study of ceramic skeuomorphism is important because it “reveals the potter’s 
                                                          
253 John H. Blitz, “Skeuomorphs, Pottery, and Technological Change,” in American Anthropologist 117.4 
(2015), 665. 
254 Dotzler, 65. 
255 Catherine J. Frieman, “Innovation and Identity: The Language and Reality of Prehistoric Imitation and 
Technological Change,” in The Archaeology of Hybrid Material Culture, ed. Jeb J. Card (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 2013), 321. 
256 Frieman, 323. 
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culturally determined conception of the proper shape and appearance of a vessel, copied 
from a familiar nonceramic prototype container.”257 
The second and third approaches to the skeuomorph recall basic aspects of 
agencement and the plans it comprises. If the features of design we now understand as 
functional were once ornamental, or vice versa, this suggests that the categories of 
“function” and “ornament,” despite their apparent discontinuity, are in some way 
continuous. The continuity of these discontinuous attributes reflects the plans of the two 
seriation methods discussed above: on the one hand an artifact is understood according to 
its function, distribution, and frequency, while on the other hand, we view it in terms of 
its material form, a form with the potential to develop in different directions and to lend 
itself to different uses. Deleuze and Guattari might say a plan d’organisation on the one 
hand and a plan de consistence on the other.  
Design is an ambiguous term, and I’ve suggested that this ambiguity ought to be 
embraced rather than differentiated. “The study of ceramic design” may refer to a vase’s 
material, its shape, the process of its making, its use, its ornamentation, its frequency or 
distribution, its heritage and legacy, and so on. Perhaps not the design “itself,” but the 
study of design reveals a conformity of different considerations or perspectives, aspects 
under which the same ceramics form as different substances. This is most salient in our 
third approach to skeuomorphs, according to which basket-inspired pottery reflects 
material, technical, cultural, and political trends—a confluence of materials and ideas.  
CONCLUSION 
                                                          
257 Blitz, 667. See also Blitz 666-7 for an excellent account of the literature on ceramic skeuomorphism. 
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As we developed our understanding of agencement and began to articulate that 
understanding in the terms of design, our initial breakthrough was that an agencement in 
Deleuze’s work was an agencement of plans. We might have doubled our trouble: now 
we had two French terms which were difficult to translate, and which had several distinct 
possible meanings. A survey of its appearances in Deleuze and Guattari’s writings as well 
as a few of the roles it has played for related philosophers gave us a clearer sense of its 
meaning as well as the meaning of agencement. What is more, our survey furnished 
criteria for design, desiderata for an approach to design suitable for an approach to 
Deleuze. We had hoped to find a way to think of design such that it comprised 
heterogeneous aspects or points of view, such that these points of view were not merely 
subjective attitudes independent of the design itself but were immanent to it, such that 
these points of view were commutative and interdependent, and finally, such that it 
implied both Problems of Consistency. In what remains of our project, we will find that 
other practical and theoretical approaches to design confirm our present archaeologically-
informed account. 
First, we saw that the different methods for determining archaeological types 
implied heterogeneous plans: one according to a morphological seriation, and one 
according to a frequency seriation. We might also distinguish, as biologists do regarding 
the notion of “species”, between a vertical and horizontal understanding of type.258 There 
                                                          
258 Simpson distinguishes between a horizontal, genetic concept of species that refers to groups of actually 
or potentially interbreeding, distinct, natural populations of organisms—horizontal, because 
contemporary—and a vertical, evolutionary concept of species that refers to lineages which have developed 
separately and which have characteristic evolutionary roles and tendencies—vertical, because linked in 
ancestor-descendent sequences. See George Gaylord Simpson, The Principles of Animal Taxonomy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1961).  
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were also different senses of the word, “function,” and in all cases, these different 
approaches and different meanings all laid equal claim on the archaeological artifact, but 
according to different plans: function as use or as design, function as opposed to style, 
function as opposed to ornament, and so on.  
Third—I will come back to the second desideratum—these plans are commutative 
and interdependent. For Hjelmslev, commutation occurs when a “correlation in one plane 
[…] has relation to a correlation in the other plane of language.”259 His language is 
technically precise: correlation is defined as a disjunctive, “either-or function,” while a 
relation refers to a conjunctive, “both-and function”; the former belongs to a linguistic 
system—e.g. either singular or plural, either b or p—while the latter belongs to actual 
linguistic processes of text or speech—e.g. r and u and n.260 We know we are dealing with 
something commutative if we can discern a correlation, or systematic disjunctive 
alternative, on one plan which is analytically heterogeneous but which is in actuality 
inevitably conjoined with such a disjunctive alternative on another plan.261  
Put another way, in order for plans to qualify as commutative, they must meet two 
main requirements. First, they must be heterogeneous; if either is reducible to the other, 
we are ultimately dealing with a single plan and cannot reasonably say that the 
“correlation” on one is related to a correlation on the other. Second, while they must be 
irreducible, they must actually appear conjoined in experience; otherwise they do not 
                                                          
259 Hjelmslev, Prolegomenon, 66. 
260 Ibid., 36. 
261 Siertsema deems it unlikely that the “relation” in Hjelmslev’s definition of commutation is the both-and 
function he describes elsewhere, but I believe that insisting on such a reading highlights the characteristic 
of agencement I have tried to develop: that plans are heterogeneous but nevertheless appear conjoined. See 
Siertsema, 165.  
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bear a real relationship. If design is commutative, then a change on one plan should 
accompany a change on another plan, and vice versa: a change in A should result in a 
change in B, while a change in B should reflect a change in A. And a consequence of our 
two requirements is that, as heterogeneous, A’s permutation in B will likely not resemble 
B’s permutation in A. Consider one of the examples that led Hjelmslev to posit 
heterogeneous plans: s exists as a unit of both sound and meaning. From kite to kites, a 
change in content (plurality) can indicate a change in expression (the sound /s/) and vice 
versa. However, plurality does not always demand an added /s/; see for example the 
permutation of mouse to mice. Furthermore, from write to writes, the change in 
expression (an added /s/) shifts the content from plural to singular, contrary to the added 
/s/ in kites. This lack of symmetry demonstrates the heterogeneity as well as the 
commutative relationship of these linguistic plans.  
We identified several candidates for the plans of design: because they sound an 
awful lot like Hjelmslev’s own “content and expression,” we can refer to the difference 
between form (as shape) and function (as use) for an example. First, we note that each of 
these plans involves its own correlations, or disjunctive alternatives: cookware can take 
many forms, it can be shaped in one way or another; cookware can be made to serve 
many functions, e.g. it can be used for frying or boiling. Second, we note that a change in 
the form, in materials or dimensions, affects what one can cook and how one cooks it. 
And with the development of new culinary functions and techniques, we will need to 
form our cookware differently, to adjust its materials and dimensions.  
Fourth, our example of commutative cookware already suggests how design 
might involve both of the “problems of consistency” we have described. The first 
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problem of consistency concerns the “endoconsistency” of heterogeneous elements; plans 
which are heterogeneous stick together, nevertheless. We briefly interpreted this problem 
through the theoretical frameworks of Spinoza and von Uexküll: for Spinoza, “internal 
consistency” might refer to the fact that the irreducible attributes of thought and 
extension nevertheless find their consistency in the same substance; for von Uexküll it 
refers us to the agencement of an animal’s Merkwelt and Wirkwelt, the link between a 
world of activity and a world of perception. On the basis of the term alone, “design” 
implies a consistency common to dessein and dessin—in the abstract dessin of our design 
we find things we did not intend in our dessein, unintended desseins lurking in an initial 
dessin. 
When different plans meet in design, as consistent, we are led to draw a further 
plan, one of consistency. From this perspective we might consider the design’s unique 
way of coordinating its plans; on a plan of consistency we might track how far we can 
“push” this style before the design no longer holds, or before it dissolves, or becomes 
something else. It is as if, “beneath” the design understood as function and/or form, we 
discover the ground that lends itself to this particular commutation of function and form. 
Thus, in addition to its internal consistency, we find design under “external” conditions 
which render it functional, pleasing, appropriate, and so on.262  
Spinoza’s external consistency resides in the relationship between the attributes 
and substance itself, rather than the attributes’ internal consistency in substance: thought 
and extension share an order and connection, which means that we can abstractly 
                                                          
262 Recall that the -gencer in agencer refers both to the creation of something and to the presence of a 
pleasing quality. Ad-gencer means something like “to bring to be,” “to bring into being,” or “to bring to the 
point of being pleasing or suitable.” 
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consider this order and connection to arrive at an affective continuum—the logic 
according to which substance lends itself to form as thought in this way, or to form as 
extension in that way.263  
Von Uexküll’s version of the story appears with the “solid chaos” of the oak tree; 
the oak is sliced into countless forms according to the different Umwelten of its 
inhabitants (as well as its own Umwelt), so that, taken together, the oak tree “itself” can 
only be chaos. But this chaos was not entirely indeterminate, for it had to be “solid 
enough” to support its various instantiations and to distinguish it from other chaoses 
(from the elm tree, from a boulder, from a Jeep Cherokee). With design, we can oppose 
all other plans to that suggested by the skeuomorph and by morphological seriation: the 
potential of future shapes in a present shape, the plan that lends basketry to pottery and 
which stretches a ceramic vessel across culinary, carrying, and ceremonial purposes. 
Accordingly, and in view of this brief comparison to Spinoza and von Uexküll, we might 
distinguish the second problem of consistency from the first by calling its plan one of 
“support,” distinct from the previous plan of consistency.  
Finally, all of this brings us to the second of our desiderata, the expectation that 
the features of our description belong to design, to the “object,” and are not merely 
“subjective” projections onto it. Even though we have limited ourselves to the 
archaeological study of pottery, our account of Deleuze, his predecessors, and 
archaeological typology has borne out this requirement. Granted, the oak tree appears 
differently according to the formal demands of different animal subjects, but there must 
                                                          
263 This is in fact the subject of Book III of The Ethics. 
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be something in the oak tree which supports these different appearances. In a 
morphologically determined typological series, a design “supports in advance” its later 
development, subsequent uses in subsequent contexts. It is as though its eventual 
functional and ornamental features were “preformed,” in what we retroactively determine 
to be typological rudiments. In Deleuze’s parlance, we describe a perspective that is 
virtual, that is, real without being actual.   
In typological rudiments we see, from the present, a past design’s potential future. 
Given a present design form, who is to say what new morphological developments or 
new functions it will support? It may bear what will be the rudiments for future types. 
What cements design’s relationship to Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of plans is the idea 
of support, or of affordance. A design affords or lends itself to certain interpretations and 
uses; we might justifiably call any discrepancy in interpretation or use a matter of 
perspective, but only on condition that such “perspective” requires its support in the 
design “itself.” The logic of affordance is implicit in Deleuze’s work and even directly 
stated in Guattari’s: 
[Y]ou cannot make a mold for a key out of just anything—you need a 
particular kind of wax; if you were to try doing it with mashed potato, you 
could not hold or transfer the diagrammatic outline that makes the key 
what it is. If you want to reproduce that outline on paper you need a brush 
that is not too broad, and ink that is neither too thin nor too thick. In other 
words you must choose materials of expression suited to the features of 
the machinism you want to transfer.264  
 
This logic, according to which the singular traits of a system of connection meet 
with the “capacity of the materials of expression to use, to activate, to organize that 
                                                          
264 Felix Guattari, “Concrete Machines,” in Molecular Revolution, 155.  
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system of connection,” will be the subject of the next chapter, as we continue on to 
discuss the “diagram” and its place in design.265 
  
                                                          
265 Ibidem.  
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CHAPTER III 
DESIGN BETWEEN DESSIN AND DESSEIN: 
DIAGRAMS ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE 
“Newton did not shew the cause of the apple falling, but he shewed a similitude between 
the apple and the stars.” 266 
“The form, then, of any portion of matter, whether it be living or dead, and the changes of 
form which are apparent in its movements and in its growth, may in all cases alike be 
described as due to the action of force. In short, the form of an object is a ‘diagram of 
forces.’”267 
D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson 
 
An agencement crosses two axes: on one axis it is stratified along a plan of 
content and a plan of expression; on the other axis, it comprises both a plan 
d'organisation and a plan of consistency. So the story goes with Deleuze and Guattari's 
most detailed definition of the term. We looked more closely at what plan meant, both in 
these four individual cases and in its general significance for the definition of 
agencement. Our inquiry allowed us to think of plans as aspects, considerations, or points 
of view, and the heterogeneity or irreducibility of these points of view helped us define 
two distinct "problems of consistency." Consistency is first an issue when we try to 
account for the continuity of the irreducible plans proper to an agencement. But insofar 
as this agencement can change, can drift away or dissolve, and insofar as it is by 
definition suitable for something or pleasing to someone, the question of the 
                                                          
266 D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson, On Growth and Form, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1942), 9.  
267 Ibid., 16. 
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agencement's "external" consistency remains.  
In this chapter, I argue that the different ways of combining plans—described by 
the two problems of consistency--represent different sides of the concept of "diagrams," 
as these appear in design and in Deleuze. We will describe design according to Deleuze's 
use of the concrete and abstract: design is abstract when a function of distribution and 
concrete when collective. The concept of the diagram directs our attention to the virtual 
"would-bes," the "real possibilities" of an agencement in one case and of design in the 
other. 
CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER’S WHOLE PROBLEM 
The two architects perhaps most known for their theoretical development and 
practical use of diagrams butt heads in their infamous exchange at the Graduate School of 
Design at Harvard; among other things, Christopher Alexander and Peter Eisenman 
disagreed on the architectural value of discord, i.e. whether there were circumstances that 
called for the design of an uncomfortable space, or whether discomfort could be valuable 
or productive. Alexander stood adamant against the idea; for him, the architect’s sacred 
duty is to foster harmony in the world by attending to the inner principles of form such as 
are found in nature, to act as a sort of paladin in the service of life, wholeness, and 
completeness.268  
                                                          
268 The positive and humanist tones of Alexander’s profile cannot be overstated. In his famous debate with 
Peter Eisenman, when discussing disharmony and architectural forms designed to be confrontational and 
uncomfortable, Alexander exploded that such architects were “screwing up the world.” He goes on to decry 
the idea that discord, failure, or incompleteness might have architectural value, claiming that such views—
characteristic in his mind and in others’ of postmodernism and deconstructionism—are “really fucking up 
the whole profession,” since architects “are entrusted with the creation of harmony in the world” (247-8). 
For a transcript of the debate, see Nikos Salingaros, Unified Architectural Theory: Form, Language, 
Complexity (Portland: Sustasis, 2012), 236-49. Paul Rand was responsible for the most prominent logos of 
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What he calls the “life” of a building or town grows directly from “the inner 
nature of the people, and the animals, and plants, and matter which are in it.”269 Good, 
living design is an organic process of cultivating the character particular to a given 
arrangement of elements; Alexander sometimes calls it life, or wholeness, or 
completeness, but because it “is never twice the same, because it always takes its shape 
from the particular place in which it occurs,” the standard for good design cannot be 
universally stated; it is a quality which “cannot be named.”270 
Good architecture is “alive” in the way a campfire might be said to be alive, if 
“made by someone who really understands a fire.”271 Yet we typically understand life in 
literal or biological terms, and Alexander wants to insist that there is nothing 
metaphorical about the nameless quality, even though it applies to non-biological 
phenomena. We might call it “wholeness,” but that could inappropriately place 
boundaries on the quality or prevent us from thinking of it as open-ended; he then 
suggests “comfortable,” but then worries that some of our uses of the word might distract, 
such as when used as a euphemism for wealth.272 Thus Alexander continues—he 
repeatedly tries to name the hallmark of good design and revokes each candidate no 
sooner than he proposes it. If the architect’s task is to cultivate and support the “nameless 
                                                          
American society: IBM, UPS, ABC, and more. Much like Alexander, he understands design as an “organic 
and functional unit, each element of which is integrally related to the others, in harmony with the whole, 
and essential to the execution of the idea.” Paul Rand, Thoughts on Design (New York: Wittenborn and 
Company, 1947), 1. 
269 Christopher Alexander, The Timeless Way of Building (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 7. 
270 Ibid., 25-6.  
271 Ibid., 29.  
272 Ibid., 33.  
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quality” proper to good design, it remains to be seen how this quality can be identified 
and reproduced, whether by designer or philosopher.  
What is most noteworthy for us about Alexander’s concern for harmony and 
wholeness is not the normative, quasi-spiritual value he lends it but the way in which it 
informs his understanding of diagrams. In his dissertation, before he shifts his vocabulary 
away from diagrams in favor of a “pattern language,” he defines a diagram as “an 
abstract pattern of physical relationships which resolves a small system of interacting and 
conflicting forces, and is independent of all other forces, and of all other possible 
diagrams.”273 As with so many others, Alexander’s account of design privileges its 
relationship to problems and solutions; the abstract pattern of a diagram maps a problem 
as well as the series of its possible solutions. A design form consists in a concrete 
instance of or solution to an abstract problem.  
While form may be the “ultimate object of design,”274 a myopic consideration of 
form at the expense of everything else will prevent the designer from achieving the 
wholeness or Alexander’s nameless quality. In his attempt to trace “design problem[s] to 
[their] earliest functional origins” in order to “find some sort of pattern in them,” he splits 
the design problem in two halves that together account for why a diagram’s forces are 
interacting and conflicting—why these forces need resolving.275 Every design problem 
“begins with an effort to achieve fitness between two entities: the form in question and its 
                                                          
273 Christopher Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), v. 
274 See Ibid., 15. 
275 Ibidem. 
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context. The form is the solution to the problem; the context defines the problem.”276  
Form alone is not enough to characterize design, and the distinction and 
relationship between solution and problem, context and form, suggests what makes 
design a distinct term from form, shape, or appearance: “when we speak of design, the 
real object of discussion is not the form alone, but the ensemble comprising the form and 
its context.”277 The form of a chair refers us to the chair itself, its structure or its 
composition. The chair’s design, on the other hand, implies that we ought to consider its 
form in context, that is, in a field of preferences and desires, possible acts which may or 
may not be intended, accidental, desirable, consciously performed, and so on. It is the 
chair’s context which constitutes the “problem” of its design, and a design-form’s context 
is complex and dynamic. Hence why design is a problem not only because we can 
theoretically discern the needs satisfied by a particular form, but, “in real world cases,” 
because the designer must attempt to “make a diagram for forces whose field [they] do 
not understand.”278 
Hence also why designers working in fields as distant as product design, graphic 
design, architecture, and engineering often agree in reminding us that a design’s problem 
can be just as elusive as its solution. Nigel Cross, in Design Thinking, complicates a 
famous adage from architect Denys Lasdun: “Our job is to give the client not what he 
wants, but what he never dreamed he wanted.” Cross points out that, after interviewing 
                                                          
276 Ibidem. 
277 Ibid., 16. 
278 Ibid., 21.  
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leading product designers and reviewing their careers, “‘the solution’ is not always a 
straightforward answer to ‘the problem.’ A solution may be something that not only the 
client, but also the designer ‘never dreamed he wanted.’”279 The problem is not clearly 
given in advance, and the process of design involves the determination of the problem no 
less than it does the formulation of its solution. Thus, since design comprises both context 
and form, problem and solution, Alexander’s diagrams need to account for both.  
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
 Design indisputably has some relationship with problems. One approach to 
understanding this relationship is to treat a design as a solution to a problem or a set of 
problems, as the expressed product of a panoply of pressures, preferences, and 
constraints: from clients, contractors, communities, climate conditions, etc. The risk in 
characterizing design as solution, however, is that one might lose sight of what we have 
just described as a hallmark of design—as a concept and as a process. Design problems 
are not given, ready in advance, and are not dissolved in their design “solutions.” Design 
embodies problems no less than solutions to problems, as succinctly expressed by the 
series of reflections which accompanied the construction of the Design Research 
Laboratory’s DRL Ten Pavilion: Nine Problems in the Form of a Pavilion.280 
Because Alexander formulated his notion of diagrams in terms of problems and 
solutions, as the context and form constitutive of design, we turn again to Deleuze, in 
                                                          
279 Nigel Cross, Design Thinking: Understanding How Designers Think and Work (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2011), 10.  
280 Nine Problems in the Form of a Pavilion, eds. Alan Dempsey and Yusuke Obuchi. London: 
Architectural Association, 2010. 
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whose career problems are an enduring subject. He opposes two common ways of 
understanding problems and problem-solving, entrenched both within and without the 
philosophical tradition. From one end, we might try “tracing problems from supposedly 
pre-existing propositions”; from the other, we might evaluate given problems “according 
to the extrinsic and variable form of the possibility of their finding a solution.”281 
The first corresponds to what Deleuze calls an “natural illusion” that results from 
understanding a problem only in an interrogative form which requires that its solution 
takes the form of a proposition. Interrogation then “dismembers problems and questions, 
and reconstitutes them in accordance with the propositions of the common empirical 
consciousness.”282 In other words, although problems are themselves extra-propositional, 
as something abstract which only exists as expressed in its solutions, we mistake them for 
interrogative statements which are “given ready-made,” and which “disappear in the 
responses or the solution.”283 Suppose we understood a problem in the form of a question, 
“What is half of twenty?” The issue here is that such a question is often framed with a 
solution already in mind, a proposition given in advance from which the question is 
derived: “Half of twenty is ten.”  
Not only is the problem and its solution assumed to be given and ready-made, but 
this illusion leads us to presume that the sense or standard according to which 
propositional responses are judged true or false is also given in advance. Deleuze writes: 
                                                          
281 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2001), 161. Gilles 
Deleuze, Différence et repetition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 209. Henceforth DR. 
282 Ibid., 157/204. 
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Far from being concerned with solutions, truth and falsehood primarily 
affect problems. A solution always has the truth it deserves according to 
the problem to which it is a response, and the problem always has the 
solution it deserves in proportion to its own truth or falsity—in other 
words, in proportion to its sense.284 
 
Even in the case of our simple example, “What is half of twenty?” the problem 
expressed in the question dictates its requirements and the conditions under which a 
solution will or will not satisfy its requirements. Among other things, it implies in what 
sense we should understand the word, “half.”  
The second common way of approaching problems Deleuze opposes corresponds 
to the “philosophical illusion,” according to which we might recognize the need to “apply 
the test of truth and falsity to problems themselves,” but mistakenly assume that “the 
truth of a problem consists only in the possibility that it receives a solution.”285 No less 
than with the natural illusion, judging problems according to their solvability still 
depends on a standard external to the problems themselves. Deleuze instead wants us to 
think of problems as harboring an “imperative internal element which decides in the first 
place its truth or falsity and measures its intrinsic genetic power.”286 The potential 
solutions to a problem or its possibility of finding a solution at all ought to be 
“determined by the conditions of the problem, engendered in and by the problem along 
with the real solutions.”287  
All of this leads to a fundamental difference separating problems and solutions, 
                                                          
284 Ibid., 159/206. 
285 Ibid., 159/207. 
286 Ibid., 161/210. 
287 Ibid., 162/210. 
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because the latter can only ever be particular cases or expressions of the former. 
Propositions of solution, particular instances of the problem, general formulations of the 
problem—these “find their sense only in the subjacent problem which inspires” or 
motivates them; the sense according to which such propositions may be interpreted or 
evaluated is determined “within a complex capable of comprehending imaginary 
situations and integrating an ideal of continuity.”288 A problem consists in such a 
complex, the “‘how and the circumstances,’ from which propositions draw their 
sense.”289 Because there is something “in” the problem itself that dictates its sense and 
the sense of its solutions, problems cannot be merely subjective moments of uncertainty. 
Problems are objective, in that they themselves determine the sense of their objectivity 
for a subject, rather than having been extrinsically applied to an object by a subject. 
From the commonsense approach to problems, a problem disappears once it finds 
its solution. On this point, Deleuze contends that, since solutions are not independent of 
their problems as discrete propositions, “a problem does not exist, apart from its 
solutions.”290 In other words, it is not that problems lack reality, but that they “insist” or 
persist through their solutions.  
What we find then, in another form, is precisely what motivates Alexander’s 
concept of the diagram: in order to truly understand design as a function of problems and 
solutions, we cannot define a problem too concretely, since it will vary according to the 
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context which characterizes it. It will need to be abstract enough to address what is 
expressed in an “infinite variety of designs.”291 Furthermore, Alexander’s “nameless 
quality” is nameless precisely because a design-form’s sense of wholeness is determined 
by its problematic context, and so every diagram will imply its own standard of “fitness.” 
Finally, as suggested by Deleuze, the diagram suggests a clear distinction between 
problem and solution while nevertheless forbidding us from understanding design solely 
in terms of one or the other. The designer will have to determine her problem in addition 
to determining her solution. Her challenge is to find “some kind of harmony between two 
intangibles: a form which [she has] not yet designed, and a context which [she] cannot 
properly describe.”292 
DIAGRAMS IN ARCHITECTURE 
With Deleuze’s comments in hand we have a better sense for what motivates the 
architectural concept of the diagram, and we return to Alexander and Eisenman to see 
how this idea develops on its native terrain. We might start by considering Alexander’s 
complaint against the architecture which fails to privilege wholeness, harmony, or his so-
called nameless quality. For him, design does not “say” anything; it is not a statement, 
political or otherwise. Architecture, pursued properly, ought not to result in anything 
“abstract” because it is by definition aimed at harmony, at producing something whole or 
concrete. The problem with abstract postmodernist or deconstructionist architecture was 
that it allowed “the design,” “an image” to crowd out the processes that “play a more 
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fundamental role in determining the life or death” of a building.293 In one understanding 
of the term, “design” is the imagined final product that guides the making process, and 
the materials and procedures entailed by the making process are in the service of this 
projected image. Alexander picks up a tile whose surface is glazed with a colorful, 
geometric pattern: 
As I thought more about how to do it—if I were making such a tile—I 
began to see that the sharp, almost hard design, the brilliant separation of 
glazes which makes the colors beautiful, and even the design itself, the 
character of straightness, curvature, and the formal quality of the line, are 
all by-products of a particular kind of process which must be used to make 
such a tile.294 
 
Alexander’s nameless quality and the architecture it motivates concern the “inner 
nature” of things, the demands inherent to the interaction of people, events, and materials 
involved in a natural or built form and to its making process. In the attempt to 
accommodate such varied, often conflicting forces we can proceed on the basis of two 
sorts of pictures; two sorts of “design” can guide the process. Against the “images” of 
abstract architecture, his natural or timeless way of building involves what he calls “word 
pictures in the mind’s eye.” 
A word picture in the mind’s eye is a medium in which we can see only 
what the words describe, and nothing more. A picture on paper or 
computer representation, on the other hand, says too much, and often 
therefore contains information and decisions which are arbitrarily added, 
and which have not—themselves—come from use of structure-preserving 
process.295  
 
                                                          
293 Christopher Alexander, The Nature of Order, Book Two: The Process of Creating Life (Berkeley: The 
Center for Environmental Structure, 2002), 3.  
294 Ibid., 6-7. 
295 Ibid., 257. 
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Pictures in the mind’s eye against pictures on paper. The latter risk “saying too 
much” because they are necessarily particular expressions of the former. “Word pictures” 
are relations that can be expressed in different ways, and the architect’s expression should 
attend to the inner nature of her design’s circumstances. If I want to build something that 
“towers above me, when I approach it, this says something qualitative about its height, 
but does not yet describe the exact height, nor does it describe its shape.”296 A picture on 
paper, which expresses this relation, will imply an actual proportional height, and will 
have “many features of shape, width, volume, articulation, which have not in fact been 
generated by the fundamental process.”297Thus Alexander focuses on what he takes to be 
the more fundamental pictures, to protect his building from anything extrinsic to its 
inherent requirements. 
His work on diagrams and, later, patterns develops a commitment to his mind’s 
word pictures; the challenge is to put them on paper without letting them devolve into 
“pictures on paper.” One cannot overestimate the scope and significance of the impact of 
the pattern language he formulated as a result, in the 1970’s. None of the patterns he 
describes are presented as fixed essences but as rules of thumb in response to 
hypothetical circumstances: 
each pattern represents our current best guess as to what arrangement of 
the physical environment will work to solve the problem presented. The 
empirical questions center on the problem—does it occur and is it felt in 
the way we have described it?—and the solution—does the arrangement 
we propose in fact resolve the problem? But of course […] the patterns are 
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still hypotheses […] and are therefore all tentative, all free to evolve under 
the impact of new experience and observation.298 
 
Pattern language has been a success, not least of all in the so-called “Oregon 
Experiment,” where the University of Oregon campus in Eugene, Oregon offered 
Alexander and his team the testing grounds for developing the method.299 It has also been 
useful for the development of information, software, and architectural patterns in 
computer science; for example, the collaboratively managed structure called a “wiki” was 
largely developed as a tool “to facilitate efficient sharing and modifying of patterns.”300 
At any rate, the designer can identify the nameless quality of a well-designed 
room by carefully attending to the pattern of events that regularly occur there, a pattern 
which contributed to the room’s current form and which likewise shapes our engagement 
with it. Design becomes an interlocking system of patterns in space and patterns of 
events. See Alexander’s example of a sidewalk:  
The people on the sidewalk, being culture-bound, knowing that the space 
which they are part of is a sidewalk, and, as part of their culture, they have 
the pattern of a sidewalk in their minds. It is this pattern in their minds 
which causes them to behave the way that people do behave on sidewalks, 
not the purely spatial aspect of the concrete and the walls and curbs. […] 
Each sidewalk is a unitary system, which includes both the field of 
geometrical relationships which define its concrete geometry and the field 
of human actions, which are associated with it.301 
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In this unitary system, patterns of events and patterns in space are interdependent, 
such that neither set of patterns can exhaustively explain the entire design. A certain 
arrangement of furniture in a certain kind of space lends itself to the configuration of 
events characteristic of an “art studio,” and we tend to associate this configuration of 
events with a certain arrangement of furniture in a certain kind of space. The two sorts of 
patterns exist together; it is not that “space creates events,” nor that “it causes them.”302 
The nameless quality of good design, its life or wholeness, marks these patterns’ mutual 
fitness. 
The patterns most significant for Alexander’s architect, entrusted with protecting 
and procuring life and wholeness, are not those of events or those in space, but the pattern 
of their interaction. He wants to know precisely “how the structure of the space supports 
the patterns of events it does, in such a way that if we change the structure of the space, 
we shall be able to predict what kinds of changes in the patterns of events this change 
will generate.”303 The two commutative plans of events and geometry support and affect 
each other, and Alexander’s work leads us from particular architectural expression to the 
diagrams or patterns expressed in architecture. In houses we find similar patterns of 
structural elements and similar patterns of events, but the elements themselves appear 
differently wherever they occur, so these elements “cannot be the ultimate ‘atomic’ 
constituents of space.”304 The nameless quality remains indeterminate only so long as the 
                                                          
302 Ibid., 72.  
303 Ibid., 83. 
304 Ibid., 84. 
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architect focuses on particular shapes and structural elements—pictures on paper—rather 
than attending to the “fabric of relationships” which “repeats itself and gives the structure 
to a building or town”; particular elements are “only labels for the patterns of 
relationships.”305 
EISENMAN’S DIAGRAMS 
Alexander and Eisenman’s disagreement over the role of architecture reappears in 
their respective uses and understandings of architectural diagrams. For Alexander, 
patterns or diagrams characterize the basic relationships that make up problems and the 
solutions to problems. Because he naturalizes architectural design and understands its 
form as harmonious and self-preserving, his diagrams are necessarily iterable and 
constant; incomplete or dissonant architecture cannot endure, whereas the “timeless” way 
of building works precisely with diagrams or patterns in mind. There is presumably a 
diagram for every conceivable architectural problem, and if no diagram can be obtained 
from an actual architectural form this means that it either inadequately solves its own 
problem or that it is not clearly or actually motivated by a problem. Even if he rewrites 
the notion of design form to be living and to imply a wholeness or fitness to a problem or 
context, Alexander remains firmly planted in the modernist tradition of architecture: 
“form follows function,” still and always. The architecture’s duty is to foster harmony in 
the world, and diagrams are the means for doing so.  
In their debate, Eisenman claimed that discord might be a legitimate goal for an 
architectural design, and for this reason stood accused of “screwing up the world.” While 
                                                          
305 Ibidem.  
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a bit harsh, there are grounds to see this as a compliment—provided, at least, that we take 
up Eisenman’s side of the story. As with Alexander, his take on the concept and use of 
diagrams reflects his position on architecture.  
At one point in the debate Eisenman discusses a building in Logroño, Spain, built 
by his friend, Rafael Moneo, which included an arcade of extremely thin columns (Figure 
8). Alexander may have been unfamiliar with the building, but had a few choice words on 
the subject, even for a second-hand account.  
Alexander: The thing that strikes me about your friend’s building—if I 
understood you correctly—is that somehow in some 
intentional way it is not harmonious. That is, Moneo 
intentionally wants to produce an effect of disharmony. 
Maybe even incongruity. 
Eisenman: That is correct. 
Alexander: I find that incomprehensible. I find it very irresponsible. I find 
it nutty. I feel sorry for the man. I also feel incredibly angry 
because he is screwing up the world. 
Audience: (Applause) 
Figure 8 – Rafael Moneo’s project in Logroño 
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Eisenman: Precisely the reaction that you elicited from the group. That is, 
they feel comfortable clapping. The need to clap worries me 
because it means that mass psychology is taking over.306 
 
Eisenman, for his part, is skeptical of the reverent and unexamined demand for 
comfort—his interlocutor’s as well as that of the audience. If architecture should only 
strive to make people comfortable and to satisfy natural needs, where does that leave the 
architect who takes issue with these comforts, or who disagrees that such needs are as 
“natural” as they appear to be? Eisenman believes that architecture offers a means to 
challenge assumptions, that perhaps a deliberate sense of discomfort can alert people to 
the forces that underpin their sense of comfort and its urgency.  
The primary purpose of the diagram for Alexander is to map the relationship 
between patterns of events and patterns in space, such that we can assess whether form 
follows function as closely as we would like, or in a way that feels “whole.” While he 
assumes, in his own way, that architectural form is inevitably tied to function, his 
framework suggests a challenge to this assumption. On the one hand he holds that design 
consists in a mutual fitness between spatial patterns and patterns of events, but on the 
other hand he recognizes that these two sets of patterns can be considered independently, 
and that the patterns or diagrams he describes are tentative and open to evolve. Form, the 
set of patterns in space, can very well lend itself to new functions, new patterns of events, 
uses, and associations. From his earliest writings on the diagram, Eisenman has used the 
                                                          
306 Christopher Alexander and Peter Eisenman, “Contrasting Concepts of Harmony in Architecture: The 
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concept to suggest that “the substrate of form [as] architecture’s interiority, could be 
detached from such programmatic concerns.”307 
This is not to suggest that form, architectural or otherwise, ought to oppose 
function. What the diagram does is dissolve any necessary bond between the two, such 
that even when form does “follow function,” we might isolate the design’s formal 
dimension irrespective of any presumed function. The diagram is Eisenman’s device for 
testing architecture’s potential. When I consider a building and put aside my assumptions 
and expectations for what sort of building it is, how it might be labeled or the sort of 
events I might associate with its spatial patterns, its intended inhabitants, and so on, what 
do I have left? Whereas Alexander’s diagram mapped the relationship between form and 
function in the context of a problem to be solved, Eisenman’s diagram sweeps function 
away so that we might better understand “the formal” itself: what it is, how it serves the 
function(s) that it does, and how it might do otherwise.  
Eisenman offers a few disclaimers regarding his idea of the formal; I will mention 
three. First, the formal character of architecture at stake in the diagram is not synonymous 
with its “aesthetic,” since Eisenman is concerned with the form itself and not how it 
appeals to the senses. So, it is not: this is how the house looks, regardless of what it is 
called or how it is used. Second, it is not to be confused with a “stable set of forms.”308 
The diagram traces an abstract array of forces and lines, not the predetermined 
architectural furniture comprised in a building—façades, rooms, arcades, plinths, 
windows, etc. Third, Eisenman’s ideal of the formal simultaneously articulates “generic 
                                                          
307 Peter Eisenman, Diagram Diaries (London: Thames & Hudson, 1999), 50.  
308 Ibid., 51.  
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form, such as linearity—as opposed to a specific line—and the idea of a process of 
form,” processes and relationships only implicit in the “actual physical character of the 
form.”309 
Sequences of repeated geometrical procedures, the distorting effect of superposed 
images, small partial adjustments that snowball into a transformation of the whole 
(Figure 9)—the diagram offers Eisenman a lens through which one can detect and 
describe the formal dimension of built artifacts, as well as a way of “searching for a 
process,” a method for both understanding and creating.310 On this point, at least, he and 
Alexander have something in common. While they understand the task of architecture 
differently and conceptualized diagrams differently, both architects understand the use of 
diagrams as equally theoretical and practical: the diagram is something to be prescribed, 
realized in an actual architectural form, and it is something described, recognized in an 
actual architectural form.  
                                                          
309 Ibid., 52.  
310 Ibid., 54-5.  
Figure 9 - Peter Eisenman, Diagrams of transformation of House IV, 1971 
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DIAGRAMS, REGARDING CONTINUITY 
In the preceding chapter we reported two ways of talking about consistency and 
claimed that the concept of agencement was formulated to address two distinct problems, 
one corresponding to a question of internal consistency and the other to a question of 
external consistency. In the first, the problem is how elements can interact and belong 
together in the same agencement despite being heterogeneous; in the second, the problem 
is where such an agencement stands regarding outside forces, regarding different 
agencements. In both cases we are at liberty to frame things in the more classical or 
conventional terms of continuity or of “the continuum.” At the end of the day, Deleuze 
seeks a vision of the world without any gaps, whereby we can find the irreducible 
nevertheless continuous: the continuity of discontinuity.311   
For the purposes of this chapter, slightly adjusting our language to talk about 
continuity offers a few advantages. We have seen that not only are problems and 
problem-solving hallmarks of the concept of design, but that this is more so the case 
when we take our cues from Deleuze in our approach to problems. We will have a better 
handle on the diagram’s role in the definition of agencement (and by extension, design) if 
                                                          
311 An unfortunate oversight in our account is the way Deleuze treats continuity and discontinuity in his early 
book on Henri Bergson. Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New 
York: Zone, 1988). Gilles Deleuze, Le bergsonisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966). Glossing 
over much of the detail in his interpretation, for now I will only mention Deleuze’s comments on how 
Bergson understands the real. Bergson’s reality involves two basic steps which line up with our presentation 
thus far: first, the real is naturally articulated into differences in kind; second, “it is also that which intersects 
again along paths converging toward the same ideal or virtual point” (29/20-1). These differences in kind are 
heterogeneous, or irreducible, tendencies, intensities, or directions. Yet despite their difference, they 
converge onto the same reality. Such is Bergson’s two-step method, according to Deleuze: pursue dualism, 
first, until it comes back around to, second, a restored monism (see 73/71). Deleuze (and Guattari) offer a 
similar two-step (or two-at-once-step) in their tetravalent definition of agencement. One separates 
heterogeneous plans and recognizes their irreducible character, and then one finds the plan according to 
which they “hold together,” i.e. how they converge despite their divergence (or the continuity of their 
discontinuity).  
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we can more precisely trace its significance for thinking about consistency. As luck 
would have it, precisely those figures to whom Deleuze’s concept of the diagram owes 
most each addressed their projects to the problem of continuity or of the continuum. We 
will begin with a head-to-head comparison of so-called “diagrammatism” with its most 
famous alternative: Kant’s schematism. To work out the meaning of diagrammatism, we 
will first call on Foucault to whom Deleuze explicitly applied this term, and then on 
Leibniz to foreground its value for thinking about continuity. Continuity will also prove 
helpful when reading Deleuze’s diagram role models: the catastrophic diagrams in the 
painting of Francis Bacon and Charles Sanders Peirce’s theory of signs.  
DIAGRAMMATISM VERSUS SCHEMATISM 
Deleuze singles out “diagram” as a crucial term for Michel Foucault’s philosophy. 
He has something like the pattern of the coordination of patterns in mind. Alexander’s 
diagrams describe the way spatial patterns and patterns of events support and presuppose 
each other. In Foucault, the sayable and the visible, the discursive and the non-discursive, 
represent distinct forms that nevertheless work together to characterize a historical 
period. On the one hand, the eighteenth century saw the emergence of a form of content, 
a new way of distributing via “the prison”; at the same time, penal law as a form of 
expression emerged, a “new way of articulating infractions, sentences, and their 
subjects.”312 The form of the prison and the form of penal law presuppose one another, 
and “yet there is no common form, no conformity, not even correspondence” between 
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them.313 As before, these forms belong to heterogeneous or irreducible plans, and their 
commutation poses important difficulties for Deleuze (and Foucault). First, if these forms 
are irreducible, can we account for their communication by positing a cause common to 
both, i.e. immanent explanation that preserves their heterogeneity? Second, given such a 
cause, how would we account for the variable concrete instances of these plans’ 
agencement, adjustment, and interpenetration [l’agencement, l’ajustement des deux 
forms, leur mutuelle penetration]?314 
According to Deleuze, Foucault responds to both problems with the idea of the 
diagram. Foucault calls the Panopticon the abstract “diagram of a power mechanism” 
with variable instantiations, a certain way of “placing [implantation] bodies in space, of 
distributing and relating individuals, of organizing hierarchically, of arranging 
[disposition] centers and channels of power, of defining instruments and modes of 
intervention” which can be actualized “in hospitals, ateliers, schools, [and] prisons.”315 
Foucault is dealing with pure forces or relations that abstract from the concrete forms of 
content and expression, and the abstract diagram of these forces helps him explain the 
coadaptation of heterogeneous forms. Deleuze likens his “diagrammatism” to Kant’s 
schematism.316 
The diagram leads a double life. On the one hand, “Panopticism” names the 
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315 Michel Foucault, Surveillir et punir: naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), 207. It’s worth 
noting that Foucault also refers to this “diagram” as l’agencement panoptique (210). 
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agencement of materials that characterizes prison and which expresses a certain way of 
thinking, talking, and behaving, but on the other hand, Foucault also “views it abstractly 
as a machine” that affects and is expressed in this agencement, and which “in general 
passes through every [one of its] articulable function[s].”317 As an “abstract formula” 
which binds visible and sayable forms, the diagram’s double character is what draws 
Foucault so near to Kant. 
Foucault’s version of the panopticon is less a particular prison arrangement than it 
is the way such a prison is arranged. According to our discussion of agencement thus far, 
the panopticon diagram consists neither exclusively in relations of ideas nor exclusively 
in spatial relations, but in the realization of one sort of relation in the other. Deleuze 
reminds us that Kant’s schematism entails a similar dynamic and risks a similar 
misinterpretation: the schema “does not consist in an image but in spatio-temporal 
relations which embody or realize relations which are in fact conceptual.”318  
Kant underscores a difficult consequence in the development of his critical 
project. He establishes that experience draws on the use of two faculties, among others, 
which are heterogeneous in their operation and in their contribution to experience. On the 
one hand, we have the categories and concepts of the understanding, while on the other 
hand, there are empirical appearances of sensible intuition. But if the latter are to be 
objects of our experience such that we can apply our concepts to them, then “the former 
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318 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
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must be homogeneous to the latter, i.e. the concept must contain that which is represented 
in the object that is to be subsumed under it.”319 How do we apply a conceptual category 
to a sensible intuition, if the former is not empirical and the latter is not in itself 
conceptual? Kant has no choice but to introduce a third component, the schema: 
Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in 
homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the 
other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter. This 
mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical) and 
yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other.320 
 
Although it is the product of the imagination, as pure and non-empirical, the 
schema is not to be confused with an image because the imagination in this case “has as 
its aim no individual intuition but rather only the unity in the determination of 
sensibility.”321 Much like Alexander’s pictures-on-paper, “no image of a triangle would 
ever be adequate to the concept of it,” since “it would not attain the generality of the 
concept, which makes this valid for all triangles, right or acute, etc., but would always be 
limited to one part of this sphere.”322 The schematic form is paradoxically both 
conceptual and empirical, without thereby compromising the heterogeneity of concepts 
and intuitions. It is not a conceptual form or a sensible form, but the form of these forms’ 
mediation, the form of their agreement. As a rule of application or determination, the 
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schema regulates both how I might realize a concept in empirical form, as well as how I 
might recognize a concept in its empirical application.  
Deleuze admires Kant for positing a “difference in nature” between the “faculties 
as sources of representations,” and for having realized what follows from their 
heterogeneity, having recognized that some sort of synthesis is required “to explain how 
passive sensibility accords with active understanding.”323 Unfortunately, Kantian 
schematism comes up short, and this is perhaps where we can begin to discern the 
meaning of “diagrammatism” and its advance over schematism. Kant calls upon a 
synthetic exercise of the imagination to mediate the heterogeneity of sensibility and 
understanding, but doing so only kicks the can down the road: “for the imagination and 
the understanding themselves differ in nature, and the accord between these two active 
faculties is no less ‘mysterious.’”324 
DIAGRAM OVER MONOGRAM 
What, if any, advantage does the diagram have over Kant’s schemata? We can 
point to key differences separating his schematism from Foucault’s diagrammatism,325 as 
well as a minor but revealing part of how Kant defines schema. In the case of sensible 
intuitions, the schema 
is a product and as it were a monogram of pure a priori imagination, 
through which and in accordance with which the images first become 
possible, but which must be connected with the concept, to which they are 
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325 I.e. the version of Foucault we find in Deleuze’s reading, which builds around the diagram as a primary 
concept.  
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in themselves never fully congruent, always only by means of the schema 
they designate.326 
 
Consider the difference between a monogram and diagram. A monogram unites 
several letters, words, or images into a single image [mono-gram]; perhaps most familiar 
are those monograms that serve as corporate logos. Schematism entails that the concept 
and image are united in a monogram stamped onto every instance of the same concept or 
image. A diagram also connects different terms, but the sort of connection it expresses 
and its mode of expression is quite different to that of the monogram. The initial letters of 
signum sectionis fuse into the monogram, §, whereas a diagram such as S  S expresses 
a relation or set of relations: what-S-stands for is somehow related to what-S-stands-for. 
The monogram dictates and is attached to the figures that realize it, but the diagram 
expresses something “in” the figure which can be realized in still other figures.  
This frees the diagram, and diagrammatism, to operate regarding any 
heterogeneous relationship. Schematism reconciled sensibility and the understanding via 
an a priori use of the imagination, but was not equipped to reconcile any other such 
difference—between either sensibility or the understanding with the imagination itself, 
for instance. Concept and intuition come together in an image, a monogram, but this 
remains an “image,” and this sort of image is different in kind from concepts and sensible 
intuitions.327 As we will later see, the diagram is a peculiar sort of icon, in that it 
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expresses relations themselves and not just related things. According to Deleuze’s 
reading, like Kant, Foucault needed a third agency to mediate heterogeneous forms, and 
the diagram names both the abstract formula for the determination of, e.g., Panopticism 
and the concrete profile of the agencement in which this determination is determinable.328 
FRANCIS BACON’S CATASTROPHE 
There are many ways to begin a painting, and many artists begin their struggle 
against empty canvases and tired clichés by sketching out their ideas. 20th century British 
painter, Francis Bacon, does not sketch: he begins with random marks on the canvas and 
the “diagrams” these marks reveal.329 Beyond his reading of Foucault, the only 
substantial reference Deleuze makes to diagrams independently of his collaboration with 
Guattari resides in his Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. Deleuze arguably took 
some liberties with Foucault when he centered his interpretation around the notion of the 
diagram, but while it was not a frequent term in Foucault’s vocabulary it nevertheless did 
appear in his work. The same cannot be said of Bacon; diagram is Deleuze’s translation 
of what Bacon calls a “graph” in interviews regarding his method.330 That the term’s use 
in this instance is unambiguously Deleuze’s decision makes it all the more instructive for 
our interpretation.  
On the face of it, the diagram leads a very different life in Francis Bacon than it 
                                                          
328 For this discussion—the second occasion where Deleuze compares Foucault’s project to Kant’s 
schematism—see Foucault, 68-9.  
329 Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (London: 
Continuum, 2003), 99.  
330 Cf. David Sylvester, The Brutality of Fact: Interviews with Francis Bacon 1962-1979 (New York: 
Thames & Hudson, 1987), 56. 
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does elsewhere: it is not as clearly associated with Kantian schematism, it does not 
appear to mediate between heterogeneous elements, and there is no mention of concrete 
agencements or abstract machines. Bear in mind, however, the advantage the diagram 
enjoys over Kant’s monogram: the monogram mediates the heterogeneous by means of 
an image, whereas the diagram depicts relations which cannot be exhausted by any 
image.331 Reviewing its role in Francis Bacon, with some attention paid to the work of 
mathematician René Thom, who looms in the background and exerts a strong influence 
on much of Deleuze’s work, will underscore his advance on Kantian schematism, and 
advance that will prepare us for a crucial aspect of Peirce’s formulation: whereas the 
schema links already-given conceptual and sensible forms, the diagram reaches further to 
link the already-given with the not-yet-given, or the old with the new.  
In Semio Physics, René Thom follows up on his initial formulation of catastrophe 
theory and carries out two main tasks, or two versions of the same task. First, in response 
to the work of Jean Petitot, he wants to develop a “physics of meaning,” or a general 
theory of intelligibility; in this regard, the main hypothesis is that “only certain 
configurations of elements really make sense and can be used as a basis for intelligible 
construction that allows linguistic description.”332 Secondly, Thom was astonished to find 
that Aristotle had “already achieved” much of catastrophe theory’s philosophical project, 
and so he wanted to articulate his first task and rearticulate his standing theory in direct 
                                                          
331 Consider Deleuze and Guattari’s frequent claim that the diagram is “surlinéaire.” What matters most 
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332 René Thom, Semio Physics: A Sketch, trans. Vendla Meyer (Redwood, CA: Addison Wesley, 1989), vii. 
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contact with Aristotle’s metaphysics.333 Rather than a first philosophy which comes “after 
physics,” metaphysics, Thom is after “something that might be called ‘protophysics,’ 
source and reservoir of all permanent intuition, of all those archetypal metaphors that 
have nourished man’s imagination over the ages.”334 
The project develops two basic concepts that together form a common language 
for mathematically describing linguistic, sociological, physical, and biological 
phenomena—and perhaps more, besides: saliences and pregnances. It is the arrangement 
or agencement of these two forms that furnishes the world with “generaticity,” i.e. forms 
and figures can be generated for and by us, things can appear or appear as meaningful, 
and our milieu makes certain activity available to us. On the one hand there are salient 
forms, namely any form “clearly separate from the continuous background against which 
it stands out.”335 In order for anything to figure as meaningful, it must first be salient or 
discernable. Naturally, salience alone is insufficient for sense, as there are countless 
forms which are capable of discerning but remain unnoticed. Of the many discontinuities 
we can perceive, “it is necessary for some pragmatic or communicatory interest to focus 
our attention” to certain forms and features.336 In other words, some saliences are 
pregnant. 
Pregnances are non-localized entities emitted and received by salient 
forms. When a salient form seizes a pregnance, it is invaded by this 
pregnance and consequently undergoes transformations in its inner state 
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which can in turn produce outward manifestations in its form: we call 
these figurative effects.337 
 
The pregnance itself is not any single form but a neighborhood, and a pregnant 
form is a salient form which is able to charge other forms: my hunger is not itself a 
salient form, but it motivates and associates a neighborhood of saliences; mere saliences 
can now achieve an alimentary sense as food, as cutlery, as restaurant signs, as 
condiments, as spoiled or fresh. As mentioned above, the figurative logic of salience and 
pregnance was Thom’s way of redescribing his earlier work on catastrophe and 
morphogenesis. There, catastrophes were described as developments which appear to be 
discontinuous, as a change in form. The qualitative discontinuity appears on a plane 
transversal to the continuous function of a system’s factors. Small wonder, then, that 
Thom opens Semiophysics with a discussion of discontinuity and heralds Aristotle as the 
first and, for “maybe thousands of years […] the only one to think in terms of the 
continuous.”338 
It is not immediately clear where Bacon stands in relation to the problem of 
continuity, and it is very unlikely that he drew on Thom when developing his method of 
painting. Nevertheless, Thom allows us to reinterpret Bacon’s description of diagrams as 
“catastrophes,” and through the lens of catastrophe theory and “semiophysics” his artistic 
intervention will carry over into a broader view of the diagram. Again, Bacon does not 
begin with sketches but with free marks, thrown onto the canvas haphazardly. After the 
marks have been made, 
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you survey the thing like you would a sort of graph [diagramme]. And you 
see within this graph the possibilities of all types of fact being planted. 
[…] But you see, for instance, if you think of a portrait, you maybe have 
to put the mouth somewhere, but you suddenly see through this graph that 
the mouth could go right across the face. And in a way you would love to 
be able in a portrait to make a Sahara of the appearance.339 
 
We begin a painting primed with assumptions about the forms and figures we 
might wish to paint; the challenge is to paint something new, to paint a portrait that 
remains a portrait without falling back on conventions or clichés. In other words, we 
approach the canvas with facts already in tow, whereas the diagram of free marks isn’t 
pinned down by any of our assumptions and only suggests possibilities, which it renders 
continuous. I could build off these random marks and make them into a desert, but they 
also suggest a human face. The painting stretches between these possible facts; “in the 
midst of the figurative and probabilistic givens, a catastrophe [overcomes] the 
canvas.”340 The chaos separating a human face from the Sahara desert prepares the 
painting for a “new order,” the possibility of a figure that is both face and desert: the 
diagram reveals what is Sahara-like in the human face and what is facial about the 
Sahara.341 
Deleuze presents us with three options available to the painter who wishes to 
break with the figurative given. First, she may employ a “digital” method whereby the 
figure is reduced to a code of abstract features: the face becomes a group of lines and 
shapes with simple, blocked regions of color. The digital approach won’t do, however, 
                                                          
339 Sylvester, 56.  
340 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 100. 
341 Cf. Ibid., 102.  
 
 160 
 
since it “can easily become a simple symbolic coding of the figurative.”342 She can 
replace eyes with colored squares and the profile with abstract lines, but she preserves the 
portrait’s cliché figure, nonetheless. Second, she may use an analogic rather than digital 
approach. Like the diagram, especially à la Peirce, analogy involves resemblance, as 
opposed to the substitution of a digital code. Deleuze says that there are two distinct roles 
resemblance might play in analogy, and as a result there are two different analogic forms 
of painting.  
In one instance, resemblance is the analogy’s origin; in the other, it is the result.343 
With the first, a difference in the final depiction reflects a difference in the thing 
depicted, as when the chemical relations of a photograph “captures relations of light.”344 
Regarding painting, this amounts to reproducing diagram’s chaos or catastrophe without 
leveraging it to uncover something new. The painter succeeds in disrupting figurative 
expectations, but her success is won by muddying up the canvas to such an extent that no 
figuration is possible whatsoever. But for Bacon, Deleuze tells us, the goal is not simply 
to dissolve the figurative but to arrive at a “new figuration.” He writes: 
The diagram […] must remain operative and controlled. The violent 
methods must not be given free reign, and the necessary catastrophe must 
not submerge the whole. The diagram is a possibility of fact—it is not the 
fact itself. Not all the figurative givens have to disappear; and above all, a 
new figuration, that of the Figure, should emerge from the diagram and 
make the sensation clear and precise. To emerge from the catastrophe…345 
 
                                                          
342 Ibid., 109. 
343 Cf. Ibid., 115-6. 
344 Ibid., 115. 
345 Ibid., 110. 
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With the other form of analogy, whereby resemblance is a product, any 
resemblance between a human face, the Sahara desert, and rhinoceros skin appears 
“abruptly as the result of relations that are completely different than those it is supposed 
to reproduce: resemblance then emerges as the brutal product of nonresembling 
means.”346 There is nothing similar or analogous in the processes responsible for forming 
the face, desert, or rhinoceros, and yet the diagram renders these continuous and leads us 
to discover a resemblance that defies our assumptions and expectations about form or 
figure. Neither is the painting a mere depiction of the diagram “itself”; it does not linger 
at the moment of catastrophe but suffers it in order to emerge as something new. With 
only slight difficulty, we might re-name these two sorts of analogy in accordance with a 
distinction from evolutionary biology (Figure 10): the first, where resemblance is the 
producer, describes what biologists call “homology.” The bat’s wing and the human hand 
are both pentadactyl limbs and share a common ancestor, even though they have come to 
assume different forms and very different functions. The second, where resemblance is 
the product, is more properly called “analogy”; we discover a resemblance between shark 
                                                          
346 Ibid., 115. 
Figure 10 – Analogous versus Homologous Structures,  http://www.old-
ib.bioninja.com.au/options/option-d-evolution-2/d5-phylogeny-and-systematic.html  
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fins and dolphin flippers, even though they arrived at these forms independently. 
Bacon’s relevance to the problem of continuity should now be more apparent. 
Different figures describe the problem in different terms and under different 
circumstances, but in most instances the question is one of explaining what appears as 
discontinuous as in fact continuous. For example, something new emerges and, since 
something cannot come from nothing, we need a way to explain how it fits into or is 
continuous with what came before. Or we think of mind and body as mutually 
irreducible, and need some way to explain their correspondence in a single account. In his 
method of painting, Bacon does not want to arrive at a continuum which would dissolve 
apparent discontinuity, but instead discovers a continuity in his diagram that he can 
leverage to carve up the continuum into new discontinuous forms. He does not want to 
explain the new but to produce it. With the figurative equivalents of “mind” and “body,” 
he does not want a single account that resolves their discontinuity, but instead wants to 
see through their continuity to arrive at forms other than mind and body.  
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE’S ICON 
Guattari is clear that his diagrams derive from the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, 
who also exerted a tremendous influence over Deleuze, particularly in his late work on 
cinema.347 Guattari adopts Peirce’s sense of the “diagrammatic” as an antidote for 
theories of behavior and communication that privilege or isolate information assumed to 
                                                          
347 Cf. Félix Guattari, “Towards a Micro-Politics of Desire,” in Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and 
Politics, trans. Rosemary Sheed and introduced by David Cooper (New York: Penguin, 1984), 94-95. As 
for Deleuze’s cinematic use of Peirce, the reader will find extensive references to the latter’s Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness throughout both Cinema 1 and Cinema 2.  
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be explicit “terms of communication.”348 On the contrary, he emphasis what he calls 
“machinic information”: the non-representational element which “adds to a 
representation,” whereby one can produce new signs and new conjunctions of signs and 
things.349 This, in fact, is the context for one of agencement’s earliest appearances. On the 
one hand, language as denotation always concerns particular territory, and consists in the 
use of images, indexes, and concepts to pin this territory down as territory (so-called “re-
territorialization”). Guattari believes that the diagrammatic, in Peirce’s sense, surpasses 
denotation and describes an aspect of language beyond individual utterances [énoncés] 
and particular subjects: a collective agencement of utterance [énonciation] which 
actualizes an abstract interchange between “non-semiotically formed matter […] and 
semiotically formed substances.”350 Because so many of these terms derive directly or 
indirectly from his work, we will make better sense of what Guattari is up to if we review 
the terms of Peirce’s semiotic theory. 
For our purposes, we need to understand the nature of the diagram in particular, 
and how it stands apart from other sorts of signs. Or rather, Peirce’s index, symbol, and 
icon represent not three distinct signs but three ways a sign might relate to its object. 
Indices function according to physical effect or contiguity, an actual relationship between 
object and sign. For example, smoke signifies fire as its index because it is the effect of 
fire and because it is found in close proximity to fire. Symbols signify their objects 
according to established convention or habit. Due to the conventions of traffic law, a 
                                                          
348 Ibid., 88.  
349 Ibid., 95. 
350 Ibid., 96. In this last phrase, Guattari employs Hjelmslev’s terminology.   
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driver in the United States recognizes the symbol of a red octagon as a sign that they 
should stop their vehicle. 
 Diagrams belong to a third category: they function as icons. An icon is a “sign 
which stands for something merely because it resembles it”; take for example the figure 
on a pedestrian crossing sign, which represents the pedestrian it resembles.351 Peirce’s 
distinction is subtle, since he recognizes that in practice the signifying operation of such a 
representation is rarely purely iconic, since the traffic sign also, e.g., indicates the 
presence of human life and symbolizes a pedestrian in a particular way according to 
convention. Consider geometrical diagrams: a triangle represents a set of relations which 
it resembles or reproduces, but insofar as it “has a general signification,” or stands in for 
triangles in general, it is “not a pure icon.”352 
But while no sign is purely iconic, the icon—and the diagram in particular—has 
“an immensely fundamental role” in Peirce’s theory as “the only signs realizing 
meaning.”353 
                                                          
351 I will adhere to the convention of citing Peirce by volume and standard pagination for references to the 
Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols., eds. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. 
Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958). Charles S. Peirce, “On the Algebra of Logic: A 
contribution to the philosophy of notation” (1885), 3.362. 
352 Ibidem. 
353 Frederik Stjernfelt, Diagrammatology: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Phenomenology, 
Ontology, and Semiotics (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 29. It is interesting to note that Deleuze does make a 
brief appearance in Stjernfelt’s book, as an adversary. Stjernfelt’s general aim is recruit Peirce, and Husserl 
to no small extent, to resuscitate “the iconic” in the study of semiotics in light of wide prejudices against it. 
He recognizes and endorses the widespread suspicion or criticism notions of representation were subject to 
in the 20th century but worries that this bred an anti-iconic tendency “in so far as iconicity has very often 
been spontaneously identified with psychological imagery.” He sees the tendency in scientific inquiry, 
where “the abolition of iconical intuition of the object became conceived of as a necessary prerequisite for 
thought to become scientific,” but he finds “poststructuralism” and “philosophy of difference” no less 
guilty, and calls Deleuze out by name (51). It is true that some of Deleuze’s expressed reservations with 
Peirce’s diagram are perhaps misplaced, but when compared to the other French philosophers Stjernfelt 
names—Lévi-Strauss, Lyotard, Greimas, Barthes, Lacan, Derrida, Foucault—Deleuze is arguably the most 
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Thus, the typical index contains an icon: the footstep on the beach as the 
prototypical index is an evident example of this: we are able to recognize 
it as a footprint only because it looks like a foot, because it is an icon of a 
foot. And thus any symbol intends an iconic interpretant. […] Continuity 
is at stake in relation to the icon to the extent that the icon, while not in 
itself general, is the bearer of potential generality. The footprint on the 
beach refers (potentially) iconically to all feet of approximately (give and 
take a certain margin dependent on the granularity and wetness of the 
sand) this shape and size, as well as to all artificial feet, etc. of the same 
size—that is, in turn, to a continuum of possible feet.354  
 
The icon’s privilege can be put another way: icons are fundamental because they 
function on the basis of the qualities of the object itself that make it representable, or that 
make it possible to navigate between model and copy, general and particular. If a traffic 
sign bears the image of a pedestrian, it only represents the pedestrian by depicting those 
of the pedestrian’s qualities such as can communicate the idea of a pedestrian. In other 
words, it will not do to merely depict “a person,” “a person near a street,” or “a walking 
person.” The iconic image must depict the qualities necessary to communicate “a person 
walking near or across a street.” It is not only a matter of physical effect, contiguity, or 
social convention; the icon’s semiotic function depends on the nature of the thing itself. 
This is what Peirce means when he says that an icon is a ‘Representamen whose 
Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First,” that is to say, “a quality that it has 
qua thing” which “renders it fit to be a representamen.”355 Even if it does not appear in 
isolate, the “pure icon” can be understood as a sort of possibility, the possibility of the 
                                                          
explicitly indebted to Peirce, his most vocal enthusiast, and it seems a mistake for Stjernfelt to overlook is 
extensive use of Peirce’s terminology (diagram included).  
354 Ibid., 29. 
355 Peirce, 2.276. Capitalization Peirce’s. 
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thing to be represented.356 
It is very common for the same object to evoke multiple signs or alterations in 
signs; although they direct us to the same object, we can distinguish and classify these 
multiple signs according to the nature of their relationship to it, and we can thereby 
consider their relationship to each other. We reason that a fire is burning in the presence 
of its indices, smoke and ash, but this indication is a contingent result of the fire’s 
physical effect. Neither smoke nor ash are necessarily the result of fire, and there is no 
necessary connection between smoke and ash. My surname and my identification number 
are symbolic representations of my identity, but that I am their common object is the 
result of convention and historical contingency. But in the case of diagrams, as icons of 
relations, the unity of particular diagrams is not contingent but necessary: 
What [a math textbook] invariably does is first to describe in general terms 
a diagram […] There will probably be a figure of such a diagram in the 
book. Do not copy that, but make one of your own, following exactly the 
general description. Now the book, which understands that you have done 
this, invariably goes on to speak of alterations to be made in that diagram 
[…] Now the book proceeds to compare the original diagram with the 
altered diagram, and to call upon you to remark certain exact relations 
between them […] Your diagram shows only one way out of an infinite 
variety of ways in which the diagram might have been constructed.357 
 
The claim is that different instances diagram the same object not by virtue of 
having been written by the same person (as with an index), nor by force of habit (as with 
                                                          
356 Ibidem. 
357 Charles S. Peirce, The New Elements of Mathematics IV: Mathematical Philosophy, ed. Carolyn Eisele. 
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976), 4.200. I should note that I’ve omitted parts of this quote 
that address its immediate context. Peirce is discussing some of the difficulties in mathematical education, 
and so the quote continues: there is an infinity variety of possible diagrams, “so that although the relation 
which the book says will exist may do so in this case, yet that does not prove that it would be so in every 
case.” Hence NEM. 
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symbols), but because diagrams depict relations, and the same relations can be 
diagrammed in different ways, across different media, and with different levels of 
precision. Whether it has a single or an infinite number of instances, no diagram “can 
present more than a single object, while the verbal expression of the proposition to be 
proved is necessarily general.”358 The unity in variety of diagrams explains Peirce’s 
ambiguity between drawn, particular diagrams, on the one hand, and “the” diagram 
communicated by these particular diagrams, on the other. Outside the technical terms of 
his semiotics, he defines the diagram “in the peculiar sense of a concrete, but possibly 
changing, mental image of such a thing as it represents. A drawing or model may be 
employed to aid the imagination; but the essential thing to be performed is the act of 
imagining.”359 
We might piece these observations together and say that diagrams are particular 
types of icons, while the Diagram belongs to the “middle part” of our reasoning, between 
model and copy, general and particular. It belongs to the imagination, the object’s 
possibility qua object of becoming an image. Particular diagrams depict the same 
objective relations with regard to their shared diagrammatic features. We said that no 
diagram can present more than a single object, but it would perhaps be more accurate to 
say that no diagram can present more than a single object at once and under the same 
aspect. For a particular diagram will likely have significant but non-diagrammatic 
features, i.e. indexical and symbolic elements; in considering its perceived form, another 
perspective might distribute the diagrammatic and non-diagrammatic differently, such 
                                                          
358 Ibid., 4.219.  
359 Ibidem. 
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that “one and the same construction may be, when regarded in two different ways, two 
altogether different diagrams; and that to which it testifies in the one capacity, it must not 
be considered as testifying to in the other capacity.”360 This means that not only is the 
same Diagram expressed by many diagrams, but the same diagram can express 
simultaneous but heterogeneous Diagrams.  
THE PURE DREAM IN THE MIDDLE PART OF OUR REASONING 
Iconic signification, or the Diagram, belongs to the “middle part of our 
reasoning,” and if we stare at a complex sign like a painting long enough or closely 
enough,  
we forget that abstraction in great measure, and the diagram is for us the 
very thing. So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we 
lose the consciousness that is not the thing, the distinction of the real and 
the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream—not any 
particular existence, and yet not general.361 
 
I believe that the moment when a painting becomes a pure dream, when, as a 
diagram, it blurs the distinction between general and particular, is crucial for 
understanding Deleuze and Guattari’s references to diagrams: they are somehow between 
the abstract and concrete, are neither particular nor general, and consist in a sort of 
“dream.” In a way, although icons are technically defined as functions of resemblance, 
this dream is no longer a matter of formal resemblance: it is not the painting’s 
resemblance of a landscape, but the quality the painting and landscape have in common 
that makes it possible for the painting to resemble it. We find a similar theme developed 
                                                          
360 Ibid., 4.324 
361 Ibidem. 
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in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, who often write on the “middle parts” of relations.  
DISEGNO: BETWEEN DESSEIN AND DESSIN 
Before turning to two key “middles” in Deleuze and Guattari’s corpus—the 
concept of becoming as it appears in A Thousand Plateaus and the concept of drama or 
dream in Difference and Repetition—we should recall how “design” itself depicts a sort 
of middle ground in a way similar to Peirce’s notion of the diagram. Design has been a 
difficult term to comprehend from the start. We have found at the level of the words 
themselves that it and agencement are ambiguous for similar reasons, but what’s more, 
we find that developing an account of design comprehensive of its ambiguity entails 
working through some of the same conceptual problems which motivated Deleuze’s use 
of agencement and which plagued efforts to translate the latter. Disegno, which originally 
referred strictly to drawing, featured prominently in Late Renaissance debates on 
aesthetics. Federico Zuccari, for example, divided the concept as “internal” and 
“external.” A drawing is a “disegno esterno,” but in fact “all visible expressions of 
mental images fall into this category: letters, figures, ciphers, notes, etc.”362 Even more 
broadly speaking, external disegno included “the external forms of natural objects, which 
Zuccari understood to be the visible guise of disegno interno, the archetypal ideas 
according to which God created the things of this world.”363 He offered a speculative 
etymology for disegno to account for this distinction: the disegno we see in the world is a 
                                                          
362 Julian Brooks and Robert Williams, Taddeo and Federico Zuccaro: Artist-Brothers in Renaissance 
Rome (Los Angeles: Getty Trust Publications, 2007), 115. 
363 Ibidem. 
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“sign of God,” segno di Dio.364 Whereas disegno interno could only be one, as the inner 
principle for forming form, the formed forms of disegno esterno are various, multiple 
because actualized in sensible reality.365 Disegno “itself,” then, would be the actualization 
of disegno interno in disegno esterno; hence its central status for many Renaissance 
authors.  The word’s ambivalence was preserved in disegno’s transmission into English; 
art historians and present-day design theorists have a common difficulty: “grasping the 
problem of disegno in its full complexity” means grappling with “the fact that it is both a 
pure act of thought as well as its visible result, in which the physical work of the artist 
participates as well.”366  
Architectural metaphors are hardly rare in the history of philosophy. While some 
scholars understand such metaphors as mere symptoms of systematic or “architectonic” 
ambition, Claudia Brodsky Lacour takes René Descartes’s architectural language to 
demonstrate the kind of writing characteristic of modernity, what she calls “drawing a 
line.”367 By this she means the way that Descartes, in his Discours de la méthode,368 
“produces discursively” a line which is “based on no previously available figure or 
                                                          
364 Cf. Federico Zuccari, L’Idea de’ Pittori, Scultori ed Architetti (Rome: Marco Pagliarini,1768). 
Originally written in 1607. Zuccari was not the only, nor the first, Italian theorist to develop disegno 
interno and disegno esterno through a more or less explicit Neoplatonism. See also Romano Alberti’s 1604 
Origine e Progresso dell’Academia del Disegno, and Giorgio Vasari’s Vite de’ più eccelenti pittori, 
scultori e architettori from 1568.  
365 Cf. Zuccari, 18-9.  
366 Lichtenstein, 225.  
367 Claudia Brodsky Lacour, Lines of Thought: Discourse, Architectonics, and the Origin of Modern 
Philosophy (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 1-5. 
368 Lacour reminds us that, although Descartes’s title is often translated as Discourse on Method, the French 
tells a different story: The Discourse of Method, method’s discourse, the method which is discourse.  
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form.”369 In other words, she intends both senses of drawing: creating and pulling out. If 
Descartes’s Discourse invokes architectural metaphors and is intended to put down a 
solid foundation for the edifice of knowledge, then he develops this point by drawing a 
“line through representation by reinventing discourse as [architectural] notation.”370 
Drawing from both the Discourse as well as his correspondence, she writes: 
Unlike an imagined architect designing “places regulières” without any 
external or historical encumbrance whatsoever, Descartes’s discoursing on 
or “talking about” method is both historical and projected forward, both 
representational and intentional. Descartes’s stated “design” (dessein), his 
intention or motive, is thus not the “design” (dessin), outline, or ground 
plan the architect draws “à sa fantasie.”371 
 
Opposed to this interpretation of Descartes would be any approach which 
privileges either term: for example, creating something new by sheer force of one’s 
intention or dessein, regardless of historical circumstances, or merely tracing and 
describing a dessin of such circumstances. Lacour’s claim is that dessein and dessin need 
each other. Descartes’s “design,” understood as “neither term alone but rather his use of 
and reliance on the two terms individually,” names the “exchange between dessein and 
dessin,” the shared ground of given and intentional forms, the interaction of which 
allegedly constitutes his method.372 The designer draws something new by drawing it out 
of what’s already given; her dessein is realized in a dessin. 
                                                          
369 Ibid., 5. 
370 Ibidem. 
371 Ibid., 35, referring to René Descartes, Discours de la méthode (Paris: Vrin, 1962): “[J]amais mon 
dessein ne s’est étendu plus avant que de tâcher à reformer mes propres pensées, et de bâtir dans un fonds 
qui est tout à moi” (15). 
372 Lacour, 35. 
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BECOMING 
Near the beginning of The Science of Logic, G. W. F. Hegel introduces 
“becoming” as a key logical mediator between “pure being” on the one hand, and 
existence on the other. Pure being, since it has no content, is from a certain vantage 
indistinguishable from pure non-being; we can only really talk about being and 
nothingness with regard to existence, that is, insofar as “being has passed over into 
nothing and nothing into being.” Hegel therefore understands becoming as “a movement 
in which the two are distinguished, but by a distinction which has just as immediately 
dissolved itself.”373 It is reasonable to read this moment, the distinction-and-unity of 
being and nothing in a “third” moment of being, as indicative for the rest of Hegel’s 
project, his basic dialectical procedure.  
At first light, we find Hegel’s use of becoming similar to Deleuze’s, but, although 
we cannot enter into a more rigorous comparison between Hegel and Deleuze at the 
moment, there are important differences separating the two. The main sticking point is 
becoming’s place in the above sequence, and the methodological consequences of the 
authors’ priorities. Where Hegel derives an abstract becoming by combining a general 
sense of being and a general sense of non-being, Deleuze’s becoming enjoys priority over 
any sense of being or reality. His becoming is a purposeless, meaningless continuum in 
which being is only an instant and from which the ground to determine intelligibility is 
                                                          
373 G. W. F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans., ed. George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 60. Translation refers the reader to the German pagination: Gesammelte Werke, 
vol. 21, Wissenschaft der Logik, Teil I: Die objektive Logik; Band I: Die Lehre vom Sein (1832), eds. 
Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Meiner, 1985), 69. 
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selected.374  
Like the dream Peirce located in the middle part of our reasoning which renders 
the model and copy, landscape and painting continuous, Deleuze and Guattari attribute 
what they define as becoming to the “middle” of things. They contrast two paradigms for 
thinking about life forms, ones we might recognize from our tour of archaeology in the 
previous chapter. On the one hand, natural history concerned itself with the relationships 
between animal organisms, “the sum and value of [their] differences,” in order to discern 
“progressions and regressions, continuities and major breaks” in their various forms.375 
On the other hand, evolutionism, after Darwin, focuses on kindship and filiation, such 
that what matters most are the “highly variable degrees of difference with respect to the 
ancestor.”376 The latter may have more explanatory power than the former, but Deleuze 
and Guattari draw a surprising lesson from natural history.  
While it may not be able to think “in terms of production (from A to x)” and can 
only proceed “in terms of relationships (between A and B),” thinking in terms of 
production has its drawbacks: a strict adherence to filiation or descent may be too 
reductive.377 The relationship between animals A and B only dissolves in the evolutionist 
                                                          
374 For an excellent discussion of this point in the context of Deleuze’s reading of Henri Bergson vis à vis 
Hegel’s dialectic method, see Samantha Bankston, Deleuze and Becoming (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 
20-1. Despite their differences, both philosophers emphasize becoming and this emphasis is emblematic of 
their general projects. See, for example, Anne Sauvagnargues, “Hegel and Deleuze: Difference or 
Contradiction?” in Hegel and Deleuze: Together Again for the First Time, eds. Karen Houle and Jim 
Vernon (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2013), 38-53.  
375 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 234/286. 
376 Ibidem. 
377 Ibid., 235/286. 
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schema, A to x, if the only relationship between A and B is adequately addressed in A to 
x—if the relationship A-and-B describes is nothing but a weaker form of the A-to-x 
function. There are two complications. First, “the relationships between animals are the 
object not only of science but also of dreams, symbolism, art and poetry, practice and 
practical use.”378 Second, “the relationships between animals are bound up with the 
relations between man and animal, man and woman, man and child, man and the 
elements, man and the physical and microphysical universe.”379 Thus, that which is 
“between” A and B is a variable relation that changes as its terms appear in different 
domains, and as it intersects with other variable relations that do or do not share one (or 
more) of its terms. The terms and domains become tangled and interlocked as a “block,” 
in which they are inseparable. This variable “between” is what Deleuze and Guattari 
characterize as “becoming.” 
Let us see the basic difference between Hegel’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
becoming through an example: a werewolf—that is, in rough non-philosophical terms, a 
human being turns into a wolf. In ordinary language we might say that a human 
“becomes” a wolf once their appearance comes to perfectly resemble or imitate that of a 
wolf. Applying the basic structure we encountered above from Hegel’s Science of Logic, 
we would parse the werewolf as: (Human)  Non (Human) Being, where the transition 
of one to the other, in becoming, allows us to distinguish between being and non-being. 
In this case becoming has no content, no reality of its own, since its effect is to render 
being as being and non-being as non-being. Our ordinary understanding does the same, 
                                                          
378 Ibid., 235/287. 
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ultimately, since the terminal states (human, wolf) are significant whereas the transition 
itself is an empty operator for linking one to the other.  
How would Deleuze and Guattari make sense of the werewolf? As opposed to the 
above views, they insist on the reality of becoming in its own right: “The becoming-
animal of the human being is real, even if the animal the human being becomes is not.”380 
In both of the above views, removing the terminus, wolf, destroys the thought 
experiment. I do not “become” anything if my being does not transition into something it 
is not. But although I do not resemble a wolf in my appearance or apparent behavior, I 
am stratified by plans that may secretly link me to the wolf in a “dark agencement which 
stirs what is deepest within” me, and I can perhaps be dragged along toward becoming a 
wolf without every actually becoming a wolf.381 In that case becoming-wolf would be 
different from human-being but it wouldn’t exactly be the latter’s non-being, since in 
their agencement human and wolf would have “something in common” in becoming-
wolf. Hegel argues that without becoming, that is, abstracted from any determinate 
existence, being and non-being are one and the same. They invert Hegel’s schema: for 
him, being and nothing are the same without the becoming of real existence, whereas in 
their case, they elevate becoming such that it no longer matters whether it is “real” or not, 
whether its terms are present or absent. In Hegel’s case, becoming is the mode whereby 
we can discern being; as it were, it is the opposite in the case of Deleuze and Guattari.  
The concept of becoming is a complex one, but I believe that one of their 
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examples helps clarify the matter: the difference between a “childhood memory” and a 
“childhood block, or becoming-child.”382 Guattari tells us that memory involves both 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization: i.e. on the one hand we select and abstract 
certain features which remind us, and on the other hand we “reassemble a whole that can 
be presented as a thing,” such that we can see our childhood in the that which reminds 
us.383 Our nostalgia comes from something in a given scene which appears to escape 
beyond it: “What is actually there to see seems to be concealing something else.”384 He 
distinguishes between memory and block because the former might be confused for the 
“scene” which we would remember, whereas our childhood forms a block, a constellation 
of features in the present385 If something I do reminds me of my childhood, it is not just 
that “I’m acting like a child,” but that I participate in a block or constellation of features 
whereby I can recognize my childhood in the present. The diagram which brings the 
landscape and painting together presents us with a block that involves what is scenic 
about painting and what is painterly about landscapes. 
THE DRAMATIZATION OF AN IDEA 
Early on in his career, before his collaboration with Guattari brought him to the 
concept of the diagram, Deleuze had experimented with other alternatives to Kant’s 
schematism. In the years surrounding the publication of Difference and Repetition, he 
often described the spatiotemporal dynamism of an idea according to which it is 
                                                          
382 Ibid., 294/360. 
383 Félix Guattari, “Concrete Machines,” 154.  
384 Ibidem. 
385 Ibidem. 
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actualized, according to which it is articulated in problems or in solutions. He called this 
dynamism a “drama,” or a dramatization of the idea. The concept of “drama” is another 
instance of Deleuze working “between” things: similar to Kant’s schematism, the drama 
helps us mediate between an idea and its actualization. Insofar as the diagram was 
another way for Deleuze and Guattari to negotiate their concerns with schematism, 
dramatization’s role in this regard can shed further light on how we should interpret the 
diagram. 
Deleuze and Guattari have a habit of switching out their terminology; long before 
they would give up their desiring-machines in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze’s drama all 
but disappeared by the time the two thinkers met. The basic concern with continuity 
remains: an idea takes on a new form in new circumstances, which may imply that the 
element necessary for its differentiation was already present, inherent to the idea itself. 
The new should be continuous with the already-given, and the form of all three—the 
new, the given, their continuity—is supplied by its dramatization, the idea as “in itself a 
system of differential relations and the result of a distribution of remarkable or singular 
points (ideal events).”386  
Kantian schematism is only equipped to answer the question, “What is this?” That 
is, the schema’s mediation between concept and intuition functions in a way limited to 
recognition and reproduction. Hence why it is so often characterized as a procedure: 
being able to “draw a line” with my imagination helps me to apply the concept, “line,” to 
                                                          
386 Gilles Deleuze, “The Method of Dramatization,” in Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953-1974, ed. 
David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 94. “La méthode de 
dramatisation,” in L’Île déserte: textes et entretiens 1953-1974, ed. David Lapoujade (Paris: Minuit, 2002), 
132.  
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the sensible lines of my intuition. Schematism’s implicit demand is to account for 
conceptual judgments.387 What is this? By what right do I apply a concept to an intuition? 
Given an intuition, what concept corresponds? Such are the questions which motivate 
Kant’s schemata. Deleuze, on the other hand, proposes other questions that indicate a 
more complex scene: Who? How much? How? Where? When?388 
To reiterate, it is not a matter of applying a concept, “line,” to an intuition, but of 
a differential system of relations, or an “Idea,” which dictates how to distinguish different 
lines, different senses of linearity, and so on. We saw earlier that a problem expressed an 
internal character which differentially determined the form of its solvability, the standard 
against which we can judge its possible solutions: Deleuze said another name for this 
internal character was sense. Something similar is going on with the dramatization of 
concepts. The differential element of an Idea determines the sense according to which we 
should understand “line.”  
We should take “drama” literally: in order for lines to be 
differenciated/differentiated, or in order for this to “play out,” “the stage must be set.” It 
is like a conceptual screenplay: there are roles, rules, relationships, themes, and motifs; 
the audience’s variability, the director’s concealed but demanding stage direction, and the 
venue’s particularity provide a selective pressure for new and different performances of 
the same “script.” This is not to mention the many dramas involved in the main drama: 
                                                          
387 DR, 218. “A schema is indeed a rule of determination for time and of construction for space, but it is 
conceived and put to work in relation to concepts understood in terms of logical possibility: this is so much 
part of its nature that it does no more than convert logical possibility into transcendental possibility. It 
brings spatio-temporal relations into correspondence with the logical relations of the concept.” 
388 See Deleuze, “Method of Dramatization,” 94/131. 
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the dramas of the actors’ individual lives, their interpersonal dramas, their drama with the 
director, and so on.  
Whereas the schema “does not account for the power with which it acts,”389 the 
differential dynamism expressed in the drama already includes the subject and conditions 
for the incarnation of ideal relations and the specification of concepts—even if this 
subject only exists in a larval form. Larval because “there are movements which the 
embryo alone can endure,” and at the level of dramatic dynamism itself, the only subjects 
are “rough drafts, not yet qualified or composed, rather patients than agents.”390 The 
drama’s subject is still unqualified and will be qualified only as it is subject to the 
complex of relations comprised in an Idea. One of Deleuze’s oldest examples is that of 
the island, which is dramatized at several levels. 
Take the Idea of an Island: geographical dramatization differenciates it or 
divides the concept into two types, the original oceanic type which signals 
an eruption or raising above the sea, and the continental drift type which 
results from a disarticulation or fracture. The Island dreamer, however, 
rediscovers this double dynamism because he dreams of becoming 
infinitely cut off, at the end of a long drift, but also of an absolute 
beginning by means of a radical foundation.391  
 
The Island dreamer is not yet a fully composed individual but is dramatic role 
conditioned by the dramatic constraints placed on it by the Idea of an Island. The drama’s 
geological moments take on a particular sense, according to which the island’s concept 
can be divided and according to which they can resonate with other, non-geological 
                                                          
389 DR, 218.  
390 Deleuze, “Method of Dramatization,” 97/136. 
391 DR, 219-20. See also one of Deleuze’s earliest publications, “Desert Islands,” in Desert Islands and 
Other Texts: 1953-1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 
9-14. 
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situations. By means of this sense, and the drama which expresses it, all of these 
discontinuous elements are rendered continuous.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the diagram will resemble that of each of these 
three concepts: disegno, becoming, and drama. Disegno was drawn between the 
“internal” and “external,” just as Descartes developed a method of discourse that 
mediated between dessin and dessein. Like becoming, the diagram will suggest a virtual 
continuum anterior to actualized forms; and like Deleuze’s dream, it is made up of 
differential relations which condition the way in which such forms are actualized—the 
rules, the roles, the script. We turn now to see how Deleuze and Guattari discussion the 
diagram in particular, especially with reference to the “abstract” and “concrete.” 
BETWEEN THE ABSTRACT AND THE CONCRETE 
We saw that Foucault conceived of the diagram—Panopticism, in his case—as 
both an actual agencement of forms and the abstract formula which runs through the 
agencement and binds its forms together as an abstract machine. When wielded by 
Deleuze and Guattari, the diagram is likewise doubled: it has two different states, or links 
two different kinds of consideration. It renders indissoluble the connection between the 
collective, concrete agencement of heterogeneous forms and the singular, abstract 
formula expressed in this agencement.392 Among the most helpful exercises for 
understanding agencement from Chapter One was holding it up against the many terms 
Deleuze and Guattari believed it to have replaced—including one of their own terms, 
from Anti-Oedipus, “machines.” The diagram’s two states or the two forms of 
                                                          
392 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 100/127. 
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Panopticism in Foucault come to light when we consider two everyday uses of the word, 
machine. 
In one case we might refer to a particular collection of parts: when my computer 
breaks down, for instance, I might exclaim, “This dang machine!” I have in mind a set of 
components which together instantiate a general mechanism. But on the other hand, I 
might talk about “the machine” in abstract terms, the mechanism which is instantiated in 
the particular case: this is certainly the case when we talk about fighting the “machine” or 
system of modern politics.393 Fighting the machine cannot simply mean opposing this or 
that congressperson or policy, since these are only particular components which are 
interchangeable or mutable; fighting the against the machine means resisting something 
like the abstract grammar or mechanism at work in every particular instance.394  
The distinction between concrete and abstract—whether it concerns agencements, 
machines, or diagrams—is well-worn in Deleuze’s career. In the part of Thousand 
Plateaus most explicitly devoted to linguistics, Deleuze and Guattari offer the abstract 
                                                          
393 Consider the work of one of Deleuze and Guattari’s great American influences: Lewis Mumford. Cf. 
The two-volume The Myth of the Machine (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1967-1970). 
Mumford’s development of the term, machine, as well as the baggage associated with the word 
“mechanism,” may explain why they prefer “abstract machine” over abstract mechanism, where I think the 
latter would do just fine. Hence my reference to “mechanism” above should not in any way be 
misunderstood as mechanistic commitment. 
394 The reader should recall Deleuze’s love for jurisprudence, which he understands as the philosophy of 
case law over and against natural law or human rights. Rather than deferring to essential, eternal laws and 
principles which are universally constant, jurisprudence by precedence entails that the law is determined by 
each new case no less than each case is determined by the law. He offers the example of smoking in taxi 
cabs: at one point drivers could not forbid their passengers from smoking, since a cab was treated like a 
“rolling apartment” and passengers like tenants, and apartment-owners were not allowed to prohibit their 
tenants from smoking.  But then it became universally forbidden to smoke in cabs, once taxis were judged 
to be a public service, and smoking is forbidden in all public services. Where smoking is allowed or 
forbidden, what counts as a residence, what qualifies as a public service—these are not given in advance; 
past cases of their application offers precedence for the law to stretch and fit new cases, which will in turn 
determine the law’s flexibility with future cases. Jurisprudence entails a plastic form of law.  
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machine as an alternative to the tendency in linguistics to propose general or universal 
constants, rules, and categories for any possible particular instance of speech. It is true, 
they credit Hjelmslev with saying, that the abstract machine of language “necessarily 
includes unexploited possibilities or potentialities,” but the parameters for such 
unexploited potential are not universally constant; it is not as though new slang or the 
Latin’s development into French was already given in advance at the outset of human 
language.395 
[T]he abstract machine of language is not universal, or even general, but 
singular; it is not actual, but virtual-real; it has, not invariable or obligatory 
rules, but optional rules that ceaselessly vary with the variation itself, as in 
a game in which each move changes the rules. That is why abstract 
machines and agencements of enunciation are complementary, and present 
in each other. The abstract machine is like the diagram of an 
agencement.396 
 
I would like to offer an example of such a game, in which “each move changes 
the rules,” that I think well exhibits the distinctions Deleuze and Guattari develop here. 
Magic: The Gathering was the first game to incorporate the collectible aspect of trading 
                                                          
395 See Hjelmslev, Language: An Introduction, trans. Francis J. Whitfield (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1970), 39ff. Deleuze and Guattari later turn to “atypical expressions” like e.e. 
Cummings’s “he danced his did.” They refer to such expressions as tenseurs, and although they cite 
Sephiha’s work on the intensif, the tenseur’s importance is much more obvious in view of its likely source: 
Gustave Guillaume. Although Guillaume is not often cited in Thousand Plateaus, his work on the verb and 
the article betray the unmistakable debt owed him. In this instance I have in mind his tenseur binaire. The 
power of language and of the human mind, for Guillaume, lies in the “ability to particularize and 
generalize,” and the abstract mechanism of human language is formed by these two tensions or tendencies 
(118). This of course might in part explain why the abstract machine cannot be general or particular, for it 
is precisely the way in which one negotiates between one and the other. The tenseur binaire is but one 
example of Guillaume’s many diagrams, which he privileges because, by “bringing out a system of 
relationships better than words can,” diagrams reflect how “the economy of language consists in making 
sayable—in translating into something that can be said—certain mechanisms which, deep in our minds, are 
already seeable” (18-19). Gustave Guillaume, Foundations for a Science of Language, trans. Walter Hirtle 
and John Hewson (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1984). 
396 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 100/127. 
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cards and thus initiated a new genre: the trading card game. Each of two or more players 
will compete with individual decks either randomly drawn from a larger stock of cards or 
carefully selected under agreed upon constraints. Their battle involves several card types; 
they cast spells against their opponent, summon creatures to do their bidding, and use 
artifacts and enchantments to augment themselves or their summoned entourage. All of 
these are only operative if fueled by a magic resource, “mana,” of which there are five 
different kinds all produced by what are called “land cards.” 
Beyond these card types and the basic stages of gameplay—players take turns, 
and their turns comprise several phases that dictate the number and order of possible 
plays—a game of Magic is unpredictable; the cards themselves stipulate the rules of the 
game in which they are included, and there are, as I write this, some 15,865 official 
cards.397 “Scour the Laboratory” is an instant spell that allows the player to draw three 
cards from their deck, and normally costs four mana (of any sort) in addition to two blue, 
or water, mana. If the player has four or more card types in their discard pile 
(“graveyard”), however, the spell costs slightly less. The “Fugitive Druid” is a creature 
which can attack for three points of damage and defend for two—but it stipulates a new 
rule that anyone who enchants it will permit its owner to draw an extra card (Figure 11).  
                                                          
397 See Gatherer, Wizards of the Coast’s official card database. http://gatherer.wizards.com. Accessed on 
July 22, 2018. 
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Any analysis of individual acts in the game would miss the point if it attempted to 
isolate such acts from the concrete agencement of cards, rules, motivations, etc. which 
conditions and is conditioned by each individual act. But individual concrete 
agencements or games are not entirely random or contingent; there is an abstract style 
that determines how new rules will be determined. A diagram of Magic: The Gathering 
would not offer an exhaustive list of all possible rules and all possible consequences 
following all possible combinations of rules, but the “style” which dictates how a game 
adapts to its rules. This is what makes it a “concrete universal,” because it is only 
universal wherever the name, Magic, applies. The concrete agencement is collective 
because it involves different components and plans, whereas, as a proper noun, the 
Figure 11 – Two sample Magic: The Gathering playing cards from The 
Gatherer, op. cit. 
 185 
 
abstract machine describes the distribution of something singular.398 Rules emerge and 
are accommodated like so—otherwise, we aren’t playing Magic. Hence abstract machines 
describe “rules of ‘planification,’ of diagramming,” since an agencement’s complex 
relations are not random.399 
The difference between concrete agencement400 and abstract machine is not one 
drawn between distinct entities, even if these two are “entirely different”;401 the concrete 
and abstract are functions or descriptions of the same entity, depending on whether we 
are concerned with the first or second problems of consistency, respectively. The nature 
of the concrete, the agencement machinique, as opposed to the machine abstraite, is 
sketched out in a dense passage of A Thousand Plateaus, and we can parse out its parallel 
sets of claims as follows (Figure 12): 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
398 Deleuze and Guattari write: “The abstract machine is always singular, designated by the proper name of 
a group or individual, while the assemblage of enunciation is always collective, in the individual as in the 
group. The Lenin abstract machine, and the Bolshevik collective assemblage… The same goes for 
literature, for music. There is no primacy of the individual; there is instead an indissolubility of a singular 
Abstract and a collective Concrete” (ATP, 100/127).  
399 Ibid., 70/91. Deleuze and Guattari often say that the Abstract Machine draws at the same time as it is 
drawn—that it develops the concrete while being enveloped in the latter. This formulation expresses a 
long-running and deeply-rooted idea in Deleuze’s career; we find versions of it as early as the latter’s 
Nietzsche and Philosophy. “Power is the one that wills in the will [la puissance est ce qui veut dans la 
volonté]. Power is the genetic and differential element in the will. […] The genetic element (power) 
determines the relation of force with force and qualifies related forces. As plastic element it simultaneously 
determines and is determined, simultaneously qualifies and is qualified” (Nietzsche, 85/96-7).  
400 Or “concrete machine,” after the title of Guattari’s essay. Op cit. 
401 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 71/91. 
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 Version of Description 
 1 2 3 
What is an 
agencement 
necessary 
for? 
 
It performs the co-adaptations of 
content and expression, and 
ensure their biunivocal [cf. 
“commutative”] relationships. 
It is necessary for the 
articulations of the 
organic stratum. 
It is necessary for “states 
of affairs” and “regimes 
of signs” to intertwine. 
It ensures a relationship between 
a stratum and substratum. 
It is necessary for the 
relationship between 
two strata. 
 
Through the plan of consistency, 
it effects an abstract machine on a 
stratum, between strata, and 
between the strata and the plan 
itself.  
It is necessary for an 
organism to be caught 
in and utilized by a 
social field.  
It is necessary for all of 
these stratified 
relationships to be 
organized, rather than 
random. 
Figure 12 – Itemization of three lists describing agencement in ATP, 71/91. 
 
REAL POSSIBILITY: WHAT “WOULD BE” DESIGN 
The abstract machine or diagram is like the modus operandi which marks the 
continuity of an agencement. At a certain juncture we identify the Panopticon as the 
abstract diagram which describes the design of the prison and the design of criminology. 
Prison walls and penal law are different in kind; their continuity resides in the abstract 
“style” they share, a style which informs them equally and which they equally develop. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the diagram allows us to reconcile some of the seeming 
contradictions of social philosophy: in one sense, the institution of new policies and the 
election of new politicians give the impression that “things change,” but in another sense, 
the critic recognizes that “nothing has changed.” The diagram addresses the continuity 
according to which heterogeneous registers and fields can conspire, as well as the 
continuity of this conspiracy’s developments (e.g. its perpetuation, its shifts in direction, 
its dissolution…).  
The diagram isn’t all Deleuze and Guattari borrow from Peirce; Peirce’s 
philosophy, according to at least one ambitious interpretation, rests on and is built up 
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around a commitment to the idea of continuity.402 Peirce was enthusiastic about Cantor’s 
set theory and the Continuum Hypothesis, but had one critical reservation: he agreed with 
the hypothesis that no transfinite number existed between real numbers and integers, but 
“did not subscribe to the implicit addition that the real numbers, in turn, correspond to the 
continuum.”403 Cantor’s set theory views sets as series of individual numbers, whereas 
Peirce sought a “version of set theory which made evident that the continuum 
transgressed any attempt at formalizing it as a line built up from points, [as] a set 
consisting of individual numbers.”404 
That the real continuity exceeds formalization forms the core commitment to a 
web of related issues. According to Stjernfelt, Peirce invokes continuity to address six 
distinct concerns: 
1. While not equivalent to generality, continuity explains how a concept’s 
intensional meaning outstrips its finite extension (no matter how large). 
2. Since actual events belong to a real continuum of potential events, novel events 
cannot be said to arrive ex nihil.  
3. Likewise, continuity allows Peirce to be a realist with regard to general 
tendencies. 
4. Because the laws and tendencies of reality are continuous, the processes of 
learning and research are likewise continuous; knowledge has no beginning or 
end.  
5. As a result, continuity is “the idea of fallibilism objectified,” or the pragmatist 
doctrine that “our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a 
continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy.”405 
                                                          
402 Stjernfelt, 3. 
403 Ibid., 4. 
404 Ibidem.  
405 Peirce, “Untitled manuscript (1897),” CS 1.171. 
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6. Peirce can build up a new logic and epistemology around diagrams, since 
“diagram manipulation [is] basically continuous and hence able to mirror real 
continuity.”406 
 
Several (if not all) of these concerns are relevant to design. We have mentioned 
the word’s many uses and ambiguous definition, and the difficulty in pinning it down 
reflects the ways continuity is at stake in the concept. We talk of design as an abstract, 
intentional dessein or program which is realized in individual designs (1). If the (planned) 
design is continuous with the (used) design, then both intended and unintended purposes 
belong to a real continuum of possibility (2, 3). Finally, when we understand design as 
the “diagram” of an entity, we find in the diagram a continuity that mirrors this 
continuum of possibilities and find that we can track or manipulate such a diagram (6). 
In light of the claim that an abstract machine “necessarily includes unexploited 
possibilities,”407 Peirce’s reference to real possibilities warrants further discussion. His 
position on the Continuum Hypothesis demonstrates his commitment to realism, and as 1, 
2, and 3 above might suggest, such realism requires “reversing the order of Aristotle’s 
evolution by making the form come first, and the individuation of that form come 
later.”408 In other words, a concept’s generality is prior to its actual extension, and the 
continuum of possible events in a general tendency is anterior to any actual events. 
Peirce’s twist on this, what he considers to be a basic tenet of realism—putting form 
before individuation—is that he splits “the form in two: form as mere possibility in 
                                                          
406 Stjernfelt, 6. For full description of all six items, see Stjernfelt, 6-10. 
407 Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 100/127. 
408 Peirce, Lowell Lectures, 1903, CS 1.22. 
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Firstness, anterior to anything actual, and form as realized possibility in Thirdness, where 
it governs Secondness in the shape of habits.”409 Form in this double sense is what is 
“communicated” in the diagram or design, as “a power [or] the fact that something would 
happen under certain conditions.”  
Thus the aspect of continuity which interests us most is that of “Would-Bes” or 
“Real Possibilities,” the real continuum of possibilities which belong to a form prior to its 
actualization. The formal relations depicted in an equation or diagram—these 
“regularities, tendencies, dispositions, patterns, may possess real existence, independent 
of any observer.”410 Real possibility is a relational conditional which exists virtually in a 
design even if it is never actualized. As icons which depict relations, the diagram is thus 
our only representative means for charting in the actual form a continuum of real 
possibility larger than the actual form, for uncovering the virtual in the actual. It is the 
only icon which communicates possibility itself, and this is why Peirce attaches so much 
importance to diagrammatic reasoning as a methodology.411 They are the signs we get 
more “out” of than we “put in”; I can draw up a diagram of my house and learn 
                                                          
409 Stjernfelt, 37-38. A note on Peirce’s terminology, which I do not yet have the occasion to discuss at 
length. We find a good presentation of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness in a letter Peirce wrote to Lady 
Welby in 1904. “Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without 
reference to anything else. Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a 
second but regardless of any third. Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing 
a second and third into relation to each other” (CP 8.327). Thus, Firstness might be understood as pure 
quality “in itself,” Secondness is the incarnation of such quality as it appears to someone (a “second”), 
while Thirdness is the generality that allows us to identify the same Firstness in different Secondnesses.  
410 Stjernfelt, 38.  
411 Cf. Sun-Joo Shin, The Iconic Logic of Peirce’s Graphs (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002). Shin offers a 
comprehensive and compelling defense of diagrammatic systems in logic. She understands Peirce’s 
“diagram” in broad terms, much as Stjernfelt does.  
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something from it.412  
GUATTARI’S MASHED POTATOES: ON AFFORDANCE 
Among Stjernfelt’s examples of world-bes or real possibilities is a concept now 
celebrated in design and in the cognitive theorists most interested in design-thinking, and 
one which fits comfortably into Guattari’s description of the “diagrammatic”: affordance. 
Designers and philosophers alike tend to focus on practical considerations of design, on 
the methods and types of reasoning employed in the process of design. Accordingly, they 
discuss design as “design-thinking,” as a method for solving problems, and their goal is 
to arrive at an optimum method or to extract elements of this method for application 
“outside” design. Some authors, on the other hand, focus on the material or “ontological 
condition of design,” rather than via a theoretical manifesto for an abstract, experimental 
design method. As the argument goes, such manifestoes “often forget that design cannot 
be seen and analyzed only according to its intentions […] but that it must also be 
analyzed according to what it does and does not do to other actors and to other 
environments beside the actor, environment, and function for which it was originally 
designed.”413 Intentions have their effect upon design forms, but design in turn affects its 
environment and, as a result, the intentions of its users and makers. A chair appears as a 
complex of affordances: “the capabilities of wood, skills and labor in the workshop as a 
                                                          
412 “For a great distinguishing property of the icon is that by direct observation of it other truths concerning 
its object can be discovered than those which suffice to determine its construction.” Peirce, “That 
Categorical and Hypothetical Propositions are one in essence, with some connected matters,” in CP 2.279. 
413 Mahmoud Keshavarz, Design-Politics: An Inquiry into Passports, Camps and Borders (Malmö: Malmö 
University, 2016), 86.  
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site of production, and the possibilities of the designed chair being oriented in one 
direction and not the other, thus shape spaces that,” for example, dictate the range of 
activity afforded to different kinds of bodies.414  
The term, affordance, originates in the work of James Gibson, pioneer of 
ecological psychology. In his Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, he challenges 
what he takes to be a pervasive and mistaken assumption about visual perception, an 
assumption with potentially disastrous consequences for psychology: that “vision is 
simplest when the eye is held still,” and that “each fixation of the eye is analogous to an 
exposure of the film in a camera, so that what the brain gets is something like a sequence 
of snapshots.”415 On observing actual animal perception, however, he notes that “if an 
animal has eyes at all it swivels its head around and it goes from place to place. The 
single, frozen field of view provides only impoverished information about the world.”416 
Once we treat the animal as a living, moving, and motivated thing and remember that its 
perception is part of its organism, we cannot treat the information its perceives as neutral, 
as if we could understand its “snapshots” in isolation from everything else about the 
animal.  
No animal exists without its surroundings, no more than an environment exists 
independently of any inhabitants. The bulk of The Ecological Approach is devoted to the 
development of the necessary terms for diagramming an animal’s relationship with its 
                                                          
414 Ibid., 87. 
415 James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1986), 
1.  
416 Ibid., 2. 
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environment; Gibson proposes a world of paths, surfaces, lines, and points.  In one sense, 
different animals share the same surroundings, but since their perception is bound up with 
their anatomy, their biological needs, and so on, each animal will carve up these 
surroundings into different environments. From the same landscape, animals disagree on 
what they pick out as “shelter,” “food,” “threat,” “mate,” “obstacle,” etc. It is this aspect 
of the animal-environment relationship which Gibson calls affordance: “the affordances 
of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for 
good or ill.”417 
The concept of affordance thus has three main components: the animal, the 
environment, and the potential activity which the latter affords the former (Figure 13).418 
The afforded activity does not exist outside the animal-environment relationship. That a 
surface affords crawling to a millipede is 
not equivalent to saying that the surface is 
flat; its affordance to the millipede says 
something about the nature of both surface 
and millipede, and the nature of their 
interaction. The surface must exhibit certain qualities in order to be crawlable for the 
millipede, and the millipede must be properly equipped to find the surface crawlable; the 
                                                          
417 Ibid., 127. 
418 There is a lot of debate as to whether perception should count as a distinct fourth component. Is 
perception simply another afforded activity? Or is it more rudimentary, as part of an affordance’s necessary 
condition of possibility. The debate comes down to whether affordances can be “directly perceived,” a 
claim that traces back to Gibson himself, since an environment cannot support the animal’s activity if the 
animal is unaware of its affordance, or whether the environment’s affordances are available even before the 
animal has perceived them. See Don Norman, The Design of Everyday Things, Revised and Expanded 
Edition (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 12. These issues with perception will be pertinent to our 
discussion in the following chapter, and so I leave them aside for now. 
Animal Environment 
Potential Activity 
Figure 13  
 The components of affordance 
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affordance of crawlability only emerges when the millipede’s environmental context 
includes such a surface.  
After collecting different accounts and possible definitions for “diagram” from far 
and wide, we return to Guattari’s essay, “Concrete Machines.” I take it to be an 
authoritative account of the matter, the reasons for which should be clearer given the 
context and concepts discussed above. Although Deleuze himself certainly has a stake in 
their use of the term and although it has a specific value for his career, his own 
motivations were first expressed in dreams and dramatism, and by his own admission, 
diagrams were Guattari’s domain. The essay will not offer us a formal definition, but I 
wager that, given what we have seen in our discussion of architectural diagrams, Kantian 
schematism, Deleuze and Guattari’s other concepts of dramatization and becoming, the 
history of the word disegno, Francis Bacon’s painting, and René Thom’s catastrophe 
theory, Guattari’s use of the term will be more instructive than adding yet another 
possible definition to our list. The essay is doubly significant, since in addition to settling 
our account of diagrams, it solders Deleuze and Guattari’s diagram (and agencement) to a 
discussion of design: first, because it is amenable to Gibson’s affordance, a darling 
concept in design literature; second, because Guattari’s own examples are of design—key 
molds and aircraft blueprints.  
So, to recall: Guattari proposes a “childhood block” rather than a “childhood 
memory.” We discussed the former as it related to the concept of becoming, but the 
distinction offers a good means for isolating what it means to be “diagrammatic,” or what 
sort of relationship this entails. Childhood appears to me in the present not as an isolated 
entity or feature, as a memory, but as a whole block of such features, “constellations or 
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masses of the kind that actualize intensities… as concrete machines.”419 Like the 
agencements which would come to replace them, these concrete machines both “stratify” 
different plans to regulate their commutative interchange, as well as diagram the 
possibility for things to escape and drift off to become something else. 420 What it means 
to diagram in this instance is closely linked to what Guattari calls “diagrammatic 
redundancy.” A concrete machine’s diagrammatic redundancies “work on reality itself,” 
and one should recall that even in Peirce the diagram depicts real possibilities and not 
merely subjective resemblances: that’s why one can get more out of a diagram than one 
puts in, or how one can learn from a diagram of what they already know.421 
To explain what Guattari means, consider two of his examples. First, he describes 
what is entailed by the blueprints for a Concord aircraft: 
what is noted at the semiotic register is the de-territorialized articulations 
of the various things that go to make up the aircraft—aluminum, electrical 
fluxes, semiotic fluxes as expressed materially and so on. But such a 
blueprint is only of interest in so far as its articulations are sufficiently de-
territorialized and can be made to correspond with the de-territorialized 
articulations of the materials of expression. […] [T]he relevant features of 
the materials of expression involved—their raw materials, we might say—
must be compatible with the nature of the articulatory features of de-
territorialization of the material field.422 
 
Only certain features of certain materials, e.g. aluminum, will serve to express the 
                                                          
419 Guattari, “Concrete Machines,” 154. 
420 Ibid., 160. I am doing my best to avoid getting caught in Guattari’s highly technical jargon. It is worth 
mentioning, though, if for no other reason than to flag its resemblance to what will appear in A Thousand 
Plateaus. He says that concrete machines “manipulate both molecular multiplicities and mass 
stratifications” (160), and notes that, “Thus concrete machines can be said to be molar in their stratifying 
aspect and molecular in their diagrammatic de-territorializing aspects” (160n4).  
421 See above. Also see Stjernfelt, who clarifies that Peirce’s diagrams entail “operational” rather than 
“subjective resemblance” (90).  
422 Guattari, “Concrete Machines,” 154-5.  
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relations necessary for an aircraft, and aluminum will only serve certain possible relations 
and purposes. Hence the diagram is so often referred to as an “interchange,” since the 
relationship between plans (in this case, between airplane and aluminum) is not random 
but regulated by certain immanent requirements. It is not a stretch to refer these 
requirements, which Guattari calls “support,” to Gibson’s notion of affordance. For 
further evidence, we turn to the second example, that of key design. 
You cannot make a mold for a key out of just anything—you need a 
particular kind of wax; if you were to try doing it with mashed potato, you 
could not hold or transfer the diagrammatic outline that makes the key 
what it is. If you want to reproduce that outline on paper you need a brush 
that is not too broad, and ink that is neither too thin nor too thick. In other 
words, you must choose materials of expression suited to the features of 
the machinism you want to transfer. Diagrammatic redundancy thus 
depends, on the one hand, on the de-territorializing articulations of the 
various material and semiotic strata [BG: plans] that are to be connected 
together (aluminum, steel, information, equations, etc.) and, on the other, 
on the capacity of the materials of expression to use, to activate, to 
organize that system of connection.423 
 
We can conclude from Guattari’s example here that the concept of diagram we 
have been struggling with, which is relevant to agencement as well as to design, 
combines two components from our survey: first, Gibson’s notion of affordance, which 
allows us to think of design as serving a purpose without necessarily having a purpose in 
esse, and as perfectly determinate without committing us to determinism; second, the idea 
of continuity, whereby the reality of an affordance exceeds its actuality, since a surface 
does not “suddenly” become walkable for a millipede upon its arrival (natura non facit 
saltus).  
                                                          
423 Ibid., 156.  
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ABSTRACT AND CONCRETE DESIGN 
But although Guattari’s “concrete machines” ultimately appeared under the guise 
of “agencement,” it would be a mistake to understand this as proof that agencements and 
so-called abstract machines are separate entities. I have been trying to arrive at a sense of 
design that encompasses both dessein and dessin as different aspects or states of what is 
really a single concept. Do not Deleuze and Guattari often insist on the diagram’s double 
status? I believe this is why they qualify it as concrete when they describe an 
agencement’s relationship to the abstract machine, and why in its earliest appearances the 
opposition was between agencement machinique and machine abstraite. Since the 
tetravalent definition with which this project began comprises two “axes,” we can take 
the claim that agencement/design is a diagram quite literally. They write: 
We may distinguish in the abstract machine two states of the diagram, one 
in which variables of content and expression are distributed according to 
their heterogeneous forms in reciprocal presupposition on a plan of 
consistency, and another in which it is no longer even possible to 
distinguish between variables of content and expression because the 
variability of that same plan has prevailed over the duality of forms, 
rendering them “indiscernible.” (The first state relations to still relative 
movements of deterritorialization; in the second, an absolute threshold of 
deterritorialization has been reached.)424 
                                                          
424 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 91/116. I included the parenthetical remark in the passage in order to 
anticipate a seemingly reasonable objection: how can I claim that an agencement is both concrete and 
abstract when Deleuze and Guattari here claim that the two states of the diagram belong to the abstract 
machine (and not agencement)? Do they not also say that the abstract machine is the diagram of an 
agencement (Ibidem)? If the passage is taken in isolation, I concede. However, I refer the reader to the 
account Guattari gave of “machines” (above), and the things he and Deleuze list for which an agencement 
“is necessary” (see Figure 12) The parenthetical in the above passage says it all: the abstract machine or 
diagram states the relations performed in the concrete machine/agencement as described in these other 
passages. But given what we have seen about the diagram’s unique relationship to continuity, we have to 
admit that the relations depicted in the diagram are continuous with the diagrammatic relations which 
depict such relations. The abstract/concrete relationship is thus another instance of Deleuze’s obsession 
with the expressed/expression relationship, the abstract is that which is expressed in the concrete and which 
does not exist outside its expression; it is “enveloped” by the concrete which “develops” it. Another brief 
comment from Thousand Plateaus may be instructive on this point, since it involves aspects Louis 
Hjelmslev’s work which we have discussed at length: they write that the “form of content and form of 
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We could distinguish a sense of concrete and abstract design which likewise does 
not sort out two different “kinds” of design, as, for example, when someone is furniture-
shopping and turns their nose up at dining room set for being “too abstract.” What does it 
mean for something to be concrete or abstract? Consider last chapter’s findings: the term 
or object of an agencement is a plan, and following Hjelmslev, it assumes different 
substantial forms on each of its different plans, which are irreducible but for the 
unformed, material “purport” they share. Now, typically, we might think of abstraction as 
the “process of extracting pure or essential Forms, emptying a space of its concrete 
contents.”425 In other words, we understand the abs-tractus426 as the sort of skeleton we 
“pull out” of concrete experience. We could adjust this understanding: the truly abstract 
is not the skeleton we remove, as a pure or essential Form, but what remains once this 
skeleton is removed, as “Form withdrawn from matter.”427 The abstract is enveloped in 
each of the different formations on different plans, and we say something is “concrete” 
                                                          
expression involve two parallel formalizations in presupposition: it is obvious that their segments 
constantly intertwine, embed themselves in one another; but this is accomplished by the abstract machine 
from which the two forms derive, and by machinic agencements that regulate their relations” (68/88). The 
first part of this claim should be familiar from Hjelmslev’s own account, and we might accordingly 
translate the rest in his terms: content and expression both derive from the same unformed sens, mening, or 
purport (read: abstract machine); once this purport is “realized” in language, its forms are regulated and 
regulative according to the system, or language (agencement), which expresses it. We also find a similar 
formulation in Deleuze’s work on Friedrich Nietzsche, in his interpretation of the “will to power” as an 
affective force relationship: “The relationship between forces in each case is determined to the extent that 
each force is affected by other, inferior or superior, forces. It follows that will to power is manifested as a 
capacity for being affected. […] The will to power is always determined at the same time as it determines, 
qualified at the same time as it qualifies” (Nietzsche, 62/70).  
425 John Rajchman, Constructions (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 56. 
426 ab- “away”; tractus “pulled, drawn” 
427 Rajchman, 65.  
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when these plans conspire.428  
It may already be clear how the abstract and concrete both belong to design, but 
this is a good opportunity to return to the figures with whom we began and the debate 
that separated them: Christopher Alexander and Peter Eisenman. The two states of the 
diagram, the abstract and the concrete, the Diagram and diagram—we can now see that 
theirs was not a simple disagreement between two authors who happened to 
independently develop their respective versions of architectural diagrams. Rather, the two 
architects engage with “different states” of the diagram, and so naturally conceive of 
architecture and the purpose of architecture differently. It first appears that their dispute 
concerns the value of discord for the architect: is it the ultimate and definitive enemy of 
the architectural pursuit of harmony, wholeness, and life, as Alexander believes, or does 
it nevertheless offer an opportunity for architecture to critically engage in social and 
political life by shaking up sedimented views and practices, as Eisenman argues? In fact, 
the dispute concerns the nature of the diagram: both architects assume different aspects of 
the diagrammatic and cannot find a common ground because they do not conceive of 
design or of the diagram in a way that comprises both.  
Although the diagrams or patterns catalogued in his Pattern Language can be 
instantiated in different ways and are purportedly “abstract” accounts of architectural 
problems/solutions, Alexander’s diagrams are not abstract enough. Ultimately, his 
diagrams concretely bring together and negotiate the difference between patterns of 
events, on the one hand, and geometrical patterns in space, on the other. This is what it 
                                                          
428 The Latin concresco means to thicken or congeal: from con- “with, together; complete”; cresco “to 
grow, come to be, become visible.” 
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means to say that a pattern or diagram expresses a problem or solution; it describes the 
“ultimate object of design”: Form. Alexander is not interested in withdrawing this Form 
to arrive at an abstract, unformed matter wider than the given, but wants a Form which 
conforms to, is comfortable with, the given. A design is interpreted and ought to be 
judged according to how well it solves its problem, or how smoothly patterns of events 
meet patterns in space, and the diagram is the concrete description of the paradigm for 
doing that well. It is no wonder that he cannot ascribe any architectural value to discord. 
Eisenman’s diagrams are abstract where Alexander’s are concrete. If the latter are 
a response to the question—How does a good design do its job so well?—Eisenman is 
trying to figure out what architecture is on its own terms, when we take away the “jobs” 
and outside demands placed upon it. This sense of abstraction is much closer than what 
we developed above. As we saw before, he saw diagrams as a means to describe “the 
formal,” i.e. not Form as essence or purpose, not a set of forms, or even the concrete 
process of construction, but that which is in form more than any of these, the formal 
capacity to escape or defy intentions, to be repurposed, to be obtuse, et cetera. He thought 
that the diagram, understood in this way, privileged architecture as a means for abs-
tracting Form and hinting that the world offers still unexploited “real possibilities.” It is 
no surprise that he underscores discord as not incidentally permissible but necessarily 
valuable to the work of architecture. Alexander says that architecture’s service to society 
is in making its life easier, while Eisenman claims that architecture’s gift to society is a 
glimpse at another life.   
We saw in the last chapter that the plans of an agencement communicated despite 
their heterogeneity. Now we have two ways of diagramming their communication and 
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have found that a diagram’s continuity entails unexploited affordances, or “real 
possibilities,” and degrees of variation. A few things remain to be seen. We have 
mentioned that the “abstract” aspect of the diagram suggests the possibility of drift but 
have not established drift as a prominent feature for either agencement or design. In the 
following chapter we will need to discover a necessary relation between heterogeneity 
and continuity, and one which is particular to both design and agencement. 
A design, as both concrete and abstract, is a diagram of real possibilities, 
according to which it lends itself to certain acts and certain actors. As we will see in the 
following chapter, this is regardless of whether these acts were intended: some of its 
aspects will function as the design’s “active site” when engaged by a user in a milieu and 
will not appear outside this relationship. But the design’s affordances are still there, 
nevertheless, virtual if not actual. It is both dessein and dessin, concrete and abstract, 
diagram and Diagram: on the one hand it is the organized arrangement of affordances and 
functions which appear in the context of certain intentions or purposes; on the other hand 
it is the continuous matter that holds a singular but still indeterminate field of affordances 
together, such that it will afford this in one context but not in another, and such that it can 
be differentiated from other designs.  
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CHAPTER IV 
WHEN GAMES CHEAT BY THE RULES: DRIFT AND 
UNINTENDED DESIGN EFFECTS 
Our initial engagement with agencement has led us far and wide, but some work 
remains to fit our findings together. In the second chapter, we saw that plans somehow 
held together despite being different in kind. Following Spinoza or Hjelmslev, we should 
think of them as attributes, which each express the same substance, which can only take 
form under one attribute or another, and so every attribute has an equally legitimate claim 
on that substance and do not parcel it into discrete regions. Following Leibniz or von 
Uexküll, we should think of these plans as “perspectives,” as Deleuze’s version of the 
monad. In this view, a plan is not a perspective that belongs to the subject but the 
perspective which the subject inhabits—not what is seen but what enables one to see—
and therefore there can be irreducible perspectives on the same substance without these in 
turn constituting different substances.  
In the third chapter we consulted the architectural diagrams of both Christopher 
Alexander and Peter Eisenman to describe the two ways in which an agencement or 
design is “diagrammatic.” According to Alexander, a diagram is the concrete solution to 
a problem that negotiates between patterns of events on the one hand and geometric 
patterns in space on the other. For Eisenman, a design’s diagram reveals the continuity of 
its real possibilities, according to which it might assume new patterns or negotiate its 
heterogeneous patterns in unforeseen ways.  
As it stands, we lack a strong connection between these two chapters, and this is 
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largely because we have merely stated the problem—as the two problems of consistency, 
or as the problem of continuity, for example—without explaining how an agencement or 
design actually addresses, solves, or realizes it. The same design is stratified by different 
plans, and it negotiates their concrete interchange and develops/envelops an abstract 
continuum of their real possibilities—but how exactly does this negotiation take place? 
And what are the consequences or advantages for thinking of design in this way? The 
present chapter is my response to the first question, while the second question will be 
addressed in the final chapter.  
WHAT SETS DELEUZE APART? 
An agencement involves heterogeneous plans or considerations, and we can 
diagram its heterogeneous nature in concrete ways (in actual designs) or in an abstract 
way (regarding their consistency, or the singular style of holding-together which the 
concrete expresses). Can this be made clearer? How does an agencement negotiate 
between plans? One way to approach the question is to treat it with suspicion. One might 
object that this new terminological framework is superfluous: either it fails to actually 
describe a distinct process or phenomenon, or it is adequately accounted for by another 
set of terms. Since the project behind one’s terms matters more than the terms 
themselves, as I have maintained, then I begin by holding Deleuze’s project up to other 
ostensibly similar authors to determine what sets his work apart and what justifies the use 
of Deleuzian terms. Rather than returning to consult his and Guattari’s influences, as we 
have done, this time we will cross-reference their jargon with less immediately related 
figures. We will look at Donald Davidson’s so-called anomalous monism, Herman 
Dooyeweerd’s aspect theory, and Arthur Koestler’s notion of bisociation. We will 
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consider what heterogeneity means for each author and see how they deal with it in their 
respective projects.   
A. COMPARED TO DONALD DAVIDSON 
Donald Davidson’s impact on the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of 
language in the 20th century betrays his inheritance from American Pragmatism, and a 
few words about this inheritance are warranted. Having studied logic under Josiah Royce 
and later having been in close contact with Harvard’s collection of Peirce’s manuscripts, 
C. I. Lewis was by most accounts a realist, but nevertheless distinguished between the 
world as it is revealed in practice and the world as it is categorized and structured by 
thought. Every object is thus split: on the one hand there is the a priori apple as the 
“product of the activity of thought,” while on the other hand there is the “givenness” of 
the apple, “independent of such activity.”429 Regarding what he calls the empirical 
content of experience, all that is given is the fact that things are given; the rest is built up 
from a priori concepts which we apply. Something like “objectivity” only applies to the 
given since its givenness is out of my control and insofar as it meets or defies my 
expectations.430  
                                                          
429 C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (New York: Dover, 1929), 
37. Note that Lewis uses “a priori” as a relative rather than absolute term: our idea of an apple or our ideas 
about apples are prior to a given experience of apples; if I encounter an apple later this afternoon I will do 
so with concepts in hand, prepared ahead of time. He should not be understood as saying that our concepts 
are prior to all experience.  
430 Lewis’s example is of opening a drawer to whether chalk is inside. A given drawer is understood as a 
“drawer” when understood as being able to be opened, closed, able to contain a certain amount of certain 
kinds things, as a component of furniture, and so on. If this is my conceptual schema, I can form a 
proposition which is verifiable or falsifiable: there is chalk in the drawer. When I open the drawer, either I 
will find chalk or I will not find chalk—but the possibility of being mistaken about this drawer’s contents 
demonstrates the drawer’s objectivity, according to Lewis. Cf. Ibid., 194.  
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All objectivity means for Lewis is this: we can assume the reality of an agreed 
upon reference to “something out there” if there is an agreement in our activity involving 
the reference  and if we can coordinate our plans around it; the respective content of our 
individual experience, on the other hand, only needs to be consistent enough to allow for 
our practical agreement: “On a day which is terribly long to me and abominably short to 
you, we meet, by agreement, at three o’clock, and thus demonstrate that we have a world 
in common.”431 Much of Lewis’s Mind and the World Order can be read as a warning to 
not confuse empirical givens with conceptual schemas and a reminder that we can only 
decide between forms of logic to the extent that they rely on empirical givens.  The 
distinction is important, among other reasons, since it addresses why multiple systems of 
logic can lay equal claim to the same phenomena, and it speaks to the fact that logical 
principles and categories seems to always involve extra-logical rules of application:  
The laws of logic are purely formal; they forbid nothing but what concerns 
the use of terms and the corresponding modes of classification and 
analysis. The law of contradiction tells us that nothing can be both white 
and not white, but it does not and can not tell us whether black is not white 
or soft or square is not white. […] They are legislative because they are 
addressed to ourselves—because definition, classification, and inference 
represent no operation in the world of things, but only our categorial 
attitudes of mind. Furthermore, the ultimate criteria of the laws of logic 
are pragmatic.432 
 
Lewis’s student, W.V. O. Quine, shared many of his sentiments, implicitly if not 
explicitly: he was a committed realist on the subject of truth with the famous caveat that 
truth is the value of a variable. See, for example, the second chapter of his Word and 
Object, where he lays out the basic form of his so-called “principle of indeterminacy of 
                                                          
431 Ibid., 80. 
432 Ibid., 246-7. 
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translation.” There it is clear what Quine shares with his mentor and what furthermore is 
lent to Davidson’s project. We can re-describe mental or behavioral events, such as we 
report in propositions involving verbs like believe, desire, or remember, in terms of 
physical or physiological events. Quine’s view is that the translation of one set of terms 
or events into the other is “less than determinate.” In other words, 
manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in 
divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet 
incompatible with one another. In countless places they will diverge in 
giving, as their respective translations of a sentence of the one language, 
sentences of the other language which stand to each other in no plausible 
sort of equivalence however loose.433 
 
As Davidson develops this principle, he does not break with his teacher or his 
teacher’s teacher: his so-called “anomalous monism” features ideas precious to both 
Lewis and Quine and demonstrates the degree to which all three men inherit the Kantian 
approach to heterogeneity previously discussed. He quotes Kant as saying that 
speculative philosophy’s task is to show that the sense according to which human beings 
are free and the sense according to which human beings are subject to nature “not only 
[…] can very well co-exist, but that both must be thought as necessarily united in the 
same subject.”434 The agreement of practical experience convinced Lewis of a certain 
monism, and Davidson likewise defends the identity of mental and physical events.435 
                                                          
433 Ibid., 24. For further reference, see Ibid., 23-72. 
434 Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott 
(London: Longmans, Green, 1916), 76. As cited in Donald Davidson, “Mental Events,” in Essays on 
Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 225. Emphasis in original. 
435 Among other things, I insist on including C. I. Lewis in this discussion because I believe his pragmatist 
commitments obviate some of the classic criticism leveled at Davidson. Exemplary here is Louise Antony’s 
“Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force,” in Philosophical Review 98 (April 1989), 153-
187. Antony leverages Davidson’s Quinean heritage to argue that his commitment to Quine’s principle of 
indeterminacy “is opposed in principle to there being any systematic nomic relation between psychological 
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What is more, however, is that, like Lewis and Quine, he identifies the mental with the 
physical without reducing the former to the latter: it is an identity of kinds, aspects, or 
properties rather than an identity of individual events.436 
To see why this is so, consider the three planks of anomalous monism: 
1. The Principle of Causal Interaction: At least some mental events 
interact causally with physical events. If “someone sank the Bismarck, 
then various mental events such as perceivings, notings, calculations… 
played a causal role in the sinking of the Bismarck.”’ 
2. The Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality: “events 
related as cause and effect fall under strict deterministic laws.”  
3. The Anomalism of the Mental: “there are no strict deterministic laws 
on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained.” 
437 
 
Davidson fends off the contradiction these three commitments might invite in 
large part by carefully discerning how we ought to understand what is related as identical 
or as causal. Rather than individual entities, his three principles apply only to types, 
                                                          
and physical kinds” (183). As a result, anomalous monism forfeits any of the physical’s explanatory force. 
She is lead to this conclusion because she assumes—whether rightly or wrongly in the case of Quine is not 
my concern—that the psychological and physical wind up as equivalent descriptions without any firm 
ground to determine a lawlike relation between them. She objects: “It is the acceptability of particular 
rationalizations that metaphysically ground psycho-physical identities, and not the other way around… 
there is no objective attachment between the interpretive psychological story we decide to tell and the 
physiological goings-on in a person’s body” (184). First, this seems to largely agree with Davidson’s 
position. Second, she assumes that Davidson takes psycho-physical identity for granted, but we could 
happily accept her characterization of Davidson’s monism in light of Lewis’s work on the “world in 
common.” Identity grounded in practical agreement might not be an obstacle to determining a systematic 
nomic relation between descriptive kinds.  
436 Obviously, it requires some effort to reconcile Lewis’s and Quine’s language with Davidson’s. Note 
also that, while Davidson talks about kinds, I mention aspect and property to evoke interpretations of 
Davidson which characterize his anomalous monism as a “double aspect ontology” or “property dualism.” 
For the former, see in particular Gordon G. Brittan, Jr’s “Davidson, Kant, and Double-Aspect Ontologies,” 
in Dialogues with Davidson: Acting, Interpreting, and Understanding (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011). 
While he doesn’t refer explicitly to  “property dualism,” influential critic of Davidson’s position, Ted 
Honderich discusses anomalous monism in terms of properties and the relationship between their respective 
descriptions. See “The Argument for Anomalous Monism,” in Analysis 42 (1982), 59-64. 
437 Davidson, “Mental Events,” 208. 
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kinds, or properties—we may add plans to this list, after our discussion of figures like 
Hjelmslev. The claim that the plans of expression and content stratify the same purport 
does not require that each term on one plan is necessarily and invariably linked to a 
single term on the other plan; a consequence of their distinction as different plans is that 
they are “heteronomic,” to return to Davidson’s language. The laws of content differ 
from those of expression.438 Therefore, Davidson holds that the same events which are 
describable as physical can at least sometimes be described as a different kind of event, 
as mental. Whether describing their identity or their causal interaction, the 
psychophysical relationship is one between kinds rather than individual entities.439  
B. COMPARED TO HERMAN DOOYEWEERD 
Davidson’s anomalous monism can be understood as a property dualism or 
double aspect theory of mind, but Herman Dooyeweerd’s philosophy offers a more 
thoroughgoing form of aspect theory that is not limited to two aspects or kinds of event. 
As the English title of his magnum opus suggests, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought 
aims to explain the conditions of possibility for “theoretical analysis, through which 
reality appears to split up into various modal aspects,” as opposed to naïve pre-theoretical 
experience where, e.g., no distinction is made between number and spatial extension.440 
                                                          
438 I admit that I am ignoring a point of contention concerning Anomalous Monism’s Principle of Causal 
Interaction. An ambiguity that Honderich discusses is whether the mental qua mental interacts causally 
with the physical.  
439 See his discussion of Charles Taylor and identity theory (212).  
440 Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought I: The Necessary Presuppositions of 
Philosophy, trans. William S. Young and David H. Freeman (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Company, 1969), 3. 
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Dooyeweerd opens with a clear definition for what he means by “modal aspect”: 
the fundamental universal modalities […] which do not refer to the 
concrete ‘what’ of things or events, but are only the different modes of the 
universal ‘how’ which determines the aspects of our theoretical view of 
reality. For instance, the historical aspect of temporal reality is not at all 
identical with what actually happened in the past. Rather it is the particular 
mode of being which determines the historical view of the actual events in 
human society. These events have of course many more modal aspects 
than the historical. There does not exist a purely historical reality. The 
same holds good for all other modal aspects.441 
 
The distinctions of the theoretical attitude refer to and express a real unity which 
is above and beyond any single modal aspect, and the “universal character of referring 
and expressing, which is proper to our entire created cosmos, stamps created reality as 
meaning, in accordance with its dependent non-self-sufficient nature.”442 Meaning is the 
translation for the Dutch, zin, the equivalent for French sens. When Dooyeweerd claims 
that “meaning [is] the mode of being of all that is created,” he means that although I 
“actually” exist equally in every aspect and even beyond every aspect, I am limited to 
understanding being under one modal aspect, one sense, or another at a time.443  
To ground the possibility of our making theoretical distinctions between aspects 
he invokes a fundamental difference between God and His creation, a temporal 
difference. The modal aspects of theoretical thought are aspects of temporal experience, 
and transcendental philosophy in Dooyeweerd’s view entails abstracting from temporal 
                                                          
441 Ibid., 3n1. 
442 Ibid., 4. 
443 To quote the translator’s note on this remark: “In the original Dutch text this passage reads: ‘De zin is 
het zijn van alle creatuurlijk zijnde.’ ‘Het zijn van het zijnde’ has no more equivalent in English than Martin 
Heidegger’s ‘das Sein des Seienden,” which is its German equivalent” (4n3).  
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experience to the “cosmic order” behind individual aspects. Theoretical thought thus 
requires a distinction between two sorts of time and, correspondingly, two sorts of law 
(Dooyeweerd is ultimately a philosopher of law).444 Creaturely existence, viz. temporal 
experience, is finite: there are limits to what I can think “at one time,” and so I interpret a 
thing as numerical, linguistic, aesthetic, logical, etc. According to creaturely time, each 
aspect enjoys a sort of sovereignty whereby they each have jurisdiction over all of 
creation while at the same time resisting any reduction of one to the other: when we 
consider things in their numerical aspect, we are beholden to numerical laws; when in the 
economic aspect, we deal in economic laws, and so on. From the creaturely perspective, 
each aspect has its own laws, and together the fifteen modal aspects of temporal 
experience are like fifteen simultaneous clocks which all keep time in their own way. 
The closest we can come to understanding God’s time is what Dooyeweerd calls 
“cosmic time,” which is the “indissoluble correlation of order and duration” which all 
modal aspects have in common.445 When they apply to the same phenomenon, different 
aspects will agree in the order of their rendered events despite the irreducibility of their 
respective laws. He privileges order as the purview of eternal time, as opposed to cardinal 
numbers which only describe one aspect of experience. The cosmic law which 
corresponds to cosmic time is the object of his career.  
Whatever the other differences separating them, Davidson and Dooyeweerd 
                                                          
444 N.B. The original title of A New Critique of Theoretical Thought is De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, the 
philosophy of the idea of law. As the translators indicate in their preface, while Dooyeweerd began his 
career “seeking a distinctively Christian foundation for his own special field of Jurisprudence, [he] found 
himself involved in more general philosophical questions” (xii).  
445 Ibid., 24.   
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diverge on the role played by “heterogeneous plans” in their respective projects. 
Davidson’s anomalous monism is a conclusion drawn by the demands of ordinary 
experience, and ordinary language in particular: the way we talk precludes both dualism 
and reductive monism. Dooyeweerd, on the other hand, begins with “modal sovereignty” 
and “the temporal coherence of all the law-spheres” as a basic condition for his entire 
project. As created beings, we of course interpret things in simultaneous but distinct 
senses (“modal aspects”); the problem is whether and how philosophy can transcend 
modal law to reach cosmic law—which makes his a uniquely Christian mission: 
The question: what is meaning? cannot be answered without our reflecting 
on the origin and unity of all temporal meaning, because this answer 
depends on the cosmonomic Idea of philosophical thought. Not a single 
temporal structure of meaning exists in itself (an sich). That which makes 
it into meaning lies beyond the limit of time. Meaning is ‘ex origine’ the 
convergence of all temporal aspects of existence into one supratemporal 
focus […] which has meaning and hence existence only in virtue of the 
sovereign creative act of God.446 
 
C. COMPARED TO ARTHUR KOESTLER 
Whether God’s creative act, a comedian’s clever turn of phrase, or novel 
developments in biological morphogenesis, Arthur Koestler’s The Act of Creation 
attempts to describe the logical structure underpinning all “patterns of creative 
activity.”447 In all cases the process depends upon the discovery of hidden connections 
revealed by bisociated frames of reference. Other kinds of activity can adequately be 
                                                          
446 Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought II: The General Theory of the Modal 
Spheres, trans. William S. Young and David H. Freeman (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Company, 1969), 30. 
447 Koestler, 27. Cf. Ibid., 631. 
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understood in one frame of reference, on a single plan, but creativity entails perceiving a 
situation “in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames,” such that it is “not 
merely linked to one associative context, but bisociated with two.”448 Koestler’s name for 
these frames of reference or associative contexts is “matrix.” We might find in 
conversation that we can associate the same topic of discussion to different contexts, can 
express the same subject according to the “codes,” or rules of expression, of different 
matrices.449 Suppose we are discussing Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo; we can talk about 
it “‘in terms of’ (a) historic significance, (b) military strategy, (c) the condition of his 
liver, (d) the constellation of the planets.”450 
Borrowing from the language of the previous chapter, the matrix refers to a plan 
“as such,” in the abstract, while code is the concrete way forms are realized on that plan. 
The situation of the creative act is complex since events are bisociated with more than 
one matrix and are therefore coded in more than one way, but these terms are insufficient 
to account for specific creative acts, i.e. code isn’t quite “concrete” enough until we can 
account for how it is actualized and under what conditions. Thus, in addition to 
bisociation, matrix, and code, Koestler’s framework also entails that one have a choice of 
strategy given the requirements imposed by an environment. To put these components 
together, consider his own example of a game of chess—games and the concept of play 
being a central feature of his work: 
                                                          
448 Ibid., 35.  
449 Cf. Ibid., 38. 
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When you sit in front of the chessboard your code is the rule of the game 
determining which moves are permitted, your matrix is the total of 
possible choices before you. Lastly, the choice of the actual move among 
the variety of permissible moves is a matter of strategy, guided by the lie 
of the land—the ‘environment’ of other chessmen on the board. We have 
seen that comic effects are produced by the sudden clash of incompatible 
matrices: to the experienced chess player a rook moving bishopwise is 
decidedly ‘funny.’ 451 
 
This grammar lets Koestler treat a broad array of different phenomena. While the 
bulk of the project is devoted to humor, he can just as easily interpret biological 
mutations, the “transformations of fins into legs, legs into arms, arms into wings, gills 
into lungs, scales into feathers,” as “witty answers to the challenges of environment.”452 
At the heart of his examples is the hidden affinity between what we assume are 
incompatible matrices: a play on words or a transformation and repurposing of previous 
biological structures is only possible if these words or structures are bisociated, capable 
of being read in different ways and subject to differently coded matrices. In Koestler’s 
case, then, the negotiation of heterogeneous plans is not a problem to be solved but a 
fundamental condition of things which is necessary for solving problems. I claimed 
above that creativity is different from normal activity, and this is not entirely accurate. 
The truth is that things are already bisociated to multiple matrices, and that the creative 
act simply makes use of previously hidden connections. Reality’s fundamentally 
multidimensional condition is what motivates Koestler’s ardent resistance to any form of 
reductionism.453 Even if the most reductionist neuroscientist realizes their wildest dreams, 
                                                          
451 Ibid., 40-2.  
452 Ibid., 466. 
453 For a good summary of Koestler’s anti-reductionism as well as an account of his engagement with 
contemporary scientific communities, see James F. Stark, “Anti-reductionism at the confluence of 
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he argues, they would not have the adequate tools for a full account of the world, and a 
fortiori for novel developments (i.e. creativity). 
Perhaps one day a super-EEG will be constructed which will record all the 
thoughts […] which the stream of consciousness carries through the 
subject’s wired skull; yet even such a record, far more complete than 
anything James Joyce could dream of, would be but a poor pointer to the 
multi-dimensional patterns underlying the linear stream. […] The super-
EEG […] would still need a psychoanalyst or a Joyce-interpreter to divine 
the meaning behind the meaning: the connotations of individual words, 
their unconscious echoes, the motivation behind it all, the rules of the 
patient’s game, hidden to himself, and the memories which crop up as 
landmarks in his internal, mental environment.454 
 
This “meaning behind the meaning” is not a bad place to start for a re-description of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of agencement.  
In all three cases—Davidson, Dooyeweerd, and Koestler—we recognize several 
of the features we’ve attributed to design and to Deleuze: heterogeneous plans that come 
together despite their heterogeneity. The three authors represent a development which 
progressively comes to resemble Deleuze’s position. Davidson’s property dualism allows 
him to remain a monist about reality while admitting that reality exhibits physical and 
psychic properties which are irreducible—irreducible since anomalous, as there is no 
necessary nomic relation between physical and psychic properties. It is under a similar 
consideration that Deleuze and Guattari are able to bring together their monist emphasis 
on immanence rather than transcendence and their pluralist emphasis on difference rather 
than identity. Anticipating the accusation that their work merely swaps out one dualism 
                                                          
philosophy and science: Arthur Koestler and the biological periphery,” Notes and Records of the Royal 
Society of London 70.3 (September 2016), 269-86. 
454 Koestler, 630.  
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for another, they write:  
We employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that 
challenges all models […] To arrive at the magic formula we all seek—
PLURALISM = MONISM—via all the dualisms that are the enemy, an 
entirely necessary enemy, the furniture we are forever rearranging.455 
 
It is the fact that their various dualisms, or their pluralism in a broader view, i.e. the many 
different sets of terms they did or could adopt and abandon, are anomalous in Davidson’s 
sense which prevents Deleuze and Guattari from settling on a final vocabulary. 
This brings us back to Dooyeweerd. His advance over Davidson is that he 
conceives of things beyond a psychological-physiological dualism: substance is 
meaningful in up to fifteen ways, from different “perspectives,” if we recall our 
discussion in Chapter Two. Not only that, but we can distinguish two different ways in 
which plans are opposed. Davidson only discusses the mental and the physical as 
heteronomic descriptions or classifications of events; Dooyeweerd does the same by 
proposing his fifteen heteronomic modal aspects of temporal experience. The difference 
is that he also distinguishes between the modal aspects themselves, taken together or 
individually, and the cosmic order of time and law which both resides within and lies 
beyond them as their divine root. For Deleuze, it is not only the plans themselves which 
are heterogeneous; so too are the plans according to which these plans are understood, 
considered according to their consistency and according to their organization.  
Koestler comes the closest to Deleuze’s philosophy. Recall from our initial 
discussion that among other things, Guattari wanted agencement to serve two closely-
related purposes: first, he wanted a concept that would require interweaving very 
                                                          
455 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 20-1/31.  
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different semiotics and registers instead of resorting to a simple dichotomy between the 
semiotic and non-semiotic or linguistic and non-linguistic: he wanted a multiplicity of 
heterogeneous plans. Second, he wanted a concept that could work comfortably at 
different scales and levels of analysis; rather than a vocabulary that only addressed 
individual behavior or historical developments or brain chemistry, he wanted something 
operative on a “pre-” and “post” personal, as well as personal, level.  
Koestler’s outlook satisfies Guattari’s requirement because it involves an 
indefinite number of matrices and codes to bisociate or stratify a given situation, and his 
schema is abstract enough to cast a wide ontological net. He has the advantage of 
focusing on creativity as a basic pattern of reality and experience, as opposed to 
Dooyeweerd for whom everything depends on a single creative act, that of God. As a 
result, we are not merely dealing with heterogeneous descriptions of the same reality, 
which is arguably static in Davidson and certainly so in Dooyeweerd, but with a dynamic 
relationship between different matrices, or plans, which results in something new: 
creation.  
It is precisely with regard to creation that we can see Deleuze’s advantage over all 
three authors. In his presentation, “What is the Creative Act?” Deleuze offers creativity 
as a rubric for distinguishing between different disciplines or modes of thought: we can 
define philosophy by identifying “what it does,” i.e. its particular sort of activity and 
particular sort of product.456 Cinema creates blocks of time and action by composing and 
sequencing plans, science creates functions across sets of data, and philosophy creates 
                                                          
456 Gilles Deleuze, “What is the Creative Act?” In Two Regimes of Madness, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. 
Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 312-24. Gilles Deleuze, “Qu’est-ce 
que l’acte de creation?” in Deux régimes de fous, ed. David Lapoujade (Paris: Minuit, 2003), 291-302. 
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concepts. Although their mode of action and their products differ, all three disciplines 
create, and if we were to describe creation in general terms, we would say that creation 
consists in realizing an idea. But therein lies the difficulty which prevents us from 
describing the creative act in general, since ideas are never general: 
No one has an idea in general. An idea—like the one who has the idea—is 
already dedicated to a particular field. Sometimes it is an idea in painting, 
or an idea in a novel, or an idea in philosophy or an idea in science. And 
obviously the same person won’t have all of those ideas. Ideas have to be 
treated like potentials already engaged in one mode of expression or 
another and inseparable from the mode of expression.457 
 
At this point in Deleuze’s presentation we do not yet have a leg up on 
Dooyeweerd or Koestler. An idea is not the cinematic scene which expresses it, and yet 
the former does not enjoy an independent existence. For Dooyeweerd, too, different 
modal aspects all express the same cosmic order and duration, while the temporal 
condition of the theoretical attitude forces us to think of things as expressed under one 
modal aspect or another. And Koestler’s different matrices or contexts all lend different 
frames for discussing Napoleon at Waterloo, a subject we cannot discuss apart from any 
context.  
While our authors may share a common interest in the difference separating 
modes of expression, plans, aspects, or matrices, the chief point of distinction for 
Deleuze is his broader account for how these heterogeneous modes nevertheless interact 
and transform. Deleuze goes on to describe how, despite the differences separating 
literature and cinema, it can come about that “an affinity is revealed through which 
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someone has an idea in cinema that corresponds to the idea in [a] novel.” 458 There is no 
hidden affinity between Dooyeweerd’s modal aspects per se. Their primary reality in 
God’s vision is undivided and undifferentiated; they only divvy up in finite creaturely 
perception, and any “affinity” between them comes to us only by overcoming the latter in 
recognition of the former. Moreover, the types of such inter-modal “affinities,” for 
Dooyeweerd, are described in advance: modal aspects have order and duration in 
common. Dooyeweerd’s framework cannot account for a hidden affinity between 
literature and cinema, whereby a literary idea qua literary is able to appear in and 
intervene into cinema. The ideas of literature and cinema both, in their own right, address 
“problems,” and recalling Alexander’s account of patterns or diagrams, these problems or 
ideas will already involve heterogeneity. When Kurosawa’s Seven Samurai engages an 
idea cinematographically which is otherwise engaged in literature, by Dostoyevsky, we 
are dealing with a heterogeneity (a problem) which is negotiated in heterogeneous ways 
(different modes of expression).459 If we are generous to Dooyeweerd we can say that his 
God-creature-cosmic-theoretic complex offers a concrete diagram for how to join 
different modal aspects, but he misses the deep “affinity” or continuity at stake in 
Eisenman’s more abstract diagrams. 
At this stage one might object: the hidden affinity such as that linking Kurosawa 
and Dostoyevsky is precisely what is at stake in Koestler’s book, which is devoted 
entirely to defining creation as the discovery of affinities between what we assume are 
incompatible frames of reference. This is true, but Koestler’s position is no less static 
                                                          
458 Ibid., 316/295. 
459 For the discussion of Dostoyevsky and Kurosawa, see 316-8/295-6. 
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than is Dooyeweerd’s. With the possible exception of biological morphogenesis (the most 
tantalizing and least developed part of The Act of Creation), the affinity linking 
incompatible matrices is set in advance, only to be uncovered and exploited by a work of 
creative genius. Koestler does not address how a continuum of real possibilities, or an 
affinity between bisociated matrices, can emerge, disappear, or transform over time. To 
recall the terms we discussion regarding diagrams, Koestler is not “abstract” enough, 
since creativity can only mean that the product of the creative act is unexpected in 
relation to its relevant matrices. Not only does he describe a link between Kurosawa and 
Dostoyevsky, but he also describes the affinity linking every work of art with an 
unknown future, with a “people who do not exist or do not yet exist.”460  
There is no indication whether Koestler can handle or how he would handle a 
matrix’s bisociation with a matrix yet-to-come. His framework has the merit of 
emphasizing play and games, however; the logic of play will warrant further discussion 
because it highlights both the strength of Koester’s account as well as the key aspect 
whereby he falls short of Deleuze’s use of agencement in accounting for heterogeneity. 
What is missing is an account of drift, i.e. a crucial component of agencement’s 
definition: deterritorialization. We will return to a discussion of games and play after an 
important detour. 
DETERRITORIALIZATION: A DETOUR 
Many interpretations of Deleuze rightly emphasize his focus on creativity and 
novelty. Indeed, one of the basic dimensions or axes of an agencement addresses the fact 
                                                          
460 Cf. Ibid 322-4. 
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that, even as it “territorializes” and appropriates elements, reproducing and maintaining 
itself, it nevertheless has an inherent tendency to “deterritorialize,” to drift off (elsewhere, 
otherwise, or toward its own destruction). As we saw in Chapter One, the first axis of 
agencement’s definition held concerned its heterogeneous character: it is both and 
equally an agencement of bodies and an agencement of statements, for example, despite 
the incommensurability separating bodies and statements. In the case of the second axis, 
however, the important aspect is that of drift, understood as a propensity to change, and 
more precisely, to change in ways we might deem “unintentional” or at least apparently 
outside the agencement’s logic in its actual condition.  
We will have the chance to revisit this topic in two ways: later in this chapter we will 
consider accidental or unintended events as they emerge in the design of software 
(videogames in particular); in the following chapter, we will have the chance to bring our 
understanding of deterritorialization-as-drift to bear on a familiar instance of drift at work 
in biological evolution. In general terms, over and above more particular discussions of 
game design and biological design, practical and theoretical interventions over 
unintended consequences abound in design literature. Edward Tenner’s Why Things Bite 
Back is an exemplary account which features a host of examples of design choices made 
in technology, planning, and ecology. Unintended consequences do not result from 
human oversight per se, but from the specific form of a design once it is anchored “in 
laws, regulations, customs, and habits.”461 Once again we have an analog to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s preference for agencement over behavior: a preoccupation with discrete 
                                                          
461 Edward Tenner, Why Things Bite Back (New York: Vintage, 1996), 8. 
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instances of individual behavior can distract from the broader agencement of conditions 
which make the behavior possible to begin with. Implicit in Tenner’s account is the call 
to broaden one’s consideration of design, to recognize that context is no less important 
than the design “itself” to a design’s definition or effect in the world.  
The air-conditioning in crowded cities raises the ambient temperature on the 
streets, causing people to spend fewer hours outdoors and to depend further on air-
conditioning.462 The introduction of laundry machines for the home meant that “women 
who had once sent soiled clothing to a commercial laundry began to do more and more 
washing at home,” a trend that solidified as it sent such commercial laundry services out 
of business.463 Fans of the eastern bluebird may build birdboxes to support their favorite 
songbird in areas where it is threatened; these boxes happen to attract house sparrows, a 
throwback to the acclimatization efforts in the 19th century. Tenner writes: 
It is one thing [to build these boxes]. It is quite another to trap and drown 
the house sparrows that occupy these boxes, wring their necks, or put them 
in a sack tied to an automobile exhaust pipe—all techniques recommended 
in a pamphlet distributed by the North American Bluebird Society. Is it the 
house sparrows’ fault that they too fit the holes designed for the bluebirds? 
More to the point, are they to blame if development has dangerously 
reduced the number of the bluebirds’ preferred nesting places, decaying 
trees?464 
 
The first axis tells us that an agencement is always multiple, while the second 
teaches us that it involves forces which help it stick around and forces which drag it 
away, so analyzing an agencement or design should entail accounting both for its inertia 
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and its drift. In order to be precise about Deleuze and Guattari’s terms and highlight what 
sets them apart from the authors considered above, we need to figure out their motivation 
behind the terms “reterritorialization” and “deterritorialization.” As with plan, 
diagramme, and agencement itself, I will briefly discuss some of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
territorial references from A Thousand Plateaus and on that basis suggest the problems or 
ideas they were meant to address.  
As the term suggests, territorialization concerns territory, which Deleuze and 
Guattari are careful to distinguish from mere surroundings, milieu, or the area occupied 
by an animal or population of animals, for example. An animal’s territory is not a section 
of land, a series of associated elements, or even either of these when associated with 
particular activities (mating, rearing young, hunting). Rather, it concerns all of these, is 
built up of all sorts of milieus and elements insofar as these are “territorialized.”465 
Something is territorialized as soon as it “cease[s] to be functional to become 
expressive.”466 In other words, what qualifies something as territorial is not its place in a 
delimited area but rather the fact that it indicates or expresses not just the animal in 
question but the whole array of other territorialized elements as well. “No sooner do I like 
a color that I make it my standard”—as soon as I pick out a favorite color I can begin to 
recognize myself in it; the color becomes territorial as soon as I can “express myself” 
with it.467 With a little adjustment to Koestler’s language, we can say that territory is the 
“matrix” of expression. 
                                                          
465 See Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 314/386. 
466 Ibid., 315/387. 
467 Ibid., 316/389. 
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The processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization are constant themes in 
A Thousand Plateaus—and beyond—but we can draw three important insights from two 
of their prominent examples. First, the relationship between hammer orchids and wasps 
demonstrates that territorialization is multidimensional and involves different elements in 
different ways simultaneously. Second, we see that the processes of deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization accompany and complement one another. Third, the example of 
slang and linguistic evolution suggests the methodological advantage at stake in their 
references to territorialization. These insights will illuminate the frequent references to 
the Earth, a reference we have already encountered when discussing the “planetary” in 
Chapter Two. 
Among Deleuze and Guattari’s most famous examples is one they borrow from 
the biologist, Rémy Chauvin: the “aparallel evolution” of the wasp and hammer orchid.468 
The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but 
the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless 
deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid’s reproductive apparatus. 
But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen.469 
 
Our discussion of Jakob von Uexküll is instructive on this point. According to his 
concept of Umwelt, we can think of the orchid and wasp as inhabitants of their own 
worlds, and each world differs with regard to what is perceptible or actionable. Their 
surroundings are territorialized differently; the same surroundings include both a wasp 
                                                          
468 Cf. Rémy Chauvin, “Récents progress éthologiques sur le comportement sexuel des animaux,” in 
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agencement and an orchid agencement.470 No matter how close orchids and wasps come 
into physical proximity, their Umwelten and their territories are “closed off” from each 
other, but there is nevertheless a kind of communication between these “closed boxes” or 
“non-communicating vases.”471 Rather than territories already given in advance, such 
communication concerns the process(es) whereby territories form, perpetuate, or 
disappear: territorialization. The wasp and orchid example demonstrates that 
territorialization simultaneously involves agencements at different scales and in different 
ways. On one level, the orchid drifts off and ceases to attract conventional pollinators and 
becomes relevant to the wasp in a new way (i.e. the orchid deterritorializes and is 
consequently reterritorialized by the wasp); the wasp is drafted as an auxiliary to the 
orchid’s reproductive system, but as a result the orchid becomes dependent on the wasp’s 
territory or behavior (i.e. the wasp is deterritorialized and consequently reterritorializes 
the orchid). On another level, the individual wasp and orchid agencements are 
territorialized and combine to produce “a shared deterritorialization” in a further 
agencement.472 From the perspective of this new agencement, Guattari tells us, the two 
function “like a mutant wasp-orchid species evolving on its own account and 
redistributing the genetic and semiotic components selected from both original species 
according to its own standards.”473 With their powers combined, the wasp and orchid 
                                                          
470 I use territory and agencement as interchangeable here since territory “is the first agencement, the first 
thing to constitute an agencement; the agencement is fundamentally territorial.” Ibid., 323/397. 
471 Gilles Deleuze, “Proust Round Table,” in Two Regimes of Madness, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames 
Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 39-40. 
472 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 293/360. 
473 Félix Guattari, “The Time of Refrains,” in Machinic Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis, trans. 
Taylor Adkins (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2011), 122. 
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influence and are influenced by other agencements in the same way they each influence 
the other. Territorialization entails simultaneous complementary processes of drift and 
appropriation. 
One of the only times Deleuze or Guattari discuss territorialization outside the 
context of their own framework is in Deleuze’s preface to Henri Gobard’s Linguistic 
Alienation, “The Future of Linguistics.”474 He praises Gobard for refusing to limit his 
analysis to a consideration of discrete linguistic subjects, for recognizing that “the 
functions of language are inseparable from movements of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization,” as for example when “English deterritorializes African Americans, 
who in turn reterritorialize on Black English.”475 What advantage is there in such an 
approach? A study of the political relationship between English and French, or between 
standard American English and African-American Vernacular English, can fail to 
account for the origin of such a relationship. Gobard proposes a four-term distinction for 
different linguistic functions: language can vernacular (spoken at home), vehicular 
(spoken at work), referential (heard on the news), and mythical (recited at church). 
Instead of merely describing the relationship between a “language of power” and a 
“language of the people” or simply comparing their linguistic structures, Gobard’s 
“tetraglossic” method addresses a genetic account of their relationship: “How does a 
language come to power, whether on a national or a global scale? By what means is 
                                                          
474 Gilles Deleuze, “The Future of Linguistics,” in Two Regimes of Madness, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. 
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linguistic power warded off?”476 Deleuze’s comment leads us to think of territorialization 
as vocabulary fit for thinking about functions rather than subjects, and about genesis 
rather than static description.  
Another notable description of deterritorialization concerns Deleuze and 
Guattari’s references to the “planetary,” which we discussed in Chapter Two. In A 
Thousand Plateaus, they write that the “nomad can be called the Deterritorialized par 
excellence,” since there is “no reterritorialization afterward, as with the migrant, or upon 
something else, as with the sedentary”—it is “the earth itself that deterritorializes 
itself.”477 The significance of the earth (la terre) for the concept of territorialization 
should not escape the reader’s attention.  
The example of the wasp-and-orchid, as well as our brief remarks on Gobard’s 
framework, should help us understand how de- and reterritorialization apply to the 
migrant and the sedentary: following the above, we are looking for simultaneous, 
complementary movements of drift and appropriation, and these movements ought to 
offer a genetic account for a new hybrid of elements. Deleuze and Guattari compare the 
three figures of sedentary, migrant, and nomad based on how they use and understand 
paths or trails. The sedentary road “parcel[s] out a closed space to people, assigning each 
person a share and regulating the communication between shares.”478 For such people, 
                                                          
476 Ibid., 68.  
477 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP 381/473. There is certainly much more to be said about the figure of the 
nomad in Deleuze and Guattari’s work, not least of all because nomade is an anagram for both monade and 
daemon. Their nomadology should be read in light of what the authors adopt or adapt from Leibniz’s 
monadology and from the “daemonology” of Neo-Platonism, especially given Deleuze’s references to 
Plotinus. A proper study of this context would go beyond the scope of the current project. 
478 Ibid., 380. 
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the land is so thoroughly territorialized, is such an efficient means of expression, that if 
“something else” should come along, it is already parceled out in space, assigned and 
regulated as dictated by the sedentary’s grid of intelligibility. The migrant travels from 
place to place, deterritorialized at one point only to reterritorialize at the point of their 
destination, “even if the second point is uncertain, unforeseen, or not well localized.”479 
For the nomad, however, points are only “relays along a trajectory,” and the aim of the 
trajectory is only to continue it. They do not stay anywhere long enough to close off 
space and have no destination to reterritorialize; if being territorialized means that 
something has become expressive, the nomad is the “deterritorialized par excellence” 
because they cannot express themselves through the land they inhabit (the sedentary) or 
the land they travel to (the migrant) but rather through traveling itself. 
But where does the earth fit into our description? The simultaneous and 
complementary movements of reterritorialization and deterritorialization should recall the 
simultaneous and complementary descriptions of the ecumenon and planomenon. 
Reterritorialization is the process whereby things are rendered as ecumenon: i.e. the Earth 
as the inhabited or inhabitable, intelligible world. This process is not complete, however, 
since the Earth (etc.) is stratified by many different plans, and my description or use of it 
under one plan will not apply under another plan, or will not apply in the same way. 
Although the “world” now covers its entire surface, the Earth remains a planet. The 
process of deterritorialization characterizes the planomenon, i.e. the Earth as a wandering 
planet, drifting through space with no regard for its inhabitants or habitability.  
                                                          
479 Ibidem. 
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There are thus a few insights to take away from our detour into 
deterritorialization. The first is familiar. The same agencement is one of bodies and one 
of statements; the two plans apply to the same agencement rather than describing two 
distinct agencements. Likewise, the processes of reterritorialization and 
deterritorialization do not necessarily involve different forces or different entities: the 
same charted and occupied Earth, as the subject of reterritorialization, is the planetary 
body of deterritorialization, wandering away. Second, the above examples allow us to 
recast their terms. Territorialization or reterritorialization might be understood as an 
agencement’s inertia; new developments emerge under the weight of its prior trajectory: 
its tendencies and categories delimit its frame of intelligibility and provide for the 
agencement’s maintenance and reproduction. Deterritorialization might be understood as 
something akin to drift; the weight behind the agencement’s territorialization—the 
processes and relations which make it up—might draw it into new associations, new 
functions, new places and meanings. Following its “logic” might bring it along a chain of 
events that leads to its undoing, or to the undermining of its own logic.  
WHAT GAMES ADD TO THE DISCUSSION 
As we said before, games and the concept of play address the shortcoming of an 
account like Koestler’s and the strength, by contrast, of Deleuze’s. It is not enough that I 
can design something which defies expectations by virtue of being bisociated with an 
unanticipated frame of reference. Such is the case with Koestler, for whom humor, 
creativity, consists in overturning conventional assumptions over what frames are and are 
not compatible. We need to further specify, however, that a design is bisociated with 
frames which do not yet exist, and that its multiple association can defy even the 
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designer’s own designs (and not just those of the audience or user). My design can shift 
to acquire new meaning or lose all meaning when contexts change and new frames 
emerge, or when new plans are drawn; it can become obsolete, can be repurposed, or can 
behave in new ways (for better or for worse). Koestler comes close by focusing on the 
creative act, but Deleuze goes further by helping us fold into the concept of design the 
possibility of its drift, its deterritorialization. 
Fortunately, we have at our disposal an entire field of design which is amenable to 
both Koestler’s insights and Deleuze’s advantage. While I believe that its characteristics 
apply to all design, the design of videogames in particular is well-equipped for the task. 
Because it is a matter of both game and software design, the videogame exhibits three 
salient forms of drift which echo Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of 
deterritorialization and cast some suspicion on conventional notions of design and its 
relation to intention or purpose. First, there are emergent forms of gameplay; players 
engage the game in unforeseen ways and to unexpected ends. Second, the player will 
encounter glitches or bugs in the game’s software; glitches can take many forms but are 
typically understood as hiccups or malfunctions in how the game’s elements appear or 
behave. Third, there are the game’s exploits; players may take advantage of aspects or 
components of the game’s design—often glitches or bugs—to play the game in their own 
way, to bypass obstacles, accelerate their progress, or to test the limits of game’s 
structure (or the patience of the game’s developer). We will review each of these three 
elements in particular, but we will first review the concepts of “game” and “play” in more 
general terms, in order to see why game design is valuable to specifying Deleuze’s 
project and the latter’s advantage. 
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GAMES, AND PLAY, IN GENERAL 
Koestler is by no means alone in elevating play—or something like it—to the 
status of a fundamental psychic or social principle.480 Because games are so pervasive 
and yet often so ill-defined, there have been many in-depth and influential attempts to pin 
down a clear concept. The reader may recall that Ludwig Wittgenstein made hay with 
games as paradigmatically unclear, as a fitting example for his notion of “family 
resemblance.”481 While one might readily recognize whether something is or is not a 
game, every attempt at a defining what games are will encounter exceptions; no 
definition will be able to account for every example of game. But Wittgenstein’s interest 
did not lie in games themselves, and other authors are more optimistic at the prospect of 
defining them. As one author writes, while Wittgenstein certainly looked at games, 
“because he had decided beforehand that games are indefinable, his look was fleeting, 
and he saw very little.”482 The field of game studies therefore draws most of its 
philosophical inspiration from “outside” philosophy, from a historian and a sociologist: 
Johan Huizinga and Roger Caillois. Huizinga’s Homo Ludens, in addition to Caillois’s 
response, Man, Play and Games, form two landmark texts indispensable to understanding 
                                                          
480 Because this chapter deals primarily with game design, I am using design and play as more or less 
synonymous. It should be noted, however, that the concept of “play” extends further than game-playing, as 
is the case with all of the authors under review here. While each author privileges games in their discussion 
of play, bear in mind that their goal is to use the example of game-playing to illustrate the character of play 
as such, which in different ways is taken to be an encompassing human principle—something like 
creativity in general, as we saw with Koestler.  
481 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1958). 
482 Bernard Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 
x. 
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the field today.483 Before turning our attention to videogames in particular, let’s sketch 
out a basic understanding of games and game design based on influential aspects of their 
work. 
Huizinga does not mince words over the privilege play enjoys484 in his project as 
he opens Homo Ludens: play is fundamental to human society. Because it is common to 
humans and non-humans alike, it necessarily predates human society, and appeals to 
something in human nature “deeper” than or irreducible to rational explanation—for 
example, we might do something “just for the fun of it.”485 This commitment puts him in 
league with classical philosophical endeavors to reconcile forms of determinism with 
human freedom, or matter with spirit. If we assume that culture represents something 
irreducible to determinism, then play affords the advantage of resisting the exhaustive 
attempts of biology and behavioral psychology while nevertheless preserving our anchor 
in the natural world—as playful animals demonstrate. Huizinga writes: 
                                                          
483 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (Boston: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1949). Roger Caillois, Man, Play and Games, trans. Meyer Barash (Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 2001). Originally published in 1958. 
484 I’ll quickly note that this privilege is all the clearer given that Huizinga would take issue with my 
wording: his goal is not to identify the role of play in culture, but to interpret culture as an instance of play. 
From the book’s initial inception as a lecture series, Huizinga insisted that the title ought to read “..the Play 
Element of Culture,” and to his chagrin his hosts and publishers consistently rendered it as “the Play 
Element in Culture.” His goal was not “to define the place of play among all the other manifestations of 
culture, but rather to ascertain how far culture itself bears the character of play” (ix). Despite how insistent 
Huizinga was in the forward to his own book, his translator did not comply. In a translator’s note: 
“Logically, of course, Huizinga is correct; but as English prepositions are not governed by logic I have 
retained the more euphonious ablative in this subtitle” (Ibid).  
485 “Since the reality of play extends beyond the sphere of human life it cannot have its foundations in any 
rational nexus, because this would limit it to mankind. The incidence of play is not associated with any 
particular stage of civilization or view of the universe. Any thinking person can see at a glance that play is a 
thing on its own, even if his language possesses no general concept to express it [Huizinga notes how many 
languages like French lack any equivalent for the English “fun”]. Play cannot be denied. You can deny, if 
you like, nearly all abstractions: justice, beauty, truth, goodness, mind, God. You can deny seriousness, but 
not play” (3). 
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in acknowledging play you acknowledge mind, for whatever else play is, 
it is not matter. Even in the animal world it bursts the bounds of the 
physically existent. From the point of view of a world wholly determined 
by the operation of blind forces, play would be altogether superfluous. 
Play only becomes possible, thinkable and understandable when an influx 
of mind breaks down the absolute determinism of the cosmos. The very 
existence of play continually confirms the supra-logical nature of the 
human situation. Animals play, so they must be more than merely 
mechanical things. We play and know that we play, so we must be more 
than merely rational beings, for play is irrational.486 
 
The fact that the existence of play confirms the irrational aspects of our nature 
cashes out in the characteristics Huizinga attributes to it. Play is necessarily voluntary and 
thus distinct “from the course of natural process,” which is obligatory and, at times, 
automatic and unconscious.487 For this reason we distinguish play from ordinary life, and 
when we play, we step “into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its 
own.”488 This distinct, temporary sphere of activity maintains its own sense of order and 
imposes its own rules, and its field of activity is under a constant tension, and 
“uncertainty, chanciness; a striving to decide the issue and so end it.”489 
Tentatively, then, we can thus far say that play is free and occurs in a delimited 
time and space that imposes a particular order that brings its resolution under tension. 
Roger Caillois largely accepted these terms but offered his own adjustments on the basis 
                                                          
486 Ibid., 3-4.  
487 Ibid., 8. 
488 Ibidem. One should recall the term for which Huizinga is often credited: the “magic circle” of play. I do 
not include it above because his is only a passing reference, and contrary to popular readings, it did not 
feature as a formal part of his system. Contemporary game studies have organized his ideas about play’s 
discontinuity with real life around the “magic circle” mostly because of the landmark interpretation of 
Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman. See Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman, Rules of Play: Game Design 
Fundamentals (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). 
489 Huizinga, 10.  
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of what he saw as limitations to Huizinga’s project. While Huizinga pursued an “inquiry 
into the creative quality of the play principle” which is characteristic of human culture, he 
privileged competitive forms of game-play, and Caillois saw this limitation as an 
opportunity to develop Huizinga’s thought further.490 Huizinga tended to focus on the 
relationship between the voluntary and rule-bound aspects of play—the fact that the play 
freely submits to the rules of the game—but Caillois thought he neglected the uncertainty 
of play, what Huizinga called tension, and uncertainty is more prominently featured in 
games of chance than in competitive games. It is the difference between working for 
money and winning at the roulette table: both may require skill and strategy, but what 
comes of your time at the roulette table necessarily lacks any guarantee. Play is 
uncertain— 
Doubt must remain until the end, and hinges upon the denouement. In a 
card game, when the outcome is no longer in doubt, play stops and the 
players lay down their hands. […] An outcome known in advance, with no 
possibility of error or surprise, clearly leading to an inescapable result, is 
incompatible with the nature of play.491 
 
This may appear to paint game design in a peculiar light, particularly if one 
adheres to the conventional understanding of design as an intentional form that manifests 
or is manifestly directed by a desired purpose or function. One has to design something 
which includes the possibility of error or surprise, something without inescapable results. 
We will eventually see that this is not exclusive to the design of games, nor even to the 
design of artifacts; uncertainty will be a necessarily quality of all design. For the time 
being, however, we can see that Caillois incorporates and builds on Huizinga’s definition 
                                                          
490 Caillois, 3.  
491 Ibid., 7. 
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of play to give us six basic characteristics. 
1. Play is free: it is no longer a game if playing is obligatory. 
2. Play is separate, “circumscribed within limits of space and time, 
defined and fixed in advance,” as in a playground. 
3. Play is uncertain: its course cannot be determined in advance. 
4. Play is unproductive: it alone cannot produce anything or generate new 
wealth. 
5. Play is governed by rules. 
6. Play is make-believe: it is “accompanied by a special awareness of a 
second reality or a free unreality” distinct from “real life.”492 
 
Judging from our detour into deterritorialization, and the requirement that 
deterritorialization, or drift, sets Deleuze’s philosophy apart from ostensibly similar 
frameworks, some of the above characteristics are more pertinent than others. Namely, 
the phenomenon of drift demands that we reconcile the fact that, on the one hand, games 
delimit and operate in a distinct realm (#2), which is necessarily rule-governed (#5), with 
the idea, on the other hand, that game-play is uncertain (#3). The tension between #3 and 
#5 is exaggerated in the case of videogames; because the architecture of such games is 
built in software, it becomes more obvious that a game simultaneously consists in and 
obeys many different kinds of rules. Furthermore, playing a videogame is “uncertain” in 
many different ways, beyond knowing whether one will win or lose. The example of 
                                                          
492 The above list is from Caillois, 9-10. Since we are to discuss examples of videogames, one could also 
cite the authoritative Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman, Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). A few things to note, however. First, like Salen and 
Zimmerman, I am not currently interested in a precise definition of videogames which would set it apart 
from other kinds of games. Rules of Play was written to clarify a basic conceptual vocabulary for a 
burgeoning field of study stretched thin across many disciplines (cf. Ibid., 2). They propose the three 
headings of rules, play, and society not because these make up the definition of the videogame but because 
these are the three main groups of concepts through which one might study videogames academically: as a 
rule-governed structure, an element of play, or a social phenomenon. In this chapter I am dealing with three 
examples of drift that emerge in videogame design—examples that emerge due to the videogame’s being a 
game and due to its being an instance of software. Huizinga and Caillois (among others) are central to 
studies like Salen and Zimmerman’s and are sufficient for my purposes. A lot of ink has spilled on whether 
videogames are unique for their, e.g., interactivity, but any commentary either way on the matter isn’t at 
stake, currently. 
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unintended game-play allows us to detach aspects of Bernard Cache’s work on 
architecture in particular and apply them to videogames and to design in general. The 
case of software glitches, or bugs—and especially the advantages they sometimes afford 
players in the form of exploits—illustrates the situation common to design and 
agencement, wherein the coincidence of heterogeneous plans lends itself to drift. 
GAMES: FRAMES, BUGS, AND EXPLOITS 
FRAMING THE RULES OF VIDEOGAME DESIGN 
Videogames, whose architecture is built in software, offer a prime example of 
what Bernard Cache describes as “frames of probability,” which drives a wedge between 
a player or developer’s intention and the result of their decisions and actions. Cache is an 
important figure in the context of Deleuze’s later career, although he is seldom consulted 
outside the study of architecture. Deleuze’s influence on his work is unmistakable, and 
Cache would in turn have his own impact on Deleuze’s philosophy: the latter refers to 
Cache by name and claims to have adopted his understanding of “inflection” when 
writing The Fold.493 
Cache’s Earth Moves was written as a catalog of the images that “make up our 
everyday lives,” namely, the elements of architecture that structure our experience: 
vectors, inflections, and frames.494 All three of these images or elements can be found in 
the form of the videogame, but it is the last variety which most concerns my projects 
                                                          
493 For the reference to Cache: see Deleuze, FLB, 14-7/20-4. Cache is also directly cited in What is 
Philosophy? See: Deleuze and Guattari, WP, 232n27/178n27. 
494 Bernard Cache, Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories, ed. Michael Speaks, trans. Anne Boyman 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 2. 
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since what privileged game play and set Deleuze apart from superficially similar authors 
was the potential for something highly regulated and delineated to drift off—into nothing 
or into something new. First, Cache says that architecture includes directional or 
gravitational vectors; it directs our activity, our attention, or ourselves in one or more 
directions.495 Second, architecture involves the art of producing and arranging what he 
calls inflections: differential thresholds and limits that haunt the landscape and influence 
what is and what is not possible at a place and time. Lastly, there is the frame, or the 
frame of probability, i.e. an interval which “separates cause from the realization of its 
effect.”496 Architecture is the art of “introducing intervals in a territory in order to 
construct frames of probability.”497 The architect cordons off a space in the city and 
designate it as a living space, a home, and design it explicitly for that purpose. But there 
is no telling what will ultimately fill that interval; its frame might serve as a crypt, a bird 
nest, a consignment store, or a safe house. In all, there are three ways to understand 
Cache’s architectural frames, or three functions we can attribute to them. There are walls 
which delimit an interval, there are windows which select the interval’s inhabitants, and 
there is the floor, the interval itself, which grounds or affords certain activities and makes 
some more likely than others.498  
As we learned from Caillois and Huizinga, gameplay occupies such a cordoned-
                                                          
495 Ibid., 12.  
496 Ibid., 23. Cache borrows this idea from Eugène Dupréel, who “criticized the classical causal scheme, 
remarking that no value has been attributed to the interval that separates the cause from the realization of its 
effect. For a cause to produce an effect, this interval must be filled” (23). 
497 Ibidem. 
498 Ibid., 23-6. 
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off, framed space which is ordered according to certain rules and within which it imposes 
its own order on those who participate in it. Cache’s architectural vocabulary is helpful to 
us because it allows us to distinguish between the several different orders of videogame 
design, the different series or levels of rules that regulate its formation and its formation 
and that shape player decisions. A videogame is software framed in a hardware 
environment, as well as in a social, political, historical environment. It simulates physical 
interaction, renders graphics, organizes interface menus, and proceeds according to a 
gameplay logic, which impose limits and win conditions on the player in addition to 
encouraging/discouraging particular forms of gameplay. 
Salen and Zimmerman discern at least two main sorts of rules in videogame design—
rules of the game and rules of strategy: 
While playing Tic-Tac-Toe, you might devise a ‘rule of thumb’ to assist 
your play. For example, if your opponent is about to win, you need to 
place a mark that will block your opponent. This kind of strategic ‘rule’ is 
an important aspect of the game, but these rules of strategy are not part of 
the formal rules of the game.499 
 
This distinction will be important for making sense of the unintended effects 
which can emerge from the form of a videogame’s design. The rules of the game are 
something akin to the “laws of nature”; they are the constraints and limits which make up 
the game’s formal identity and regulate its basic operations. Because the rules of the 
game can be split further, Salen and Zimmerman ultimately propose three categories of 
game rules: operational rules, or what we typically mean by the game’s “rules,” 
constitutive rules, or the underlying logical and mathematical rules that make a game 
                                                          
499 Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman, Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2003), 121.  
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operative, and implicit rules, or the malleable and sometimes context-specific rules of 
behavior that dictate proper gameplay and whose violation may make play—or fun, at 
least—impossible.500 Our first example of unintended game design effects appears at the 
level of these implicit rules. 
EMERGENT GAMEPLAY 
We say that a form of gameplay is emergent when the rules, goals, or activity 
which defines the game develop through the course of playing in ways that cannot be 
accounted for by the game developer’s original intent. These developments can occur in 
the course of an individual’s play experience or they can appear as the collaborate 
product of many players. The development team behind the innovative virtual ecosystem 
of Ultima Online underestimated the their players’ bloodlust, and the ecosystem swiftly 
collapsed upon its introduction.501 The designers behind massive multi-player online 
games (MMOs) did not anticipate how the in-game economic system would bleed over 
into the “real” economy, as some players began mindlessly toiling or “farming” for 
virtual currency, selling their gameplay to players willing to pay a premium on 
convenience.502 While emergent forms of gameplay are often unexpected, there are cases 
                                                          
500 Ibid., 130. 
501“What we discovered the moment the game went live was that players ran over the world like a swarm of 
ants that consumed every living thing as fast as it was possible to spawn it. […] This proverbial swarm of 
ants was unstoppable.” Cf. Lee Hutchinson, “War Stories: Lord British created an ecology for Ultima 
Online but no one saw it,” in Ars Technica, ( https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2018/12/an-afternoon-with-
lord-british-creating-ultima-onlines-unknown-virtual-ecology/).Last accessed on 01/29/19 
502 Cf. Rowenna Davis, “Welcome to the new gold mines,” in The Guardian 
(https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/mar/05/virtual-world-china). Last accessed on 01/29/2019. 
“Li Hua makes a living playing computer games. Working from a cramped office in the heart of Changsha, 
China, he slays dragons and loots virtual gold in 10-hour shifts. Next to him, rows of other young workers 
do the same. ‘It is just like working in a factory, the only difference is that this is the virtual world,’ says Li. 
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of videogame design where the developers expect or even encourage it. Some game 
makers design with flexibility in mind in order to give their players latitude in their 
approach to the game and their in-game experience. Their efforts focus less on preparing 
a specific narrative for the player to unravel or a set of concrete objectives for the player 
to meet and more on furnishing the tools to allow players to build their own narrative and 
pursue their own goals.  
RimWorld, released in 2018, is a game about space colony construction and 
management simulation.503 The player begins with a handful of generated colonists—
with varying abilities, pre-existing conditions, preferences, and quirks—who have crash 
landed on a procedurally generated planet. Another science fiction adventure game would 
have been planned out with a particular player experience in mind; available resources 
and environmental threats would have been balanced out to maintain a level of difficulty 
for the player without making it impossible to succeed. RimWorld, however, makes hay 
on the lack of such balance. The player’s random colonists may not work well together, 
and their new home’s terrain may be harsh and inhospitable. The game developer’s 
official website describes the course of typical gameplay: 
Manage colonists’ moods, needs, individual wounds, and illnesses. 
Engage in small-team tactical gunplay. Fashion structures, weapons, and 
apparel from metal, wood, stone, cloth, or futuristic materials. Fight pirate 
raiders, hostile tribes, rampaging animals, giant tunneling insects and 
ancient killing machines. Tame and train cute pets, productive farm 
animals, and deadly attack beasts. Watch colonists develop relationships 
with family members, lovers, and spouses. Discover a new generated 
                                                          
‘The working conditions are hard. We don’t get weekends off and I only have one day free a month. But 
compared to other jobs it is good. I have no other skills and I enjoy playing sometimes” (Ibidem).  
503 RimWorld, Ludeon Studios, 2018. 
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world each time you play. Build colonies in the desert, jungle, tundra, and 
more.504 
 
While the level of sophistication of its simulation and the variability of its play 
outcomes are no match for its spiritual predecessors,505 RimWorld (Figure 13) is a 
significant example because its development team has been extremely amenable to 
player-made and player-distributed modifications. What is more, as the game’s title 
screen indicates, RimWorld sells itself as a “story generator.” As a story generator built 
on the premise that unexpected results will follow from unprepared colonists encountered 
unforeseen circumstances, one could claim that such emergent gameplay confirms that 
the game’s design realizes the intentions of the original developer. I would admit this 
only on condition that we highlight the fact that the developer intended for the game not 
to proceed as intended and to have expected that events, strategies, and interpretations or 
narratives would emerge which they could not have expected.  
It is a relatively recent development for videogame designers to anticipate and 
encourage unintended forms of gameplay, and of course, most cases of emergent 
gameplay do not follow RimWorld’s example. One prominent example which includes 
countless games across different genres is what is called speedrunning, the attempt to 
play through a game as quickly as possible. As one popular host for speedrun 
                                                          
504 From the front page of https://rimworldgame.com. Last accessed on 1/27/2019.  
505 A longer discussion would warrant mention of Dwarf Fortress, an indie game with remarkable influence 
on new developments in videogame design. Fortresses built and managed in Dwarf Fortress are infamously 
short-lived, owing to crushing external threats and down-ward spirals in bad Dwarven behavior for which 
the loyal player community reserves a revealing shorthand term: “fun.” According to one fan-run wiki, the 
only way to have fun in the game is to lose, since the only fortresses that don’t eventually fail “tend to be 
very conservative and very boring—and what fun is that?” “DF2014:Losing (Redirected from ‘Fun’),” 
http://dwarffortresswiki.org/index.php/DF2014:Losing. Last accessed on 1/27/2019.  
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competitions tells it, “People speedrun to challenge themselves, to see a game pushed to 
the limits, and to get extra replay value out of a game.”506 Further modes of gameplay 
emerge as players regularly form their own version of speedrunning, imposing limits and 
extra requirements on their runs—e.g. the player must collect all coins in addition to 
completing the game. The relatively straightforward quest for maximum efficiency left 
no stone unturned, and now speedrunners look for ways to capitalize on “flaws” in the 
game’s design. By taking advantage of loopholes in the level design or various glitches in 
the game’s software, the player can succeed in “sequence breaking,” i.e. bypassing 
otherwise mandatory portions of the game. To fully understand the significance of such 
glitches and the player’s ability to exploit them, we must first discuss glitches themselves. 
In their own right, glitches, or bugs, offer us an example of how a rule-bound, intentional 
design can lend itself to irregularities and unintended consequences. 
                                                          
506 “Frequently Asked Questions,” SpeedRunsLive (http://www.speedrunslive.com/faq/). Last accessed on 
1/29/19. 
Figure 14 – Screenshot of RimWorld 
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BUGS: GLITCHES IN PERCEPTION, PHYSICS, AND PROTOCOL 
In general terms, a glitch is any hiccup in a system’s expected or usual operation, 
but the players and developers of videogames focus on the mechanical or programming 
errors that emerge and can be observed in the course of actual gameplay. Software and 
videogame glitches come in many flavors, but for now we will consider two types which 
both point back to the same logic: the game gets its “wires crossed”; two sequences of 
code or two aspects of the game come into conflict, producing undesirable or unexpected 
results. There are glitches based on the physics of the game’s engine and glitches which 
involve other forms scripted behavior. In the worst of circumstances glitches can spell the 
end of gameplay; they are said to be “game-breaking.” The operating system crashes, the 
title screen freezes, the player’s model clips through the side of a mountain and gets stuck 
out-of-map (i.e. outside the bounds of rendered or tactical space).  
The majority of glitches, though, are not as severe. Sounds are timed incorrectly. 
Collision detection fails for solid objects, and the player’s character model “clips” 
through a wall or stands “in the middle” of his horse. A model’s movements hiccup and 
are repeated in a stuttering loop. What players interact with and call a “videogame” is the 
rendered product of a software framework called the game’s “engine,” which handles and 
coordinates the programming for the game’s core features in broader strokes. The engine 
saves the developer time, since they do not have to build from the ground up. Because the 
engine already accounts for how images are rendered, how surfaces and surfaces 
interactions are calculated, how sounds are triggered and synched, and so much more, it 
offers the developer an environment in which they can focus on the details of their 
game’s “content.” 
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As with other kinds of engines, however, a game engine does not always run 
smoothly. The game’s physics or collision detection system might fumble an unforeseen 
object interaction: an example of a sort of internal contradiction between the engine’s 
different processes.  While playing a Bethesda game,507 to your horror, you discover that 
the welcoming non-player characters (NPCs) at the gate are having a bad day—their 
faces have melted down well below their necks, while their eyes and teeth (because 
independently rendered) remain fixed, floating exposed in space. See Figures 14, 15 for 
examples. 
The scheme I propose for understanding glitches involves a second category 
which currently lacks traction in the gaming and game design community. I would 
describe the above examples as constitutive glitches, indicating errors in how game 
elements are assembled and loaded as visible, tangible components of the game and its 
environment. The second class of glitch is important because I believe it captures some of 
the characteristics common to glitches and related phenomena; I call these behavioral 
glitches or glitches in protocol. Thinking of them in terms of behavior is helpful for 
                                                          
507 Bethesda Games Studio is notorious for releasing buggy games. Nearly everyone recognizes that the 
ubiquitous glitches stem from a faulty or outdated game engine, but a few have recently argued that the 
engine is a symptom rather than the source of Bethesda’s problems. See Shamus Young, “Bethesda Doesn’t 
Need a New Engine,” in Escapist Magazine 2 (2018). 
https://www.escapistmagazine.com/v2/2018/11/20/bethesda-doesnt-need-a-new-engine/  
Figure 15 – Two glitches from Skyrim  
 243 
 
emphasizing that the glitch is a matter of pattern, routine, or component systems which 
are autonomous or semi-autonomous. Furthermore, it will be helpful for recalling our 
time with Deleuze, since he 
claimed that agencement had a 
leg up on the concept of 
“behavior” since it allowed for 
more thoroughgoing analysis and 
let us challenge trite distinctions 
like that between nature and 
culture, for example.  
Sometimes the protocols for how different entities should behave contradict each 
other, or at least produce results we do not like or do not expect, or different protocols for 
the same element’s behavior disagree. Although more famous for launching big budget, 
underdeveloped games rife with constitutive glitches, game studios Bethesda and Ubisoft 
present good examples of behavioral glitches in two of their popular games: Elder Scrolls 
V: Skyrim and Assassin’s Creed: Origins, respectively. Both games feature open world 
maps; while the maps themselves are not, their massive size requires that many of their 
features and the behavior of their features be procedurally generated: bears, villagers, 
weather patterns, etc. Some of these features serve a direct narrative purpose, while 
others only exist to immerse the player in a more “realistic” environment to encourage 
their engagement with the narrative.  
In Skyrim, each city is patrolled by imperial guards for whom the player earns a 
regional reputation, one based on the player’s current and recent activity. Your reputation 
Figure 16 – A Surprising Infant from The Sims 
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will influence how city guards treat you: whether they look the other way if you’ve 
committed a crime and are caught red handed, whether they can be bribed, or whether 
they are instead hostile and presume guilt until-proven-innocent. Regardless of 
reputation, however, attacking a guard will be met with violent apprehension. Such is 
their protocol: suppress or arrest anyone who attacks them—in the name of the king!  
Meanwhile, when travelling between cities, the play may be tempted to swim 
across rivers and streams in order to save time. One should beware that the slaughterfish 
indigenous to Skyrim’s waterways have their own protocol: to pursue and attack anyone 
who wades nearby. What happens when a city’s imperial guard winds up in the water? 
The result is an endless behavioral loop: the slaughterfish attacks the guard who attempts 
to arrest the fish who attacks the guard who, etc. “In the name of the king, drop your 
weapon! You’re coming with  me!” (Figure 16). 
Figure 17 – Stand-off between city guard and slaughterfish, Skyrim. 
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The NPCs of Assassin’s Creed: Origins are not programmed for autonomous 
aquatic behavior. They mill about the city, engage in scripted and/or variable 
conversations, and together contribute to the emulation of a bustling market, but none of 
them know how to swim. The player can put this to the test after the old man, Beka, dies 
while waiting for the player to retrieve his Book of the Dead. After the end of the 
mission, the player can bring Beka’s body to the dock and gingerly push it off the edge 
and into the water. No sooner than the corpse breaks the water’s surface does it reanimate 
and haul himself back onto the dock, whereupon it will collapse, lifeless once again 
(Figure 17). According to the demands of the game’s narrative, Beka is dead. According 
to the inviolable rules dictating all narrative-related NPC behavior, people cannot swim 
and must climb out of the water as soon as possible to prevent “losing” NPCs at the 
bottom of the sea. When these two protocols and sets of demands collide, the dead arise 
to hoist themselves onto dry land.  
Figure 18 – Dead man climbs back onto the dock in order to die again, Assassin’s Creed: 
Origins. 
 246 
 
EXPLOITS: MAKING DO 
While glitches can occur spontaneously, there are reasons the player may wish to 
induce them or seek them out. When a glitch in the game’s software or an oversight in the 
game developer’s plan presents itself, the player may exploit it to their advantage. An 
exploit is defined as a strategy which makes use of non-primary features of a game’s 
design in order to undermine prescribed forms of gameplay. We will consider a few 
different exploits—the last of which, from the game Journey, will lead us to review the 
main assumptions underpinning typical interpretations of allegedly incidental and 
unintended features of game design like emergent gameplay, glitches, and exploits.  
Our first example is perhaps the most severe, involving the use of an in-game 
glitch to override the basic parameters and security settings of the gaming console’s 
operating system. Players were able to exploit an error in The Legend of Zelda: Twilight 
Princess in order to run their own homebrew games and other unauthorized software on 
the Nintendo Wii console. The main character of the game, Link, has a horse named 
Epona—a name five characters long. Clever players tweaked their save files and swapped 
“Epona” out for a name much longer than the game expected or could handle, and so the 
Wii’s operating system crashed whenever it tried to load the horse’s name. The strict 
defensive measures Nintendo had built into the system went down, and in its post-crash 
vulnerable state, the system could be made to load and run any program the user 
wished.508  
Our second example comes to us from the surprise hit indie game from 2016, 
                                                          
508 “Twilight Hack” (http://wiibrew.org/wiki/Twilight_Hack). Last Accessed on 2/5/19. 
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Stardew Valley. Stardew Valley is a game about farming and community building; it tells 
the story of a young person who feels alienated in a dead-end job at a major corporation 
and suddenly discovers that they have inherited their grandfather’s farm in Stardew 
Valley, near Pelican Town. It is up to the player to restore the form to its former glory 
and to their prerogative whether and how they interact with others in the community. The 
player has considerable latitude: they can farm crops, care for livestock, craft artisanal 
goods from raw ingredients, mine for minerals and rare artifacts, and pursue friendship or 
romance with the townsfolk. Before version 1.2.26 was released in April 2017, the 
wallpaper catalogue sold at Pierre’s small grocery offered a hidden advantage. The 
programmed ID tags for the different patterns of wallpaper happened to correspond to the 
programmed ID tags for various other items in the game, and players discovered that 
many of the NPCs and triggered events in the game did not distinguish between sheets of 
wallpaper and “the real thing.” Haley is a big fan of coconuts; giving her one will take 
you a considerable distance toward becoming her friend (or more), but a brown 
checkered sheet of wallpaper will do just as well. Pierre’s catalog was a one-time 
purchase and would produce an infinite number of sheets, so a player’s road from rags to 
riches was paved in wallpaper (Figure 18).  
We have already encountered one example of exploit from the world of 
speedrunning, where players are encouraged to look for shortcuts in their quest to reach 
the end of a level or game as quickly as possible. Such shortcuts can come in the form of 
sequence breaking glitches,  whereby players bypass intended parts of the game. The 
practice of sequence-breaking is so widespread in the speedrunning community that it has 
wound up in the official text of some games. The 100 Sammer Guys, vassal samurai 
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sworn in the service of King Sammer, are only some of the foes awaiting Mario in 2007’s 
Super Paper Mario for the Nintendo Wii. One Sammer Guy is named “Over the 
Flagpole,” a reference to a sequence-breaking exploit in earlier Mario games: the 
“flagpole” is a goal post at the end of every level; by jumping over the flagpole, Mario 
could skip levels or entire worlds. When Mario defeats Over the Flagpole in Super Paper 
Mario, the Sammer Guy cries, “Surely you are cheating! You are exploiting a glitch! You 
are a sequence breaker!”509 
Exploits and sequence breaking need not necessarily involve the use of glitches, 
as I found for myself during my first playthrough of Journey, perhaps the most iconic 
game to have come out of thatgamecompany [TGC]. Some background information is 
necessary. Like TGC’s other games, Journey privileges immersion and affective 
ambience over explicit narrative.510 Game developer, Jenova Chen, wrote their masters 
                                                          
509 Super Paper Mario, Nintendo (2007). 
510 “Starting with an emotion and attempting to design a game around that emotion, as opposed to starting 
with the mechanics, which is often how designers approach games—so it’s a first person shooter, or it’s a 
 
Figure 19 - The now-defunct wallpaper glitch in Stardew Valley. These pillars will reward 
the player with a powerful "Galaxy Sword" in exchange for a rare prismatic shard. 
Fortunately they cannot distinguish prismatic shards from sheets of pale green wallpaper. 
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thesis on how players adjust to progressive levels of game difficulty, drawing on 
Csikszentmihalyi’s concept of flow, the experience of disappearing into an activity. All 
of TGC’s games attempt to sustain the player’s flow, which might be compromised with 
dialogue, explicit instructions, and meta-game menu screens. In Journey, released for the 
PlayStation 3 in 2012, gameplay proceeds without any tutorial or exposition; the 
environment and the gameplay itself suggests a narrative and an end-goal. The player 
traverses the ruins of a lost civilization, across a mysterious desert to a mountain on the 
horizon—undeciphered hieroglyphic scenes offer clues as to the nature of this civilization 
and its eventual downfall, as well as the nature and purpose of the player’s journey, but it 
is by and large left to the player’s interpretation. As the title suggests, the journey itself is 
the point of the game. Along the way the player will encounter other travelers, and, if one 
is playing for the first time, the game does not reveal that these are in fact other human 
players. Players can interact with each other and help one another but cannot 
communicate in any way. 
In fact, players’ only form of interaction is by emitting a flash of light and a 
chirping noise, which, when in range, “powers up” the scarf worn around another 
player’s neck. These scarves afford travelers a brief launch into flight; under normal 
conditions, when travelling alone, scarves quickly lose charge and one is forced to submit 
to gravity. On my first playthrough, I cooperated with another player—who I believed 
                                                          
real-time strategy. Instead we started with this idea of making a game that makes you feel like you’re a kid 
daydreaming, and looking at the clouds—and trying to make a game from that approach.” Kellee Santiago, 
“thatgamecompany’s Kellee Santiago: the co-founder of the flOw developer on the firm’s origins and the 
importance of new ideas,” interview by Phil Elliot, gamesindustry.biz July 2, 2010. 
(http://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/thatgamecompanys-kellee-santiago-interview). Last Accessed on 
2/5/19. 
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was an NPC—to fly over most of the game’s map. We alternated our chirps in a chain 
that permitted us perpetual flight, and I unwittingly skipped over a majority of the game’s 
content. My friends struggled to contain their surprise and frustration, insistent on not 
“spoiling” the surprise that I was actually interacting with another human player, while 
dismayed that I was “missing” most of the game. I couldn’t make any sense of their 
reaction—after all, I was only doing “what the game was telling me to do,” following the 
cues given by the NPC and my environment.  
Afterward, we debated whether my accidental short-cut was an exploit. Had I 
accidentally become a sequence-breaker? Was I exploiting a flaw in the game’s design to 
my advantage or was I in fact realizing something essential to the developer’s intention, 
according to which gameplay and narrative interpretation were left open to emerge on an 
individual basis? There was a good argument that I had missed some of the intended parts 
or aspects of the game, which would imply that the design is defined and motivated by 
the designer’s intentions; but one could just as well argue that the designer’s intention 
concerned the eventual use of the design rather than the design itself. Then again, one 
could also argue that the designer’s intention was merely a fiction projected by the player 
onto the form of the design; I took it for granted that my approach to gameplay was 
legitimate: it was possible, and so it must have been intentional.  
I argue that Journey reveals a predicament common to all games and all design. 
Suppose that one can successfully open a can by smashing it with a can-opener. First, one 
might claim that the design was intended to open cans in a particular way, and that we 
have failed to realize the designer’s intention. On the other hand, we can argue that since 
the can-opener was intended to open cans, we have indeed realized the designer’s 
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intention even though we did not do so as intended. Third, if we are using a can-opener 
for the first time, we may not be aware of the designer’s “true” intention, or may not in 
fact be aware of the designer at all—instead, we take it for granted that a designer was 
responsible for the can-opener’s design and simply assume that our use of the design 
accords or fails to accord with the designer’s intention. The first claim implies a strong 
relationship between form and function such that a particular form has a necessary 
relationship to a particular function, and that one is brought to the other via the agency of 
the designer. The designer determines the essential purpose of the can-opener to be 
opening cans, and because the designer is responsible, we can look to them for the 
standard of proper design use. The second claim is functionalist rather than purely 
essentialist: the design is directed toward a particular function and its success is not 
entirely attributable to the designer’s original intent. The design succeeds when it fulfills 
its function, even if it does so in a way the designer failed to anticipate. The third claim 
privileges use. It is use that determines the function of design, since the designer’s intent 
is a post hoc fiction based on the way the design is actually used.511 
                                                          
511 In 2018, there was some public discussion over the “correct” use of manual can openers, in part due to 
Cinemagraphy, “The proper way to use the Can Opener! You have been using the can opener all wrong!” 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mFmllVIZrQs). The most common method is to hold the can opener 
parallel to the sides of the can (with the blade cutting into the top), while the other method involves holding 
it parallel to the top of the can (with the blade cutting along its sides). Both methods work, and both offer 
different measures for ensuring the user’s safety. The second method does sharpen the entire circumference 
of the top of the can, but it has the advantage of removing the lid all at once. The first method may expose 
the user to fewer jagged edges, but it has the disadvantage of requiring the user to “dig into” the can to 
remove the lid.  
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Figure 20 – Screenshot from Journey 
Regardless of how we decide between these those three claims or whether there 
are other possible interpretations, Journey demonstrates that more attention is due to the 
relationship between intention and design. Attending to this matter will carry us through 
to the next chapter. To begin, we should take stock of the basic assumptions underpinning 
our understanding of videogame accidents—emergent gameplay, glitches, and exploits. 
BUGGED ASSUMPTIONS 
The specific form and context of a glitch’s appearance, the necessary conditions 
for its existence and for our interpretation of it, as well as the actions and attitudes of both 
players and game-makers, all betray assumptions often made about design in general, 
assumptions which were also in the cross-hairs of agencement (as we discussed in 
Chapter 1). There are three such assumptions at work in common responses to 
unexpected developments in videogame structure and gameplay, and they all grow from 
the same root belief that design—and this is often said to define design—is necessarily 
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intentional and that what distinguishes a design form from non-design is that non-design 
is accidental, unpredicted or unpredictable, or otherwise unintentional. Our survey of 
these three assumptions will challenge that root belief. From a few remarks on the 
etymologies and histories behind “glitch” and “bug,” we will consider the assumption 
that glitches are external to the design itself, the assumption that bugs are in themselves 
bothersome, and the assumption that such hiccups are local, or discrete, phenomena.  
The word, glitch, is likely Yiddish in origin, though it has a wide range of 
cognates in other Indo-European languages: for example, glide in English and glisser in 
French. Somewhere in the normal operation of the system we encounter a point of 
slippage: the system fumbles, or an element slips out of its otherwise firm grasp.512 
Another general term for the same set of phenomena is “bug.” There are two different 
origin stories for this piece of engineering terminology, and both stories reveal something 
meaningful about software in general and games in particular. The assumption is that 
bugs come from outside, from outside of the machine proper or outside of the engineer’s 
intentions. The first story is widely reported but is not, in fact, the origin of the term. In 
Grace Hopper’s log from her work on the Harvard Mark II computer, the Aiken Relay 
Calculator, one can find a special article of evidence alongside her diagnosis for an 
observed malfunction: taped on the page, by September 9, 1947, is a moth (Figure 20). 
                                                          
512 One might recall, here, the several possible English translations for ligne de fuite, so prominent in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work. It might be the horizon line, the level of a painting’s vanishing point that 
frames the composition’s perspective. Fuite can also refer to a leak, an escape—this is why ligne de fuite 
often refers, in French, to an insulator’s creepage distance. If a connection’s voltage is high enough and 
particles in the air cause the air to conduct, there can be leakage (fuite), and so the electrical engineer wants 
the insulator to maximize the distance the leak has to cover (ligne de fuite). Although fuire and glisser are 
not etymologically connected, one should note the semantic relationship between leaking, escaping, and 
slipping. A glitch is when something “gets away” from normal operation.  
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Her diagnosis: “First actual case of bug being found.” As the story goes, this is why we 
refer to glitches and software defects as “bugs.” 
In truth, the word is much older than computers (a fortiori older than software) 
and described mechanical malfunctions as early as the 1870’s. Perhaps 19th century 
mechanical engineers also found moth in their gears and springs, but it more likely has 
something to do with bug’s relation to words like “bugbear.” From bugge, a Middle 
English word for scarecrows or hobgoblins, the word bugbear has come to mean an 
ongoing problem, obstacle, a source of constant irritation. A “bug” was thus a hiccup or 
malfunction in a mechanical design that “bugged” the designer or the user.  
Even if the Hopper account is not the true origin of the term, it reveals something 
about the word’s actual origin and its current use. Understood as moths in the machine, 
bugs and glitches interrupt the smooth functioning of the planned design but do not count 
as part of the design proper. They are accidents or obstacles; they are wrinkles but not the 
fabric of the game. Even if they are perfectly intelligible according to the game’s engine, 
Figure 21 – Log Book with Computer Bug, The National Museum of 
American History, #1994-0191-1. 
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its rules and its protocols, unintended consequences are not—developers and players 
agree—part of the game.  
When understood as “bugbears” rather than moths, the second assumption we 
make of glitches is that they are inherently problematic or bothersome. The player’s 
claim that something is “wrong” with the game’s software says just as much about the 
player as it does about the game itself. The glitch bugs the player or the game developer, 
but this says nothing of the glitch’s inherent qualities. On this note, recall that 
agencement was prescribed as an antidote to the preoccupation Deleuze’s contemporaries 
had with individual behavior. His frequent references to “Abstract Machines” can 
mislead the reader into presuming that he and Guattari want to lead us away from a 
concrete consideration of individual behavior to a more abstract, general consideration of 
the context of such behavior. As we saw in the previous chapter, though, the abstract 
should in no way be understood as “general,” since Deleuze opposes the concrete not to 
the abstract but to the discrete.513 It is only a particular sense of abstract that Deleuze 
objects to; it is a question of what one abstracts.  Say we are studying an individual’s 
behavior in their milieu, or a component’s role as part of a machine. What Deleuze and 
Guattari would want to avoid is abstracting the individual’s behavior from their milieu, or 
abstractly considering the machinic component apart from the machine. The worthwhile 
sort of abstraction concerns how behavior meets milieu, or how the component is 
                                                          
513 For an excellent review of Deleuze’s take on the abstract and the discrete, with regard to Hegel in 
particular, see Brent Adkins, “Who Thinks Abstractly?” in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 30.3 
(2016), 352-60. Adkins launches his discussion on the basis of Deleuze’s lecture on A Thousand Plateaus: 
“Il y a le concret et l’opposé du concret, le vrai oppose du concret ce n’est pas l’abstrait, c’est le discret” 
(Gilles Deleuze, lecture presented March 14, 1978, University of Paris VIII-Vincennes, Le Cours de Gilles 
Deleuze, accessed February 11, 2015, http://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/58).  
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“machined.”514 Our assumption that software or videogame glitches are inherently 
bothersome thus relies on a third assumption: we assume that glitches are discrete entities 
and forget the milieu that condition them. Our focus on individual behavior is misplaced; 
we treat glitches as local phenomena, when the codes and protocols behind them are 
much broader and far-reaching. Even though we say that a game is “patched” in order to 
redress bugs and other software issues—implying that the program receives spot-
treatment for localized wear and tear—such “patches” often necessarily entail broad 
changes to the game as a whole.  
Consider an example described above (Figure 21): in some installments in the 
Assassin’s Creed series, the player may encounter a glitch in how face textures are loaded 
and rendered; some underlying textures, like those of the teeth, gums, and eyeballs, load 
just fine, while the surface of the skin loads improperly or fails to load at all. Emphasis 
on individual behavior, the local manifestation of a videogame glitch, is misplaced 
because it overlooks the agencement of codes and protocols which make the glitch 
possible. Furthermore, however, our time with agencement and glitches indicates that 
things run deeper than that. The NPC’s behavior and the appearance of her face are 
simply following the rules; her face is rendered according to the “laws of nature,” as it 
were. The condition of the possibility for the glitch’s appearance includes the codes and 
protocols which produce it, but other conditions have to be met for it to be considered a 
glitch, or for it to bug us. It doesn’t conform to our expectations, intentions, and goals, all 
of which have their own etiology and their own milieus and all of which are brought to 
                                                          
514 Hence their use of abstract machines rather than abstract components. A similar gear can be used in 
several machines, and so an abstract consideration of the gear as a discrete entity doesn’t tell us that much 
as the abstract machine which makes certain use of the gear.  
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bear on our interaction with the game. A more properly Deleuzian approach would be to 
consider not only why glitches appear but also why they appear as glitches. 
Videogames in particular help underscore what is special about Deleuze’s 
account, as compared to Koestler, Dooyeweerd, or Davidson. But Deleuze in turn can 
intervene into the assumptions which frame our understanding of unintended videogame 
or software events, be they glitches, exploits, or emergent forms of gameplay. Following 
our familiar tetravalent definition of agencement, we claimed that an agencement 
involves forces which help it stick around as well as forces which drag it away, and so 
analyzing an agencement or design should account for both inertia and drift. Returning to 
some of the highlights of our detour into deterritorialization: we saw that the processes of 
territorialization were multidimensional and involved different agencements in different 
ways and at different scales; we saw that in every case deterritorialization was coupled 
with reterritorialization; and we saw that the language of territorialization was more 
suited to describe functions than subjects and to provide a genetic rather than a static 
account. We know that something is territorialized as soon as it “cease[s] to be functional 
Figure 22 – Screenshot a melting face from Assassin’s Creed: 
Unity. Courtesy of Retro_Apocalypse, Steam 
(https://steamcommunity.com/id/retroapocalypse/screenshots/?appid=
289650).  
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to become expressive.”515 No sooner than we interpret a game and submit it to our 
expectations do we territorialize it: this is part of the game, this is an NPC, this is a 
human face, this is how a human face should look and behave, and so on. Already we are 
dealing with an entire suite of different elements, plans, and agencements. Then, when 
the game “drifts off” to perform in unexpected or unintended ways—when a woman’s 
face “melts”—the deterritorialized element is soon reterritorialized. It is exploited to the 
player’s advantage, it induces a new form of gameplay to emerge, it becomes a meme 
and spurs weeks of humor and discussion online, or it becomes expressive—the glitch 
becomes Ubisoft in a nutshell. 
The consequences of this situation with videogames and glitches can be expressed 
in more abstract terms for design overall. The preceding chapters on plans and diagrams 
tell us that design is stratified by different aspects or considerations. Design—all design 
and not just so-called post-industrial, algorithmic, procedural design—is “iterative,” that 
is, it can be expressed in different ways at different levels. The architectural theory and 
practice group, Atelier, calls these ways or levels “constituents,” as we will discuss in the 
next chapter.516 Design assumes different forms on different plans in different ways, and 
each of these can be said legitimately to count as the design “itself.” They are all concrete 
diagrams of the same abstract Diagram, to recall both Deleuze’s and Peirce’s language 
from Chapter 3.  
If design has so many faces, then we say that design characteristically names the 
                                                          
515 Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 315/387. 
516 Atelier [Thomas Binder, Giorgio de Michelis, Pelle Ehn, Giulio Jacucci, and Ina Wagner], Design 
Things (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 57. 
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interface between such faces, and between them and us, which makes it possible for 
purposes to be perceived or realized. This understanding of interface will answer our 
question from the beginning of this chapter, as to how the first and second “axes” of an 
agencement are related. 
CONCLUSION: DESIGN’S DRIFT 
To develop our understanding of design as interface, in light of our discussion of 
emergent gameplay, glitches, and exploits, we will need to briefly visit a typical 
definition of interface, possible philosophical analogs in authors like Dooyeweerd and 
Deleuze, and then a similar term from biochemistry, active site, which is significant for 
crucial passages in A Thousand Plateaus. The world of computing and human-computer 
interaction (HCI) typically understands interface in three ways: as the point of contact or 
means of communication between the user and the computer system (e.g. screen, 
keyboard, mouse), between software systems or between software and hardware systems 
(e.g. the elements which allow software systems to identify, categorize, and manipulate 
other systems), and between hardware systems (e.g. wires and plugs). The first is perhaps 
the most familiar use of the term, in the context of user interface. As users, we do not 
interact with the entire computer system, and our manipulation of its elements is never 
direct; we “use” the system only be means of rendered menus on a screen, coordinated 
with what the mouse or touch screen element or keyboard registers of our input. If we 
consider what all three sorts of interfaces have in common, an interface is that which 
mediates between discontinuous systems or sub-systems. Consider, for example, an 
individual organism on the one hand, understood as a system in its own right, in the 
context of  the larger system of its physical environment on the other hand. These 
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systems have different parts, functions, and considerations, and so a cybernetic ecologist 
might ask how these systems are able to interact: what is their interface? On that basis we 
can broaden the concept of interface to cover all interactions between discontinuous 
systems. All design forms involve interfaces. That is to say, we only interact with design 
according to one “face” at a time while, whether we intend it or not, the design qua 
interface simultaneously reckons with other faces with which we do not at the time 
interact (or intend to interact).  
For a single example of how this works, we might recall our time with 
Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd believed that since we are only finite creatures, we can only 
think of things under one aspect at a time and that we are led to consider these aspects as 
discrete and mutually irreducible. I might manipulate something because, in the 
theoretical mode of my creaturely thought, I consider it under the sphere-specific laws of 
one aspect or another. Because this aspect is united with other aspects in the final order of 
cosmic law, however, my actions incur effects in other aspects following other sphere-
specific laws. For example, I rearrange the furniture in my apartment out of a 
consideration for space—what will fit, whether there is enough room for my desired 
lifestyle, etc.—but my choices at the same time mean something linguistically, 
aesthetically, economically, and so on, i.e. they incur changes under aspects which are 
distinct from and irreducible to the furniture’s spatial aspect. I might intend for what I say 
to be understood in a particular sense, but whether I anticipate it or not I may be 
understood in unintended or perhaps totally new ways, since my statements lend 
themselves to other senses. 
We interact with and use design according to its various “active sites,” to borrow 
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a phrase from the study of biochemistry. A small portion of an enzyme’s surface is 
shaped in a specific way such that it can select and interact with the substrate necessary 
for the enzyme’s chemical task. The grooves of the binding site prevent the substrate 
from slipping away during the chemical reaction and orients the substrate to ensure that it 
catalyzes properly. Substrate materials irrelevant to the enzyme’s particular process fail 
to hook onto the surface of its active site.517 The most obvious comparison with design is 
that its form or shape is only compatible with certain materials in certain ways: a 
chopstick can do a decent job of scratching an itch, but its surface isn’t amenable to 
functioning as a doorstop. Design is the interface of different sites which allows one 
surface to interact with the surfaces of surrounding forms. For a fuller understanding of 
design as an interface, however, I propose expanding the analogy to include how its 
surface “hooks” onto elements on different plans, and furthermore how it hooks different 
plans together.  
The tetravalent definition of agencement involved two axes: two pairs of plans or 
two plans of plans.518 The first axis has two segments, content and expression, and the 
agencement can be understood both as an agencement of interactive bodies and as an 
agencement of intervening statements. As we have noted several times, these plans are 
                                                          
517 Something perhaps worth noting: a footnote for the third plateau of Thousand Plateaus (ATP, 
512n4/56n3) directs our attention to Jacques Monod’s discussion of protein folding, citing Chance and 
Necessity, trans. Austryn Wainhouse (New York: Vintage, 1972), 90-95. Our use of biochemical active 
sites, then, is not without precedent in Deleuze and Guattari’s work. In the broader view of that discussion 
(Ibid., 81-98), Monod also refers to the active sites of enzymes. Enzymes and folding proteins both involve 
precise, spontaneous, and blind processes of morphogenesis. Monod compares the process to that of 
crystallization, since, like crystals, “the structure of the assembled molecules itself constitutes the source of 
‘information’ for the construction of the whole” (86). They “recognize” their materials without cognition 
and repeat their precise transformations without any intentional inner life or “memory” in the conventional 
sense. The form of the enzyme/protein itself serves as cognition, as means, and as memory.  
518 Again, I am paraphrasing the definition provided in ATP 88/112.  
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heterogeneous and yet “apply” to the same material or the same agencement, and their 
relationship is more than simply one of correspondence: the different plans are 
commutative. The second axis spells out the nature of this commutative, heterogeneous 
relationship as well as its consequences. Let us recall our time spent with Christopher 
Alexander and Peter Eisenstein and their use of diagrams in architecture. Design offers a 
concrete pattern, or diagram, for bringing together patterns of events on one hand and 
spatial patterns on the other; it solves the “problem” of their heterogeneity. In the process, 
however, this concrete solution gains momentum and leaves its mark—territorializes—on 
its patterns of events and spatial patterns: as it becomes familiar, we come to expect it as 
the “natural” solution to their difference; we begin to associate certain events with certain 
spatial elements; the concrete design is reproduced, and its influence spreads. Hence the 
agencement has “territorial sides” that maintain and stabilize it.519 However, as Eisenstein 
showed us, the form of the concrete design harbors an abstract continuum of real 
possibilities; it can bring together unexpected patterns of events and spatial patterns, can 
lend itself to do things we did not expect, or can lend itself to do nothing at all. Thus, the 
same agencement has “cutting edges of deterritorialization” that cause it to change, drift, 
or dissolve.520 
We have been looking for a way to combine and relate Deleuze and Guattari’s 
insights according to both axes of agencement’s definition. Design, particularly that of 
videogames and their unintended events, has taught us how the second axis follows from 
the first. It is precisely because its plans are heterogeneous that the same agencement can 
                                                          
519 Ibidem. 
520 Ibidem. 
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lend itself to both maintenance and dissolution simultaneously.  
I make decisions in game design on the basis of perception and my expectations 
for what human faces look like, but the face I design is bound up, on another plan, with 
the physical logic of the game’s engine, the design of which involved other decisions 
under different considerations. In Stardew Valley, our friend, Haley, is overjoyed to 
receive a checkered sheet of brown wallpaper because she has confused it for a coconut, 
one of her favorite treats. From one perspective (plan) it makes complete sense that a 
sheet of wallpaper be interchangeable with a coconut, since both items share the same ID 
tags. From another perspective—that of the narrative and of the characters’ dialogue 
script—this makes no sense at all. A certain agencement, the game’s design, brings these 
plans together in such a way that they coincide and co-adapt via the interface of the 
player’s form of gameplay. They both belong to the same game, the same design, and the 
same game both confirms the player’s previous understanding of the purpose of 
wallpaper and lends it to be re-purposed beyond the developer’s intention or the player’s 
previous understanding. 
Decisions I have made under one consideration have consequences for decisions 
made in other considerations, or considerations which I had not or have not yet 
considered. Intentional acts have unintended consequences, and local “accidents” turn out 
to be systematic, structural, and can behave “as if” intentional. Or else, what I have 
designed can serve intentions I did not intend. What is clear in any case is that intention 
alone is not sufficient to define design, despite its being a central and dominating feature 
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of any discussion of designers and philosophers alike.521 The world is not separable from 
the earth, and so it “drifts” away and is forced to suffer aberrant movements. Design is 
thus both dessein, an intentional and intelligible form, and an abstract dessin of 
singularities which “drifts” or wanders away. A good definition of design ought to 
account for both aspects. We will look for such a definition in the next chapter. 
  
                                                          
521 As we will see in the next chapter, this includes both writings on design and writings on biology (etc.) 
which refer to design.  
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CHAPTER V 
DEFINING DESIGN: MAKING WATCHES  
AND TELLING TIME 
“We cannot suppose that a man would produce a paper-knife  
without knowing what purpose it would serve.” 
- Jean-Paul Sartre 522 
 
In this chapter we will see that the difference between having a purpose and 
serving a purpose is a meaningful one, and I argue that design is best characterized by the 
latter. Our examples in the last chapter found some design theory wanting, insofar as 
many assume purpose to be the defining characteristic of design. Now it remains to 
decide what sort of relationship obtains between design and purpose and to consider what 
benefit we stand to gain from our Deleuze-informed account. Finally, once we have 
established that intended purposes alone are not sufficient for understanding design, our 
project will conclude with new definitions for design and agencement wrought from the 
many authors and themes we have covered. 
BUCHANAN’S BUGBEAR 
The reach of our engagement with design and agencement has steadily grown, 
from archaeology and ceramics, to architecture and diagrams, to software and 
videogames, and now to the realm of evolutionary biology. In all cases—and we could 
continue, surely—we found design and agencement apt terms for describing salient 
                                                          
522 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. Carol Macomber, introduced by Annie Cohen-
Solal, with notes and preface by Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre, ed. John Kulka (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007), 21. 
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aspects of the same phenomena. This comes as no surprise, if we recall that among the 
cited reasons for agencement’s word choice was Guattari’s claim that it was “at once a 
notion poorer in comprehension than [Freud’s] complex and richer in extension.”523 We 
have seen Guattari’s reasons for wanting vocabulary flexible enough to accommodate the 
analysis of all sorts of things, but someone might worry that the term risks diluting its 
critical advantages by overextension and overapplication: someone like Ian Buchanan. 
Ian Buchanan was among those concerned over the decision to translate 
agencement as “assemblage,” and he cited two main reasons for his concern. First, he 
claims that assemblage fails to convey the relationship between agency and agencement 
that he takes to be central to the latter’s definition. Second, he worried that overextending 
assemblage such that it applies to any and everything would compromise the term’s 
critical value.524 The idea is that, if everything is an assemblage, nothing is an 
assemblage; it ceases to be an informative concept. Owing to what we have seen 
regarding agencement, the components of its definition(s) and the conceptual issues it 
concerns, nothing forbids us from applying it universally, pace Buchanan. His concern is 
valid only on condition that the concept refer to a distinct class of entity or a kind of 
object. As the course of this project has demonstrated, however, this is not the case: an 
agencement is not a thing but a perspective (a plan) of things. More to the point, it is a 
perspective of the perspectives of things (a plan of plans).  
When Buchanan says that agencement risks losing its “critical edge,” he likely 
                                                          
523 Félix Guattari, “1980 – Petites et grandes machines à inventer la vie: Entretien avec Robert Maggori,” in 
Les Années d’hiver: 1980-1985 (Paris: Bernard Barrault, 1986), 156. 
524 See Buchanan, 391.  
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means that the term’s value for analysis derives from leveraging its distinction from other 
terms. A general danger facing reductive explanations is that they lose their explanatory 
power by impoverishing the world, failing to take real differences into account. In this 
case we have nothing to worry about: a general theory of agencement does not risk 
winnowing the world down to a single account because, as we saw in the second chapter, 
it offers more than a single account. An agencement simultaneously characterizes 
heterogeneous plans—moreover, it implies simultaneous, heterogeneous accounts for 
how its heterogeneous plans coexist. What we call an agencement is both and equally an 
agencement of bodies and an agencement of statements, of content and expression; it can 
be described both and equally in terms of its organization and in terms of its consistency; 
it both forms a concrete diagram and expresses an abstract diagram. 
To demonstrate why looking at agencement as an approach rather than an as an 
entity would obviate Buchanan’s concern, recall our discussion of Hjelmslev’s linguistic 
framework. He proposes a method based on what Siertsema called a “heteroplane 
function,”525 and it applies universally to all linguistic systems, as well as to all non-
linguistic semiotic systems. Not only does this not result in Hjelmslev’s inability to attend 
to important differences between systems with any specificity, it is in fact precisely what 
allows him to attend to such differences. In other words, the differences separating 
semiotic systems does not pose a problem for Hjelmslev because the differences between 
systems and plans are precisely what his “heteroplane” framework was formulated to 
address. Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari arrive at agencement because it banks on the 
                                                          
525 Siertsema, 19.  
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heterogeneity of different plans. An agencement is a plan of plans—the sort of plan 
which makes something visible, which “allows us to see, sense, or think.”526 The “critical 
edge” of Hjelmslev’s perspective thus relies precisely on its universal application. 
Likewise, while one might worry that an extensive notion of design may 
impoverish its meaning, we have good reason to think of design, too, as a mode of 
considering form rather than as a distinct type of form. The archaeologist interested in 
ceramic design has several ways of understanding the word, design,” and each of her 
options offers a legitimate and complete account of the same artifact. She might attribute 
design to a form according to evidence of use or wear. She might read design based on 
the circumstances of its stratigraphic and non-stratigraphic contexts, or consult its design, 
otherwise understood, to reveal something about these contexts. She might define and 
classify ceramic designs according to the actual record of their endurance, transmission, 
and distribution—ever attentive to the statistical curve of their find frequencies. On the 
other hand, she can attend to the “inner” nature of the design, looking to its place in a 
morphological continuum and consider its possible as well as its actual use.  
If one insists on isolating design as a type of object, one is hard pressed to pin 
down a single candidate for what this object would be. This is well-attested in the work 
of architectural design group, Atelier. What are we calling the design? Is it an idea in the 
mind of the designer independent of any realized product (“This isn’t my design!”)? Is it 
the drawing—and if so, do we mean one sort of drawing in particular, or do we mean the 
entire collection of drawings? Perhaps “the design” refers to the model. In that case, 
                                                          
526 Lapoujade, 182.  
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ought we turn to one of the many sketch or concept models, or should we privilege the 
final presentation model? Maybe the architectural design qua object is simply the final 
building—but what about the landscape in which the building is situated? And so on. 
The difficulties compound. Atelier homes in on the “design thing” as a concept 
with material, social, and semiotic dimensions. Their account underscores how 
heterogeneous points of view and usages to which a design thing is amenable collectively 
fragment or stratify it. The “thing” is no longer a single entity; in their report of the 
design process, the “same” design object is incarnated in different representations that 
they call its “constituents.”527 
What is the villa designed by our architects and discussed by their 
customers? The villa is the object of the activity of the architects and of 
their interaction  with their customers, but people interact with it through 
different artifacts and representations.528 
 
Any view of the villa according to which it is an object—including the so-called 
“final product”—is but a partial view, a set of possibilities or affordances. Atelier claims 
to have shown that the design qua object does not “exist per se; [it exists] only through 
[its] several diverse constituents.”529 
Allowing design such comprehensive extension and interpreting it as an approach 
to things rather than as a type of thing brings us to a common thread in design’s treatment 
in the philosophy of technology and the philosophy of biology. To its broad extension 
one might object: nevertheless, are not some phenomena unsuited for the terms of 
                                                          
527 Atelier, 57.  
528 Ibidem. 
529 Ibid., 59.  
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design? What about biological forms, which by definition lack a designer and are 
different in kind from designed forms? To its distinction as an approach rather than as an 
entity one might object: is this not how function theory proceeds in the philosophy of 
technology and the philosophy of biology? There, “design” is a matter of how teleology 
figures into our descriptions of things; the controversy concerns the functions of things 
rather than the things themselves. 
The rest of this chapter will meet these objections by reviewing the concepts and 
controversies surrounding design and function in the philosophies of technology and 
biology. To preview our trajectory—if design is an approach to things rather than a kind 
of thing, then we will have better luck applying it as broadly and with as much flexibility 
as Guattari had demanded from the notion of agencement. There are a few areas of study, 
however, where design has not been warmly received, such as that of biology and 
Darwinian evolution. The reason for this is ostensibly because, since design is primarily 
defined by function, biological and artificial forms do not relate to their functions in the 
same way, barring any useful comparison between them. We will look at theories of 
function in general and then consult a few Dutch figures who write on technical 
functions, in particular, and specify use as crucial for understanding function. These 
Dutch figures will in each case understand artificial function as primarily “intentionalist,” 
which is precisely the point of contention with philosophers of biology: organisms aren’t 
designed machines and their development is not driven by any intention. In both cases, 
however, authors will limit their consideration of design to engineering. If this limitation 
is not warranted, then we might uncover further reasons for talking about biology in 
terms of design, since it will no longer require necessarily invoking intended or 
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intentional function. 
Through the course of this review we will identify frequent assumptions about 
design which stymy efforts at a comprehensive theory of design and which deserve much 
of the blame for the design’s discomfort in evolutionary biology. Our understanding of 
design will suggest a new way forward for which design and design analogies are well-
suited for biological description, and for which biology and biological analogies are well-
suited for thinking about non-biological design. Hopefully it will also suggest an 
opportunity to coordinate other biological concepts which do not otherwise fit together 
comfortably, a few of which themselves subject to some controversy.  
FUNCTION THEORY 
As part of the effort to ward off any unwanted teleological implication, some 
writing in the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of mind have turned to the 
concept of function to either to carefully distinguish artifacts from organisms or to isolate 
what they have in common. Discussions of function and functional analysis have endured 
as long as the philosophy of evolutionary biology itself. There is more than one way to 
summarize its history or classify the positions philosophers have taken, owing to the 
debate’s longevity as well as the number and enthusiasm of its participants. A basic 
review of the literature reveals two main approaches to function from the perspective of 
the philosophy of evolutionary biology: a systemic or causal-role analysis of function and 
an etiological analysis.530 
                                                          
530 Some might further divide the discussion among those who understand function, e.g., in terms of its 
contribution to the survivability of its bearer, or in terms of its bearer’s evolutionary inheritance. In my 
view these are variations of the etiological model’s basic premise. I recognize that this may put serious 
limits on my coverage; certain important distinctions and arguments are either lost or skewed. See for 
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The difference between the two outlooks is evident in how their proponents might 
interpret the following statement: the function of the epiphragm is to prevent snails from 
drying out during hibernation. As the name implies, a systemic view of function would 
entail understanding the snail as a system of components both anatomic and behavioral. 
The snail-system is complex; there are many capacities which we might attribute to it as a 
whole, among which is the snail’s capacity to maintain its moisture levels during dry 
spells. Explaining this capacity would absolutely require us to mention some of its 
components, while other components would be irrelevant to such an analysis. One such 
component is the epiphragm, a temporary structure of calcium or hardened mucus with 
which the land snail seals up its shell’s opening. It is in the context of the epiphragm’s 
role in the overall system’s capacity that we ascribe it a function.  
Such is Robert Cummins’s argument in his classic proposal of the model in his 
1975 “Functional Analysis.”531 The causal-role definition of function responds to two 
assumptions made of functional description: first, that its goal is to explain the presence 
of the thing described; second, that performing a function means to have certain effects 
on a system which help cause the system to perform or maintain certain actions. At best, 
these assumptions fail to identify what is distinctive about functional description, and at 
worst, they are to blame for the close alliance between functional explanation and 
teleology. He identifies several issues with both assumptions and the theories of function 
                                                          
example Ruth Millikan’s keen objection to Cummins’s systemic theory of function: she takes Cummins to 
task for failing to distinguish between “proper” and “accidental” functions, and this is because, among 
other reasons, the systemic model offers little (if any) criteria for what qualifies as relevant to the “system” 
in question. See Ruth G. Millikan, “Biofunctions: Two paradigms,” in Functions, eds. A. R. Cummins and 
M. Perlman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 113-43.  
531 Robert Cummins, “Functional Analysis,” in The Journal of Philosophy 72.200 (1975), 741-65. 
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which build on them, but for our purposes it suffices to say that they can lead function-
attributing statements like “The function of the eye is to see” to appear to say, “Eyes exist 
in order to see, or in order to help eye-containing organisms see.” 
Cummins proposes a model of functional analysis which aims for an explanation 
of an activity’s operation rather than an explanation for its presence. He claims that “to 
ascribe a function to something is to ascribe a capacity to it which is singled out by its 
role in an analysis of some capacity of a containing system.”532 In other words, following 
our example, the function of the eye is the capacity it has with a role to play in the causal 
account for the capacity of the larger eye-containing system for sight. Cummins offers the 
assembly line as a non-biological analogy: 
Production is broken down into a number of distinct tasks. Each point on 
the line is responsible for a certain task, and it is the function of the 
workers/machines at that point to complete that task. If the line has the 
capacity to produce the product, it has it in virtue of the fact that the 
workers/machines have the capacities to perform their designated tasks, 
and in virtue of the fact that when these tasks are performed in a certain 
organized way—according to a certain program—the finished product 
results.533 
 
In short, the systemic theory of function does not concern itself with the question, 
“How do you explain the presence of the snail’s epiphragm?” Cummins and philosophers 
like him are less concerned with such etiological questions than they are with explaining 
how a system exhibits the capacities that it does: “How do you explain the snail’s 
capacity to stay moist in times of drought?” 
Complaints about the teleological suggestion of functional description typically 
                                                          
532 Ibid., 765.  
533 Ibid., 760. 
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have in mind an etiological theory of function, such as that proposed by Larry Wright.534 
As the theory’s name suggests, authors like Wright see no issue in attributing etiological 
value to functional description; the issue is rather how functional etiology differs from 
other forms of etiology.535 He argues that the key distinction resides in the fact that 
functional etiology simultaneously presents function as both reason and as consequence: 
an organ is there because of its function and its function is a consequence of its being 
there. Wright explains: 
When we give a functional explanation of X by appeal to Z (“X does Z”), Z 
is always a consequence or result of X’s being there. […] So when we say 
that Z is the function of X, we are not only saying that X is there because it 
does Z, we are also saying that Z is (or happens as) a result or consequence 
of X’s being there. Not only is chlorophyll in plants because it allows them 
to perform photosynthesis, photosynthesis is a consequence of the 
chlorophyll’s being there.536 
 
Wright offers the most straight-forwardly etiological view; while major figures 
like Karen Neander and Ruth Millikan (to name but two) disagree with or seek to 
improve on aspects of Wright’s position, all etiological theories of function agree on the 
end of functional explanation: why is X there? Wright was careful on this point, but 
perhaps not careful enough. He notes that the phrase, “is there,” as in “X is there because 
it does Z,” “can only sometimes, but not usually, be rendered ‘exists (at all).’ So, contrary 
to many accounts, what is being explained, and what Z is the result of, can very often not 
                                                          
534 See Larry Wright, “Functions,” in The Philosophical Review 82.2 (April 1973), 139-68. It should be 
said, however, that although Wright’s essay is frequently cited as an important landmark in the debate over 
biological function, Wright himself had other ambitions. His intention was to explain function in general 
rather than to distinguish biological from non-biological functions. His place in the conversation thus 
warrants an asterisk.  
535 Ibid., 159-61. 
536 Ibid., 160. 
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be characterized as ‘that X exists’ simpliciter.”537  
When such a view narrows in on biological function, however, Wright’s defense 
is unsatisfactory; philosophers of biology and mind wanted clearer means for 
distinguishing “X is there” from “X exists simpliciter.” This lens is sufficient for 
understanding the different etiological theories of function. Neander understands “X is 
there” to mean that X is present as the product of natural selection, and its function is that 
of X’s effects which explains its selection.538 Millikan largely agrees but attaches her 
definition of function to “the history of an item […] rather than to the item’s present 
properties or dispositions.”539 Millikan reports the main difference to be that she is less 
interested in “conceptual analysis” than are Neander and Wright.540 We might instead 
argue that, although all three authors share etiological commitments and believe that 
functional explanation necessarily invokes the fact that “X is there,” Millikan stands apart 
for viewing function as the explanandum rather than explanans. For Wright and Neander, 
function Z is what explains the presence of feature X. For Millikan, we can explain the 
proper function Z of X by means of X’s history: X was produced or reproduced because it 
successfully performed Z; X’s evolutionary history requires us to interpret Z as X’s 
“proper function.” To gain further ground in distinguishing biological functions from the 
functions of artifacts, we now turn to authors who focus on the latter.  
                                                          
537 Ibid., 160n19. 
538 Karen Neander, “The teleological notion of function,” in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69.4 
(1991), 454-68. 
539 Ruth Garrett Millikan, “In Defense of Proper Functions,” in Philosophy of Science 56.2 (June 1989), 
288.  
540 Ibid., 290. Millikan also refers us to Chapter 9 of Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other 
Biological Categories (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984).  
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THE DUTCH STUDY OF DESIGN 
We will keep our eye on both theories of function since they will inform the 
discussions surrounding technical artifacts and evolutionary biology, and aspects of both 
will carry over into our own take on design. Over the past 20 years, a group of Dutch 
philosophers and theorists from Delft and Eindhoven have thrown their weight behind the 
effort to legitimize engineering and design as objects of philosophical study: the debate 
and collaborative efforts between Maarten Franssen, Pieter Vermaas, Wybo Houkes, 
Anthonie Meijers, Peter Kroes, and others offer fertile ground for thinking through the 
definition of design and the philosophical problems it raises. The hallmark of this vein of 
the literature on technical artifacts is its contrast with the enduring, influential theories of 
function which focus on the function of biological forms and only refer to artifacts 
insofar as these confirm or challenge the biological example under discussion. 
Philosophers have long complained that general and biological theories fail to consider 
the nature of artifacts in particular. Technical functions and non-biological design are 
taken for granted as a framing device for the philosophy of biology, or it is assumed that 
artifacts are more straightforward than biology and thus warrant less discussion.541 
In the fourth chapter, we saw that several of an object’s formal aspects often 
assumed to be incidental to the object’s design were in fact indissociable. Because 
                                                          
541 A definitive form of this complaint comes to us from Beth Preston, who has argued against two of the 
field’s biggest assumptions. First, she challenges the idea that “an adequate general theory of function can 
be arrived at without adverting to the functionality of artifacts” (Beth Preston, “Why is a Wing Like a 
Spoon? A Pluralist Theory of Function,” in The Journal of Philosophy 95.5 (May 1998), 216). While at 
first glance it seems counter-intuitive to her first point, in the face of recent interest in synthetic biology she 
challenges the clean separation between the artificial and the natural. Technology has not recently blurred 
the distinction: the line was blurred from the very beginning, going back at least as far as to the advent of 
agriculture. See Beth Preston, “Synthetic biology as red herring,” in Studies in the History and Philosophy 
of Science Part C 44.4b (December 2013), 649-59. 
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unintended, emergent forms of game play, glitches, bugs, and exploits are taken to be 
accidental rather than essential; they may be of practical interest to users and developers, 
but they run counter to or are beside the “point” of the design proper. Our review of these 
phenomena suggested that the very aspects which provided for “the design” were those 
responsible for its unintended consequences; while a definition of design cannot do 
without some reference to purpose, we cannot take for granted that it tells the whole 
story. In order to work toward a different relationship between design and purpose, we 
will consider how the use of design figures into its definition. Our engagement with the 
Dutch current of design philosophy will cover several positions which approximate 
aspects of our own findings thus far, but from which, I demonstrate, my view departs in 
crucial ways. In addition to clarifying my own position, reviewing their stances will help 
bring into focus the main problems and assumptions operative in the biological theory of 
function and the philosophy of biology’s references to design. 
THE LIMITS OF DUAL DESCRIPTION 
A good example of the Dutch influence on discussions of design and 
technology—and an influential model for the study of technical artifacts—comes to us 
from a 2006 special issue of Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science on the 
“dual nature of technical artifacts.”542 In their introduction to the issue Kroes and Meijers 
claim that technical artifacts are uniquely subject to a double distinction: on the one hand 
they are distinct from social artifacts because “the realization of their function crucially 
                                                          
542 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37.1 (March 2006). 
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depends on their physical structure,” while on the other hand, they are distinct from other 
physical objects because they are “intentionally produced and used by human beings to 
realize certain goals.”543 Taking their cues from Davidson, they argue that we ought to 
embrace the double description of artifacts as physical and as intentional. Rather than 
deciding whether artifacts are best understood as physical structures or as intentional 
functions, they propose a concept which “combines two fundamentally different ways of 
viewing our world”—the world of causally-related physical objects and the world of 
agents who interact with and represent it according to reasons and intentions.544 
Maarten Franssen takes issue with the dual-description model of design on the 
grounds that, if qualified, it can imply that “the character of an object as a particular sort 
of technical artifact is fixed.”545 Although he and I have different projects, Franssen’s 
commentary on the dual-description model confirms the advantages offered by the view 
of design we have been working toward. In their early account of the model, Kroes and 
Meijers claim that designed objects “can only be described adequately in a way that 
somehow combines the physical and intentional conceptualizations of the world.”546 
On first review this ought to feel familiar since our discussion of plans made a 
similar point: what some designers refer to as the form and function of design now 
express two distinct ways of conceptualizing the world; we can describe design first in 
                                                          
543 Peter Kroes and Anthonie Meijers, “The dual nature of technical artefacts,” in Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part A 37.1 (March 2006), 1.  
544 Ibid., 2.  
545 Maarten Franssen, “Design, Use, and the Physical and Intentional Aspects of Technical Artifacts,” in 
Philosophy and Design: From Engineering to Architecture, eds. Pieter E. Vermaas, Peter Kroes, Andrew 
Light, and Stephen A. Moor (New York: Springer, 2009), 21. 
546 Kroes and Meijers, 2.  
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terms of its formal dimensions in the physical world (or plan), and/or we can describe it 
in terms of its purpose or function in the intentional world (or plan). However, Kroes and 
Meijers exhibit the same shortcomings we encountered with Davidson’s anomalous 
monism. As Franssen points out, we need to go further if we want to account for design 
in its actual development and use: 
This may all seem straightforward, but what is not so straightforward is 
how these two aspects have to be brought into play, or what determines 
whether a description in which the physical and the intentional aspects 
have both been brought into play is “adequate,” or what an adequate 
description says about the artifact it describes.547 
 
Franssen follows up on two observations of design in order to specify why the 
relationship between physical and intentional descriptions is indeterminate and what the 
dual-description model fails to capture. First, the eventual design-user may attribute an 
intentional description to design which differs from that of its original designer. As a 
result, he finds it “unclear why the original designer should be given the right to 
determine” what a designed artifact “is for.”548 
If anyone puts a particular object, be it an artifact or a natural object, to 
use, this person becomes in a sense the designer of a system figuring the 
object. He or she discerns certain properties in the object—most probably 
on the original designer’s instruction, but that is not relevant for the point 
at issue, since it need not necessarily go like that—and then makes use of 
these properties to realize a particular outcome.549 
 
Franssen’s second point is thus that we ought to distinguish between what a 
design artifact is made for and what it is used for. We come to recognize that the 
                                                          
547 Franssen, “Design, Use,” 22. 
548 Ibid., 28. 
549 Ibid., 28-9. 
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conditions of a design’s construction are distinct from the conditions of its use. The chief 
contribution of scholars like Franssen is that they insist on use, in addition to 
construction, as an important factor for theoretical approaches to and definitions of 
design, regardless of where they come down on so-called intentionalism. Rather than 
characterizing design with intention in general, we have narrowed in on design’s use in 
particular, and an emphasis on use remedies both of the problems Franssen identified 
with the dual model: if use reigns, then an artifact’s intentional description is fixed only 
as long as a certain use endures; we can also specify more clearly when a dual account is 
adequate insofar as intentional and physical descriptions must be brought to bear with the 
artifact’s use.  
USE PLANS 
Wybo Houkes and Pieter Vermaas are other influential intentionalists who 
emphasize the use of design to disrupt assumptions that leave intentionalism vulnerable 
to criticism. Together and independently they have proposed a “use-plan analysis” of 
artifacts: the understanding of the design process as the construction and transmission of 
plans, defined as “orderings of considered actions, undertaken for achieving a goal.”550 
Design means the deliberate manipulations ordered in the sequence necessary for 
obtaining an intended result. Thus, for example, the Dutch tea drinker approaches a tea 
                                                          
550 Wybo Houkes, Pieter Vermaas, and Marc de Vries, “Design and use as plans: an action-theoretical 
account,” in Design Studies 23 (2002), 304. For the latest and most definitive account of their position, see 
Wybo Houkes and Pieter E. Vermaas, Technical Functions: On the Use and Design of Artefacts 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 18-21. See also Wybo Houkes, “Knowledge of artifact functions,” in Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Science 37 (2006), 102-113. Houkes and Vermaas, “Actions versus functions: 
a plea for an alternative metaphysics of artefacts,” in Monist 87 (2004), 52-71. Houkes and Vermaas, 
“Planning behavior: technical design as design of use plans,” in User Behavior and Technology 
Development, eds. P.P.C.C. Verbeek and A.F.L. Slob (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 203-10. 
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bag with a particular use plan in mind:  
1. Boil fresh, cold water. 
2. Pour the water in a tea pot. 
3. Suspend a tea bag in the pot. 
4. Wait. 
5. Remove the bag from the pot. 
6. Pour tea from the pot into a cup. 
7. Drink.551 
 
This is still an intentionalist view of design, but rather than privileging the 
original intent of a real or fictional designer, the authors put all intended uses of a tea bag 
on equal footing, regardless of whether such uses are unexpected or contrary to the 
producer’s wishes. Use-plan analysis has the advantage of demonstrating that our issue 
concerns a functionalism more than it does the role of intention. One need only recall one 
of Deleuze’s stated reasons for settling on the concept of agencement: it is a substitute for 
the study of “behavior,” and by redirecting our attention from discrete individuals to 
abstract and concrete conditions, this substitution is supposed to undermine a fixed 
nature-culture distinction.552 Such is the aim of this chapter, to sketch out a view of 
design that overcomes the nature-culture distinction that makes design a fraught term for 
biological morphology. As with behavior, a narrow focus on design’s function—be it 
intentionalist or anti-intentionalist, the producer’s intention or the user’s—is too discrete; 
defining design as use-plan construction is inadequate because, for example, the tea bag 
use-plan above offers no account for why the plan is or ought to be compatible with a 
given bag, kettle, water, and so on. One can submit the same object to different use-plans, 
                                                          
551 Houkes and Vermaas, Technical Functions, 19. One could draw a similar “use-plan” for the stone-
sucking machine in Anti-Oedipus. 
552 See Deleuze, “Eight Years,” 179/165. 
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and a very many different objects can satisfy the same use-plan.  
In short, we need the means to relate different use-plans, as well as design’s other 
plans. Design’s controversy in the philosophy of biology stems in part from a lack of 
imagination: one takes design to be strictly a consideration of function, and thus design 
metaphors can only lead us to compare organisms and artifacts on the basis of their 
respective functions. The preoccupation with function is not the only common 
assumption about design; as we turn our attention to the philosophy of evolutionary 
biology, let us take stock of other assumptions which limit the discussion but which will 
also inform our definition of design.    
WATCHMAKING WOES 
The famous opening to William Paley’s 1803 Natural Theology has been a 
centerpiece of discussion for centuries of debate over evolution, creationism, biological 
explanation, teleology, and biological morphology. The passage reads:  
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were 
asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that, for 
any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor would it 
perhaps be very easy to shew the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I 
had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be enquired how the 
watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer 
which I had before given, that, for any thing I knew, the watch might have 
always been there. […] When we come to inspect the watch, we perceive 
(what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed 
and put together for a purpose. […] the inference, we think, is inevitable; 
that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at 
some time and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed 
it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended 
its construction, and designed its use.553 
 
                                                          
553 William Paley, Natural Theology: Or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected 
from the Appearances of Nature (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-4.  
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Watches and watchmakers have been bothersome even to those who dispute 
Paley’s argument and are committed to Darwinian evolution. Although such thinkers 
would all agree that a divine watchmaker does not exist, there is some concern that the 
use of design metaphors—talking about organisms as if they were watches—may 
nevertheless smuggle in unwanted teleological implications. The question is over the role 
of design in biological description, how one ought to amend the original watchmaking 
analogy or else put it to rest.  
Some authors like John Reiss find the language of design “entirely unnecessary” 
for the purposes of evolutionary biology; Reiss laments that our ideas of natural selection 
and the role it plays in evolution “are often derived not from the mechanism of natural 
selection but only from the metaphor.”554 It stands to reason that relying on teleological 
metaphors results in a teleological understanding of evolution, so we had better throw out 
the metaphor to save ourselves the trouble. Such is Reiss’s argument in Not by Design—
he claims to overcome Paley’s watchmaker by recasting what an organism and watch 
have in common. Their connection lies not in their exhibiting design but in the fact that 
they both have conditions d’existence, a term that Reiss borrows from Georges Cuvier. 
Reiss writes: “If we observe that an organism exists, then it must be possible for it to 
exist, but this does not mean that it was designed to exist or that it had to exist.”555 
Michael Ruse readily admits that “the metaphor of design, with the organism as 
                                                          
554 John Reiss, Not by Design: Retiring Darwin’s Watchmaker (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2011), 4. Emphasis in the original. 
555 Ibid., 18. 
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artifact, is at the heart of Darwinian evolutionary biology.”556 For Ruse, however, this 
metaphor poses less difficulty than appearances or critics would suggest. This is precisely 
because it is a metaphor; in his argument, the “whole point about analogies and 
metaphors is that they work only because of differences, as well as similarities, between 
the original object and that being compared metaphorically.”557 One of Ruse’s examples 
is that of trilobite eyes: their complex, multi-lensed structure prevented spherical 
aberration, and their design was duplicated in “diagrams worked out by the seventeenth-
century physicists Descartes and Huygens,” a coincidence which is “no chance but 
evidence that something is afoot.”558 If this coincidence or evidence challenges our 
understanding of organisms, or instead our understanding of functional ends, so much the 
worse for our understanding. Rather than shying away from talk of purposes and ends, 
Ruse contends that this kind of reasoning is what sets biological understanding apart from 
other explanations of the world, and is thus something to be refined, accepted, and 
embraced.559 The expressed concern of evolutionary biological explanation is to tell us 
what purpose a given piece of biology serves, or why a given morphology serves the 
purposes that it does.  
Still, Richard Dawkins famously makes his case against the watchmaker 
                                                          
556 Michael Ruse, Darwin and Design: Does Evolution Have a Purpose? (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2003), 266. 
557 Ibid., 275. Emphasis in the original.  
558 Ibid., 266.  
559 Ibid., 268. On this point, see also Tim Lewens, Organisms and Artifacts (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004). 
“Biology is unique among the natural sciences in its use of a family of concepts that might seem better 
suited to the description and explanation of artifacts rather than the description and explanation of 
organisms” (1).  
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metaphor by way of Ruse’s same example, that of the evolution of the eye.560 Whereas 
Reiss favors ditching the watchmaker entirely, Dawkins’s criticism of the metaphor takes 
the form of an important corrective to Paley’s original imagery: 
A true watchmaker has foresight: he designs his cogs and springs, and 
plans their interconnections, with a future purpose in his mind’s eye. 
Natural selection, the blind unconscious, automatic process which Darwin 
discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for the existence 
and apparently purposeful form of all life, has no purpose in mind. It has 
no mind and no mind’s eye. It does not plan for the future. It has no 
vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be said to play the role of the 
watchmaker in nature, it is the blind watchmaker.561 
 
Whereas for Ruse the metaphor of design only implied some relationship between 
morphological structure and purpose or function, Dawkins specifies that watchmaking is 
characteristically driven by foresight, by the realized intentions of purposive agent; thus, 
like Reiss, he doubts any meaningful relationship between organisms and artifacts—
unless it is tongue-in-cheek. This appears to reflect the philosophy of evolutionary 
biology’s general disposition regarding design, as evidenced by the work of Daniel 
Nicholson.  
DESIGN BEYOND ENGINEERING 
Wary of unwittingly endorsing teleology, many writers express concern with the 
use of machine or artifact metaphors, what Nicholson calls the machine conception of the 
organism (MCO).562 The figure of the machine, of design, is alleged to be the latest 
                                                          
560 Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986). See pages 15-7 for 
Dawkins’s discussion of the eye in particular. 
561 Ibid., 5. 
562 While not a major voice in the literature, Nicholson’s work is useful for our purposes because it is 
emblematic of both old and new debates over design-in-biology. For the most part, he identifies his 
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avatar of mechanism; Nicholson laments that although mechanism “collapsed in physics 
following the quantum revolution of the early decades of the twentieth century, it 
somehow managed to survive in biology.”563 Nicholson’s preoccupation with mechanism 
and machines offers the purest form of the widest and most basic assumption made of 
design, that design “belongs to the domain of machines.”564 My issue with Nicholson’s 
work—again, serving only as an example—has less to do with the concept and history of 
mechanism in the philosophy of biology than it concerns his appeal to design. Despite his 
critique of “design” in biology, he devotes little to no attention to design as such. 
Nicholson cites a philosophical dictionary and takes its definition of design at face value: 
“the deliberate production of an object by an external agent so that it accomplishes a 
desired purpose.”565 Nicholson offers no further basis for his definition or for his choice 
of dictionary; nor does he cite a single designer or theorist of design outside the 
philosophy of biology, and thus he finds the major difference between organisms and 
                                                          
misgivings with recent talk of “reverse engineering” biology with historical misgivings over the place of 
“mechanism” in the philosophy of biology. Daniel Nicholson, “The Return of the Organism as a 
Fundamental Explanatory Concept in Biology,” in Philosophy Compass 9.5 (May 2014), 347-59. Daniel J. 
Nicholson and Richard Gawn, “Neither logical empiricism nor vitalism, but organicism: what the 
philosophy of biology was,” in History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 37.4 (December 2015), 345-81. 
For his full account of the MCO, see Daniel J. Nicholson, “Organisms ≠ Machines,” in Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44.4 (2013), 669-78; and “The machine conception 
of the organism in development and evolution: A critical analysis,” in Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences 48 (2014), 162-74. 
563 Daniel J. Nicholson, “Reconceptualizing the Organism: From Complex Machine to Flowing Stream,” in 
Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology, eds. Daniel J. Nicholson and John Dupré 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 140. See also Daniel J. Nicholson, “The concept of mechanism in 
biology,” in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43.1 (March 2012), 152-63. There 
Nicholson draws up three types of mechanism from past and present philosophy of biology, and he 
endeavors to distinguish between mechanism-as-causal-explanation from mechanism-as-machine-like, such 
that he can salvage the former from the latter for the purposes of biological explanation (153-6).  
564 Nicholson (2014), 169. 
565 Ibidem. He cites Mario Bunge, Philosophical Dictionary (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003).  
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machines to be that the latter are designed, because extrinsically motivated, whereas 
organisms are intrinsically determined.566 The sticking point of design metaphors is that 
“in machines functionality entails design, [while] in organisms it does not.”567 Nicholson 
claims that the idea of “‘design without a designer’ is not only deceptive—it is also 
logically contradictory: ‘design’ means made by a designer.”568 While he may have 
implored us to consider what design “actually means,” Nicholson offers no justification 
for accepting his definition of design, other than that it appears in a dictionary written for 
philosophers. Blind watchmakers or designs without designers are only logically 
contradictory if we accept the terms of Nicholson’s argument, which we are by no means 
compelled to do. His definition fails to obtain for most theoretical and practical accounts 
of design as a project, process, or as an object of use; it fails to account for the unintended 
and non-intentional aspects of design; in sum, it is such an exceedingly narrow 
understanding of design that it writes off any meaningful application to biology in 
advance.569  
In the end, many discussions of “design” in the philosophy of biology make the 
same assumptions about design as prominent design theorists, like Houkes and Vermaas, 
                                                          
566 Nicholson (2013), 671-3. 
567 Nicholson (2014), 169. 
568 Ibidem. 
569 Note, for example, how Nicholson compares machines/design (he sees these terms as synonymous) and 
biological organisms with regard to function: machines have functions, while organisms do not. In a 
footnote, he specifies that his understanding of “function” vis-à-vis long-running debates on the concept. 
The reader will notice that he, like many philosophers of biology, cites various special aspects, conditions, 
and sub-disciplines according to which this or that theory of function is rendered inadmissible for 
biological explanation. Design, on the other hand, is discussed en bloc. The etiological account of function, 
for example, “is too narrow to accommodate function-talk in areas of biology not directly concerned with 
historical explanation” (2013, 671n5). It is implied, by contrast, that all areas of design share the same 
concerns and are all equally suited to the same theory of function. 
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who tend to privilege engineering. It is unfortunately common for designers and theorists 
alike to treat a particular sort of design as paradigmatic for all design. Fields or aspects of 
design which do not conform to the consequences of such paradigms are either ignored or 
explained away as inconsequential exceptions to design’s standard definition. While 
Houkes and Vermaas have a lot going for their account of use-plans, for example, the 
limits they place on their discussion are the limits of its explanatory power. They tend to 
focus on design as a verb; they treat it as a deliberative process, while any use of “design” 
as a noun is taken to be nothing more than short hand for that process.570 In a way, this 
stacks the deck against any non-intentionalist understanding of design in advance: design 
is a deliberate process motivated by intentional use, and therefore one argues that design 
is defined by intention. On the face of it, our philosophers of biology appear to make the 
opposite assumption: they assume design more as a noun than as a verb. When 
comparing or contrasting biological “design” with the design of artifacts, one rarely has 
in mind the process of designing; one is more likely thinking of the relationship between 
a form and its intended function. Biological forms do not have intended functions, 
whereas design is defined by intended function.  
If the assumptions made by design theorists like Houkes and Vermaas, on the one 
hand, and philosophers of biology, on the other, disagree on whether design ought to be 
understood as a noun or as a verb, why do they arrive at similar conclusions about the 
role of intention in design’s definition? The answer lies in their choice of representative 
design—primarily, engineering and product design. A major gap in both sets of accounts 
                                                          
570 See some of Houkes and Vermaas’s titles: “Designing as the construction of use-plans,” etc. 
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is that there is no room for design in the fine arts. One is able to privilege function in the 
description of artifacts and to do so strictly in terms of use plans, only on condition that 
one rules out other kinds of design. What is the use plan of a painting? How does the 
design of a snail’s epiphragm compare to that of stage design or cinematography?  
Let us return to Franssen’s work for another example. By emphasizing design’s 
use, Franssen succeeds in allowing for design’s intentional descriptions to be 
indeterminate, and he challenges the standard dualism between physical and intentional 
description by distinguishing between what design is made-for and used-for. However, as 
Franssen himself admits, this requires him to limit his account to tangible artifacts. Non-
material artifacts—e.g. user experience design—and design in the fine arts are set aside 
for the sake of argument, likely because such examples are too immediately intolerable 
for dual-description design (as well as use-plan analysis). Franssen’s view also 
disqualifies the unintended waste or byproducts of designed material artifacts (be they the 
result of construction or of use), in what might qualify as circular reasoning.571 Again, my 
impression of the problem is that authors approach design with the intention of discussion 
intention. It is taken for granted that design primarily involves intention, and so they see 
it as their task to figure out how intention is involved, to what extent, and with regard to 
what aspects of the design or stages of the design process. And if we assume that design 
is primarily about intention, we have no reason to consider design’s waste or byproducts, 
since these are by definition unintentional. Including the fine arts also becomes a non-
starter since the language of artistic intention (a fortiori the “use” of art) is hard to 
                                                          
571 For his comments, see Franssen, 21-2.  
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reconcile with the intentional description of engineering design. One could read such 
authors as saying, “In order to understand how design is driven by intention, I have 
limited my study to the design of intentional objects, and on that basis, I conclude that 
design consists in its intentional description.” 
Philosophers make broad claims about whether design metaphors are fit to discuss 
biology—on the basis of very narrow considerations or varieties of design. Houkes and 
Vermaas purport to account for the design of artifacts but bracket any consideration of 
aesthetic or scientific artifacts for the sake of their argument.572 The subtitle for their 
major work is “On the Use and Design of Artefacts,” but they have in mind only the 
technical artefacts designed by engineers (and only in certain regards). The limits 
imposed on design by biologists are no better. In their review of the twenty year 
aftermath following Stephen Jay Gould’s spandrel argument (see below), Pigliucci and 
Kaplan rehearse a theme common to both the defense and critique of design in biology:  
Although a purely engineering approach is not informative because it fails 
to account for historical pathways, once we take enough of the organism’s 
basic developmental features into account, an analysis in terms of 
optimization theory can be revealing.573 
 
I do not dispute the fact that turning to optimization theory can be illuminating for 
understanding certain aspects of biological form, but the problem is that nearly all 
comparisons drawn between design and biology start and end with the “purely 
                                                          
572 Houkes and Vermaas, Technical Functions, 1.  
573 Massimo Pigliucci and Jonathan Kaplan, “The Fall and Rise of Dr. Pangloss: Adaptationism and the 
Spandrels Paper 20 Years Later,” in Trends in Ecology & Evolution 15.2 (2002), 67. It is unclear whether 
this comment is intended to defend the reference to design or to engineering design in particular. It’s 
certainly not the case that design (in general) “fails to account for historical pathways.” An expert appraiser 
on Antique’s Road Show is concerned with the function and inner workings of a design’s elements but by 
no means loses sight of its “historical pathways.” Quite the contrary! 
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engineering approach.” Tim Lewens, for example—just like Nicholson, Pigliucci, and 
Kaplan—makes this same assumption about artifacts and design: that design is, ideally or 
in actuality, the optimal solution to a design problem. This works well enough for 
engineering design, but it remains to be seen whether this assumption obtains for other 
forms of artifacts or design processes. Lewens writes, “In the artifact case we can think of 
the artifact which is produced, as that member of a set of candidate solutions that best 
balances the competing criteria of choice that are brought to bear by the artificer.”574  
Lewens is different insofar as he is willing to include aesthetic artifacts and fine arts 
design in his account, but his aesthetic examples are head-scratchers. To demonstrate the 
difference between competing accounts of how natural selection works, he describes an 
artist who always chooses pigments closest to her: the color schemes in her final products 
would be “naturally selected” by the pigments’ relative proximity.575 Such examples, it 
becomes apparent, are not intended to say anything about the nature of fine arts design 
and do not consult the work of actual designers and artists. Painting is entirely incidental 
to Lewens’s point.  
 At worst, non-engineering design is dismissed because its inclusion would pose a 
serious problem for these theoretical accounts of design and the relationship between 
design and biology. At best, the assumption appears to be that engineering design simply 
offers the most straightforward account of what characterizes design in general: design is 
the pursuit of the optimal solution to a given problem; design is defined and driven by its 
function, its intentional function; to design or analyze design is to consider the efficiency 
                                                          
574 Lewens, Organisms and Artifacts, 45.  
575 Ibid., 48.  
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with which it realizes its intended function. And so on. The question becomes whether 
these statements apply to the “design” of organisms—one compares the two on the basis 
of their respective functions and their functional optimization.  
OTHER BIOLOGICAL DESIGNS 
It bears mentioning, however, that not all philosophers of biology share these 
assumptions about design.576 Their approaches to design may give us the opportunity to 
revisit Paley’s watchmaker and rethink the value watchmaking can offer to the 
philosophy of biology. We should mention the work of François Jacob, Stephen Jay 
Gould, D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson, and Gregory Bateson. Like the other philosophers 
of biology we have seen, François Jacob and Stephen Jay Gould want to steer clear of 
teleological language in their approach to evolutionary biology. Unlike the others we 
have seen, though, Jacob and Gould do so not by avoiding design metaphors but by 
means of design metaphors, through the concept of “tinkering” [bricolage] and the 
architectural example of the spandrel, respectively.  
In an influential essay entitled “Evolution and Tinkering, Jacob rehearses many of 
the problems with thinking of biology in terms of engineering—whether that means 
                                                          
576 Although she is not yet as influential in the field, Sara Green’s work is another good example worth 
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thinking of natural selection as an engineer who develops biological forms for maximum 
efficiency or thinking of evolutionary biology as an analog for reverse engineering. The 
engineer is a poor candidate for representing natural selection first because she builds 
according to a pre-determined plan; second, the engineer works with material that has 
been prepared with her plan specifically in mind; third, if she is a good engineer, her 
products will be as perfectly designed as current technology allows.577 Instead of an 
engineer, Jacob likens the process of evolution to a tinkerer [un bricoleur]. A tinkerer 
makes do with whatever is on hand: “In contrast with the engineer’s tools, those of the 
tinkerer cannot be defined by a project. What these objects have in common is ‘it might 
well be of some use.’ For what? That depends on the opportunities.”578 
Others in the 20th century, like Stephen Jay Gould, objected to mainstream 
accounts of adaptation and called for a new synthesis in the theory of evolutionary 
biology. Design is an inconvenient metaphor for biology when adaptation is understood 
as a feat of engineering driven by efficiency; like Jacob, Gould swaps efficiency out for 
opportunity. Evolution becomes a primarily opportunistic process. Gould accused 
evolutionary psychologists and sociologists in particular of what call “Panglossianism.” 
The latter is a reference to a character from Voltaire’s Candide, Pangloss, for whom we 
live in the best of all possible worlds.579 This being the best of all possible worlds, it 
would stand to reason that everything which exists is the deliberate and carefully 
                                                          
577 François Jacob, “Evolution and Tinkering,” Science 196 (June 1977), 1163.  
578 Ibid., 1164.  
579 Obviously, Pangloss was intended to swipe at Leibniz. 
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prepared result of all cosmological history. According to Pangloss: “Things cannot be 
other than they are… Everything is made for the best purpose. Our noses were made to 
carry spectacles, so we have spectacles. Legs were clearly intended for breeches, and we 
wear them.”580 The Panglossian attitude was an example of what Gould and others called 
adaptationism. The adaptationist’s engineering-inspired approach to natural selection ran 
the risk of implying that morphological developments were predated by the functions or 
purposes to which they have been committed: e.g., seals needed to swim, and their limbs 
adapted to that function. 
Rather than as an engineer motivated by efficiency, evolution acts more as a 
tinkerer who makes use of any resources on hand based on what they afford in light of a 
new opportunity. This leads us to the concept of ex-aptation. Exaptation is a term that 
sparked controversy when Gould first introduced it but which has failed to gain traction 
in the literature since. Gould was indeed concerned over the teleological or quasi-
teleological language in adaptational explanations, but he was worried less about 
invoking the specter of creationism than about a gap in explanatory power.  
The “adaptationist programme,” for Gould, “proceeds by breaking an organism 
into unitary ‘traits’ and proposing an adaptive story for each considered separately. 
Trade-offs among competing selective demands exert the only brake upon perfection; 
non-optimality is thereby rendered as a result of adaptation as well.”581 His suggestion is 
                                                          
580 Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin, “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: 
A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme,” in Proceedings of the Royal Society of London: Series B, 
Biological Sciences 205.1161 (1979), 583.  
581 Ibid., 581.  
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to make more room for contingency in the course of natural history, developments which 
are contingent upon existing constraints, rather than harmonious purposes which beckon 
further development.582 Instead of analyzing organisms into single, adaptive traits, he 
suggests thinking of them as “integrated wholes, with Baupläne so constrained by 
phyletic heritage, pathways of development and general architecture that the constraints 
themselves become more interesting and more important in delimiting pathways of 
change than the selective force that may mediate change when it occurs.”583 He and his 
co-author, Richard Lewontin, offer a list of alternative ways to explain an organism’s 
trait in evolutionary terms:584 
1. No adaptation and no selection: the result of genetic drift. 
2. No adaptation and no selection per se: the trait was selected indirectly 
by its association with another, directly selected trait.585 
3. Selection without adaptation.586 
4. Adaptation without selection.587 
                                                          
582 Ibid., 582. Their oft-quoted architectural metaphor here is that of spandrels, decorated triangular spaces 
at intervals along the walls supporting a dome (the basilica of St. Mark’s in Venice, in this case). “The 
design is so elaborate, harmonious and purposeful that we are tempted to view it as the starting point of 
analysis, as the cause in some sense of the surrounding architecture. But this would invert the proper path 
of analysis” (582). One builds a dome and finds that spaces emerge as a by-product; these by-products are 
put to use and covered in mosaic, but they were not made “for” mosaic, just as the dome was not built “for” 
spandrels. Contingent developments arrive at functions which, in retrospect, appear necessary. Such 
appears to be Gould’s view. 
583 Ibid., 581. Also, Bauplan is the German term for “body-plan,” Cuvier’s plan d’organisation.  
584 I am summarizing Ibid., 590-3. 
585 Sometimes referred to as genetic draft. For example, cf. John H. Gillespie, “Genetic Drift in an Infinite 
Population: The Pseudohitchhiking Model,” in Genetics 155.2 (2000), 909-19 
586 Lewontin gives the example of a rapid increase in egg-laying that does not result in an increase in 
offspring. 
587 For example, the kind of phenotypic variation one finds with organisms with wide geographic 
distribution. 
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5. Adaptation and selection but no selective basis for differences among 
adaptations.588 
6. Adaptation and selection, but the adaptation is a “secondary 
utilization.” 
 
The last entry on the list of alternatives to “adaptationist” explanation, i.e. the 
selection of “secondary” utilizations, comes to be known as exaptation.589 Gould defines 
adaptation as “any feature that promotes fitness and was built by selection for its current 
role,” whereas an exaptations were “evolved for other usages (or no function at all), and 
later ‘co-opted’ for their current role.”590 Over the years he provided several examples of 
exaptation, but the one that has gotten the most traction in the literature is that of 
feathers.591 The fact that feathers have been discovered on the remains of non-avian 
dinosaurs incapable of flight suggests that they were originally developed and selected 
for purposes other than flight, that feathers offered resources well-suited for a new 
                                                          
588 “When ‘multiple adaptive peaks’ are occupied, we usually have no basis for asserting that one solution 
is better than another,” (Gould and Lewontin, “The Spandrels,” 591).  
589 Stephen Jay Gould and Elisabeth S. Vrba, “Exaptation—A Missing Term in the Science of Form,” in 
The Philosophy of Biology, eds. David L. Hull and Michael Ruse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
52-71. 
590 Ibid., 55. 
591 Another example is that of insect wings, first discussed by Kingsolver and Koehl (1985). In the words of 
one commentary on the issue: “Small proto-wings in insect-sized creatures provide no aerodynamic 
benefits, but are effective thermoregulators. Larger wings were selected to provide better thermoregulation, 
although beyond a certain size, increasing proto-wing size provides no further thermoregulatory benefit. 
However, the largest size that was selected for thermoregulation also happened to be aerodynamically 
effective”—from Fleming and Brandon, “Why Flying Dogs are Rare,” in Studies in the History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 49 (2015) 26. In Gould’s wake several, like Fleming and 
Brandon, have called for a more robust theory of contingency. At a certain size, wings “just happened” to 
be great thermoregulators and aerodynamic; but the thermoregulative function of panting is unlikely to 
make dogs more aerodynamic. “Flying dogs are rare,” and pure chance doesn’t offer a strong enough 
explanation as to why. This sort of problem occasions a live debate in the philosophy of evolutionary 
biology that, in the service of time, is not covered in this review: the question of so-called zero-force laws 
in biology. According to scholars like Fleming, Brandon, McShae, Rosenberg, and others, the contingency 
of pursuing one thermoregulating strategy over another can only be explained if selection is not the only 
determinant in biological change—if drift is the default state of biological existence, hence a zero-force 
law. 
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“opportunity,” as Jacob might have put it. Feathers did not evolve as adaptations for 
flight; flight became possible via the exaptation of dinosaur feathers.  
The concept of exaptation comes to occupy the place originally held by “pre-
adaptation” and addresses the old problems posed by that term; Gould acknowledges its 
necessity as the only Darwinian solution to Mivart’s old taunt that ‘incipient stages of 
useful structures’ could not function as the perfected forms do (what good is 5 per cent of 
a wing?).”592 Exaptation, as the repurposing of something which serves a purpose, helps 
Gould schematize the evolution of flight feathers in a way that sidesteps that problem. 
Feathers, a morphological development that aids in thermoregulation, are exapted for the 
purposes of flight. Perhaps feathers-as-thermoregulators are also the result of exaptation, 
derived from some prior form serving other purposes.593 At any rate, we get the following 
cycle between adaptation and exaptation (Figure 23).  
 
Adaptation 
→ 
Primary Exaptation 
→ 
Secondary Adaptation 
Thermoregulation Flight 
Morphological Changes to 
Enhance Flight 
Figure 23 – Adaptation/Exaptation cycle in the evolution of feathers 
                                                          
592 Gould and Vrba, 64. N.B. Bracketing whether “Mivart’s old taunt” holds water for the case of wings and 
aerodynamics, not everyone is convinced of this criticism against natural selection or adaptation. Richard 
Dawkins, for example, writes: “Vision that is 5 per cent as good as yours or mind is very much worth 
having in comparison with no vision at all. So is 1 per cent vision better than total blindness” (41). 
593 Some, like Daniel Dennett, have objected on grounds similar to this presentation that exaptation adds 
nothing to the conversation, that it is not distinct from how adaptation is already understood. I refer the 
reader to David Michael Buss, Martie G. Haselton, Todd K. Shackelford, A L Bleske, and Jerome C. 
Wakefield, “Adaptations, exaptations, and spandrels,” in The American Psychologist 53.5 (1998), 533-48. 
As the authors there rightly point out, exaptation does not have to be a unique process for it to be distinct 
from adaptation. Contra Dennett, the distinction is meaningful because it has explanatory power that 
adaptation lacks. Thus it is very well possible in the above feather example that the same step be legible as 
both adaptation and exaptation (depending on what other step one focuses on).  
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One could interpret Gould’s intervention along the same lines as that of D’Arcy 
Wentworth Thompson. In both cases there is an emphasis on form as distinct, albeit 
inseparable, from function, and form is said to influence function no less than function 
influences form. In order to obviate unwanted teleological implications, it is necessary for 
Gould that form be able to precede function, such that new functions can derive from or 
exapt prior morphological developments. Thompson’s On Growth and Form likewise 
marches under the banner of form, running counter to a reluctance to “compare the living 
with the dead”: when the zoologist sees the spiral form of a seashell, “he is prone of old 
habit to believe that after all it is something more than a spiral […] and that in this 
‘something more’ there lives what neither mathematics nor physics can explain.”594 
Rather than directed toward a final telos, the physicist employs abductive reasoning, like 
the Darwinian biologist, looking for antecedents.595 
What the “living and dead” share is form, the accretion and subsistence of 
particular shapes under particular conditions. In this account, form is presented as a 
“diagram of forces,” the forces which “have been impressed upon [an object] when its 
conformation was produced, together with those which enable it to retain its 
conformation.”596 As such, form is inextricable from a consideration of scale, direction, 
                                                          
594 Thompson, On Growth and Form, 3. 
595 Thompson claims that, although Darwin’s account of adaptation seems to demand the use of a 
teleological principle, teleological reasoning is “but one way, not the whole or the only way, by which we 
may seek to learn how things came to be” (6). 
596 Thompson, 16. See also his note on snowflakes, reminiscent of Johann Kepler’s short reflection on the 
same subject. Thompson, like Kepler, says that “[e]very snow-crystal tells […] the story of its own 
development” (411n2). See Johannes Kepler, The Six-Cornered Snowflake, trans. John Frederick Nims 
(Philadelphia: Paul Dry, 2014). Far beyond the scope of this review, it is interesting to note this 
presentation’s proximity to the framework of so-called “Neo-Confucianism.” Neo-Confucianism is the 
translation of 理学 [lixue] or “the study of principle.” Li, principle, derives from the lines and veins present 
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and magnitude—the form of an organism is necessarily a “function of growth,” an 
“‘event in space-time,’ and not merely a ‘configuration in space.’”597 An organism 
visibly, morphologically renders the history of its species’ development, the history of its 
own development, as well as the lines of force impressing upon it in its milieu. 
As a result, we have three perspectives which see biological form as analogous to 
design but which are not thereby committed to any quasi-creationist teleology, since they 
do not limit their understanding of design to that of optimally efficient engineering. Jacob 
likened the evolutionary process to the work of a tinkerer who makes do with whatever 
resources she has on hand, taking advantages on their affordances for new opportunities. 
Gould’s intervention into “Panglossian” attitudes toward adaptation focuses on the 
example of architectural spandrels, structural by-products which have been exapted for 
new aesthetic purposes. And if Thompson’s physicist sometimes sounds like an engineer, 
his engineering example is only useful for the role that abductive reasoning plays in 
assessing both biological forms and engineered structures.  
All of this brings us back to William Paley, to the watch we find in the heath and 
presume to be the product of an intelligent watchmaker. The fraught nature of the 
watchmaker analogy requires that we limit the ways in which watches and organisms can 
be analogous (or not). The design of a watch is made with an intended function in mind, 
and its form bears a necessary relationship to its function. Thus, there is no comparison to 
be drawn between watchmaking and Darwinian evolution, since the latter is not 
                                                          
in jade that inform a cutter where and how to carve. As such, in the context of Neo-Confucian metaphysics, 
principle explains both the law of something’s development as well as the rule to which it must conform. 
597 Thompson, 283. This passage, and the chapter it comes from, demonstrates the extent to which growth 
and form must be thought together for Thompson, as suggested by his title. 
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intentional and its forms are not preceded by their functions. So the story goes. But there 
may be other comparisons to be drawn with watchmaking, and there are limits to how 
well that story applies even to non-biological design. As one biologist puts it, “it is not 
clear how even real intentions and real plans explain the emergence of good design. It is 
certainly not enough to explain how an excellent watch comes into existence to say that 
the designer intended to make an artifact that would tell time.”598 We recall a similar 
comment from design historian, Adrian Forty, vis à vis functionalist understanding of 
design. If all there is to say about the emergence of new design is that the form of design 
is defined and driven by its function, why did the Montgomery Ward catalogue offer so 
many different pocket knives? Could the “131 different designs of pocket knife be said to 
be the result of the discovery of new ways of cutting?”599 Thus, we might benefit not only 
from adjusting our understanding of design with regard to biology but also with regard to 
design itself.  
AFFORDANCE INSTEAD OF ESSENCE 
What other conclusion can be drawn from a watch, if not that its form is an 
efficient means for fulfilling its function of telling time? Martin Carrier presents a curious 
account that bears a striking resemblance to our portrait of Deleuze’s philosophy, with 
heterogeneous plans stratifying the same substance.600 If we consider the watch’s 
                                                          
598 Lewens, 160.  
599 Forty, 93.  
600 Martin Carrier, “Multiplicity and Heterogeneity: On the Relations between Functions and Their 
Realizations,” in Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 31 (2000), 179-
191. 
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technical function—that of telling time—we notice that there are many means and 
methods for realizing the same function: sundials, hourglasses, water clocks, atomic 
clocks, mechanical clocks, etc. In each case, the affordance of measuring time appears 
inherent to the form of the timepiece.601 This is precisely what Carrier picks up on: 
despite all sharing the same basic affordance, some of these forms are heterogeneous; 
they “do not share a significant feature on the physico-chemical level.”602 Different forms 
afford the same function. What’s more, though, is that Carrier makes the same 
observation from the other direction. The  same object “may fulfill diverse functions 
under the same conditions,” diverse functions that are, again, heterogeneous or “do not 
share a significant feature on the functional level.”603 He concludes that “the laws 
corresponding to the physico-chemical and the functional level, respectively cannot be 
smoothly integrated into the conceptual framework of the other level.”604 Rather than 
suggesting that one should abandon either physical or functional accounts of phenomena, 
be they biological or otherwise, this two-way heterogeneity motivates the requirement to 
think both frameworks in conjunction.  
We wanted to show that design was broad and flexible enough to accommodate as 
many phenomena and at as many different scales as agencement was capable of in the 
                                                          
601 Carrier puts this in terms of nomic properties, those ascribed by a law to collect objects into natural 
kinds. Carrier writes, “[A]ll battered cars attract every other body by the force of gravitation. But they don’t 
exert this force in virtue of being battered cars but in virtue of being massive bodies” (181). Hence, being 
battered is a non-nomic property. I find the concept of affordance more compelling in that its focus is on 
the object itself, as well as on the vast range of virtual functions which are only actualized in relation to an 
agent in a context. Nomic properties, as their name suggests, depend on laws under which an object may be 
appropriately subsumed. 
602 Ibid., 183.  
603 Ibid., 183-4.  
604 Ibid., 190.  
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hands of Guattari and Deleuze. The terms of design are hotly contested in biology, for 
example, but we find that a lot of this has to do with the assumptions that frame and limit 
discussions of design on the part of design theorists and biologists alike. If we no longer 
limit ourselves to engineering and no longer think of efficiency or intentional function as 
design’s only defining characteristics, we make room for other ways to bring design to 
bear on organisms. At the heart of Carrier’s observations—and implied by the work of 
Jacob, Gould, and Thompson—is a concept familiar to us by now: affordance.  
Now, the other, prevailing approach to design is what we might call essentialist or 
functionalist: the idea that design is defined by its being “meant for” a certain purpose. 
Under that view, one would be hard pressed to explain the sorts of unintended, emergent, 
and sometimes contradictory effects of design we discussed in the previous chapter. One 
might consider these effects as really distinct from the design itself, or dismiss them as 
consequences of poor design: surely, all unintended consequences could be prevented 
with better planning and design practices! The problem, however, is that unintended 
design effects are afforded by the very same parameters that afford intended design 
effects. The same engine responsible for cooling a building’s interior is to blame for 
warming its exterior. Naomi Campbell was able to throw a phone at her assistant because 
the dimensions suitable for making phones portable also render it projectile. It is tempting 
to think that better design practice could account for the unintended, but this overlooks 
the fact that such effects can emerge much later in the presence of new circumstances, 
new “opportunities.” It is not reasonable to expect the designer of the floppy disk to 
foresee future software trends which borrow its image as a skeuomorphic icon for 
“saving” document files, partly because the floppy disk itself contributes to the 
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circumstances under which it will later be repurposed.  
I propose that affordance offers a better alternative to such an essentialist 
perspective. In the first place, it has the advantage of accommodating both intentional and 
non-intentional views of design. My goal is not to suggest that design never involves 
intended purposes and functions; rather, I propose that something like affordance ought 
to be more central to design’s definition since it covers more ground by accounting for 
unintended design consequences in ways that “essence” cannot. Consider Houkes and 
Vermaas, committed intentionalist design theorists. While I use a tea bag according to the 
series of activities which make up its use-plan, according to my intentions and to the 
intentions of tea bag manufacturers, its use is afforded by the tea bag itself: “the physical 
structure of […] ordinary tea bags (i.e. not those filled with nitroglycerine) simply 
make[s] it impossible to use them effectively for ramming a storefront.”605 
Enter Carrier’s almost-Deleuzian observations. Function and physico-chemical 
structure belong to heterogeneous plans. The same function can be realized by multiple, 
sometimes heterogeneous structures—but not just any structure will do. Structure can 
realize multiple, sometimes heterogeneous functions—but it won’t fulfill just any 
function. Design is an account of affordance: there is something about function x that 
lends itself to be realized by certain structures and not others; there is something about 
structure y that affords certain functions but not others. According to Gould, feathers 
developed as thermoregulators but “incidentally” (according to a perspective which 
privileges them as thermoregulators) afforded the rudiments of flight. The process of 
                                                          
605 Houkes and Vermaas, Technical Functions, 7.  
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exaptation is precisely that of realizing the affordances which forms already harbor. As 
Jacob put it, it means that new affordances come to light in view of new opportunities, 
even though one is working with the same resources one had before.  
Design tells the story of affordances, of how particular uses meet up with 
particular forms, of why affordances do or do not come to light, of heterogeneous plans 
which commutate, bolster each other, and cause each other to drift away (to new uses, 
new purposes, to destruction, reinvention, or obsolescence). Gregory Bateson, again, 
offers a good example for how this point of view applies to the realm of evolutionary 
biology and its account of adaptation; we need only interpret him broadly such that what 
he says about biology applies equally to non-biological design. 
In his theory of evolutionary morphogenesis, Bateson identifies three levels or 
types of change at issue in biological evolution: change in genotype, morphological or 
somatic change, and environmental change.606 Traits are not selected, for Bateson, by 
meeting specific genotypic or phenotypic criteria; rather, genotypic changes are more 
likely to aid an organism in survival, or in coping with environmental changes, if 
resulting phenotypic developments are flexible or variable enough to meet new (future) 
demands. The criterion for survival is not simply fitness to a given environment, since a 
                                                          
606 Gregory Bateson, “The Role of Somatic Change in Evolution,” in Steps to an Ecology of Mind: 
Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology (London: Jason Aronson, 
1987), 346. 45 years later, philosophers of biology agree that changes in the environment play as much of a 
role in adaptation and selection as do genotypic or phenotypic changes. The specific form this insight takes 
in current literature appears under the rubric of “environmental heterogeneity”: the diversity, density, and 
distribution of different species or physical formations in a given space. See Riin Tamme et al, 
“Environmental heterogeneity, species diversity and co-existence at different spatial scales,” in Journal of 
Vegetation Science 21.4 (August 2010), 796-801; Zhiyong Yang et al, “The effect of environmental 
heterogeneity on species richness depends on community position along the environmental gradient,” in 
Scientific Reports 5 (2015); Anke Stein et al, “Environmental heterogeneity as a universal driver of species 
richness across taxa, biomes and spatial scales,” in Ecology Letters 17.7 (July 2014), 866-80. 
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change in environment would “select” for those organisms highly adapted to previous 
conditions. Bateson thinks of “both genotypic and environmental changes in terms of the 
price which they exact on the flexibility of the somatic system.”607 Adaptation alone 
offers an insufficient account. In light of what he calls an “economy of flexibility,” we 
can talk about mutations in terms of their survival value “because it increases the overall 
flexibility of the organism, enabling [it] to survive other demands.”608 The organisms 
which survive are those with enough “left over” to meet new, unforeseen demands, those 
which are adaptable and not simply well-adapted.609 
CONCLUSION: DESIGN AND AGENCEMENT 
We wanted to find new terms with which to describe Deleuze’s philosophy, since 
there were some issues with translating agencement—an important concept in his and 
Guattari’s later work—as “assemblage.” Our search made significant progress toward 
fulfilling the promise which concluded the first chapter. We hoped that the concept of 
design would be flexible and extensive enough to match Guattari’s ambition for 
agencement, and that through the lens of agencement we might be able to bring together 
                                                          
607 Bateson, 349.  
608 Ibid., 353.  
609 Gould and Vrba make a strikingly similar case: “the enormous pool of non-aptations must be the 
wellspring and reservoir of most evolutionary flexibility. We need to recognize the central role of ‘co-
optability for fitness’ as the primary evolutionary significance of ubiquitous non-aptation in organisms. In 
this sense, and at its level of the phenotype, this non-aptive pool is an analogue of mutation—a source of 
raw material for further selection” (65). Bateson’s left-overs lead him to describe a similar situation to what 
we uncovered at the end of Chapter Four. Because an agencement or design comprises heterogeneous 
plans, an event under one consideration or plan will ultimately have consequences under different 
considerations or plans: the same force that causes an agencement to dig in its heels and establish itself can 
cause it to drift off and behave in unexpected ways. Bateson describes this as a “lag” between control 
systems—since his is a cybernetic account of evolution, after all. He discusses the importance of the higher 
control system, that of genotypic variation, lagging behind “the event sequences in the peripheral” system 
of somatic changes in response to external changes in the environment (355).  
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disparate fields and theories into a more comprehensive treatment of design than is 
typical in the literature. Although a fully developed theory of design would require more 
work, both of these initial hopes have been realized by the wide net we have cast over 
much of Deleuze’s career, his influences and interlocutors, different periods in the history 
of philosophy, different fields of study, and over different areas and understandings of 
design. In working toward a better understanding of Deleuze’s philosophy, I hope to have 
at least suggested a comprehensive theory of design, one equally equipped to describe 
biological morphogenesis, skeuomorphic ceramics, videogame sequence-breakers, and 
architectural diagrams.  
At every turn, we found the idea of agencement marked by heterogeneity and the 
problem(s) of consistency, or continuity. Even at the level of its etymology, we similarly 
found “design” to be ambivalent, and this decisive ambivalence is reflected in our 
common reference to design and is valuable for understanding agencement’s 
ambivalence. We found that an agencement can be described both and equally as a 
dessein (plan d’organisation) and as a dessin (plan de consistence), two French terms 
related to English “design” and which share its root in Italian Renaissance painting: the 
disegno is both the image that I hope to manifest on the canvas and the image that 
actually appears on the canvas; it’s what these two images have in common. The 
“dreamlike” mediation between a landscape and the painting of a landscape is what 
Peirce called a diagram, yet another ambivalent term closely bound up with the definition 
of agencement.  
An agencement holds heterogeneous plans together in a certain way; it has a 
consistent consistency. Despite their discontinuity, these plans share a diagrammatic 
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continuity—in the second chapter, we called this internal consistency. Concrete 
agencements may hold together in the same way as, or have a diagrammatic affinity for, 
other agencements, with an external milieu—we called this external consistency. Hot on 
the trail of agencement’s definition, we realized that on the one hand it had to name 
something enduring—if not an identity, then at least a quiddity. In the case of Guattari’s 
key-making, we find something repeated (or diagrammatically resonant, as he might put 
it) in the key, in the ink and brush which traces its outline, and in the clay that forms its 
mold: something with which mashed potatoes are incompatible. On the other hand, we 
couldn’t let this something harden into an eternal essence; it needed to be open to new 
encounters—to be reproduced, to drift off into a new “becoming,” or to collapse and 
dissolve.  
As Guattari’s own examples suggest—duplicating a key, reading the blueprints 
for a Concord aircraft—design has been an effective arena for meeting these 
requirements as we pursued our new agencement-amenable vocabulary. Things come to a 
point in the concept of affordance. Recall that agencement was, in part, intended as a 
substitute for Deleuze and Guattari’s previous references to “machines.” Affordance is 
well-fitted for the mode of analysis they claimed a machinic philosophy entailed: 
Given a certain effect, what machine is capable of producing it? And 
given a certain machine, what can it be used for? Can we possibly guess, 
for instance, what a knife rest is used for if all we are given is a 
geometrical description of it?610 
 
In a few sentences, they address the benchmarks of our project: different plans are 
brought together despite their heterogeneity; analyzing the knife rest’s design 
                                                          
610 Deleuze and Guattari, AO, 3/8.  
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discretely—in isolation or with regard to only one plan (that of geometry)—will not do, 
since what counts is its commutative relationship with other plans, the conditions under 
which its form affords certain activities and not others, or the conditions under which 
some affordances come to light while others do not.  
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